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MOTIVATION FOR THIS RESEARCH 
This PhD thesis consists of three essays which are interlinked by two themes – the 
problem of risk and information asymmetry in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
carried out by UK investors. Majority of empirical research in finance, and in particular 
in mergers and acquisitions focuses on the US outward investments. However, UK 
investors are the second most active when it comes to international acquisitions. The 
country’s physical proximity to continental Europe and common legal system make UK 
transactions a particularly interesting dataset.  
In the first essay we try to understand how UK investors decide in which country to 
invest. We investigate in which cases increased level of risk and higher information 
asymmetry are desired by UK investors and find that higher corporate governance 
standards, more stringent accounting standards and strong creditor and shareholder 
protection deter investors. Legal system seems to be of no statistical significance 
indicating that the law of the host country does not fully reflect the level of such 
standards, while lack of significance of media coverage indicates that investors are not 
concerned about the public scrutiny. 
The second paper looks at how increased risk and information asymmetry impact the 
likelihood of using a contingent payout agreement and if investors always will use this 
method to reduce the risk of overpaying for the target. The evidence shows that deal-
specific features reflecting higher asymmetry of information and risk increase the 
chances of using an earnout contract. However, cross-border transactions do not involve 
earnout contracts more often than the domestic ones which is most likely due to 
potential enforcement issues resulting from different legal systems. 
 3 
 
The last chapter of this thesis looks at the ways in which the acquirer can structure the 
transaction to reduce the risk that the offer will be rejected. Our results stress the 
importance of bilateral negotiations. Although the size of the premium is significant, its 
importance is fairly negligible when compared with the impact of hostile transactions, 
competing bids and the inclusions of a termination fee. From the above we can infer 
that carefully planned bilateral negotiations leading to a high premium would maximise 
the chances of deal completion. 
Recapitulating, in this collection of essays we try to answer the questions of how risk 
and information asymmetry influence UK investors‘ decision where to invest, how to 
pay for the target and whom and how to acquire in order to maximise the chances that 
the transaction will be successfully finalised.  
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ABSTRACT 
Only in 2012 the value of M&A transactions in the UK and Ireland accounted for 
almost 22% of the total European M&A (Mergermarket, 2013). More than half of this 
amount can be attributed to cross-border outbound investments. Given, the above we 
decided to study how corporate governance of the host country influences investors’ 
choices where to invest. “At a general level corporate governance can be described as a 
problem involving an agent – the CEO of the corporation – and multiple principals – the 
shareholders, creditors, suppliers, clients, employees, and other parties with whom the 
CEO engages in business on behalf of the corporation” (Becht et al., 2002, p. 8). 
Despite the benefits of good corporate governance standards, we put forward that 
investors will be more inclined to take over companies in countries which enable them 
to extract additional benefits from their investments. The pillars on which corporate 
governance is based include Shareholder Protection, Legal System, Ownership 
Concentration, Creditor Rights and Accounting Standards. Furthermore, we extend the 
usual definition of corporate governance to include insider trading and other 
media/analyst coverage. The inclusion of the first additional variable is motivated by 
our belief that insider trading is a pivotal violation of good corporate governance 
whereas media can help lower the cost of information acquisition and act as corporate 
monitors. We study cross-border takeovers by UK acquirers which took place between 
1993 and 2012 and where there was a change of control in the foreign target. The 
number of host-countries is reduced to 48 which were initially analysed by La Porta et 
al. (1998). The values of the transactions for a given year and a given country are 
summed together and divided by the value of all outbound UK acquisitions in a given 
year to get a percentage of UK funds attracted by every country every year. Our sample 
includes 960 country-year observations. We regress the independent variable computed 
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as described above on different measures of corporate governance, using a fractional 
logit model, as advised by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).  
Based on the results of our analysis we conclude that higher corporate governance 
standards reflected in lower ownership concentration, more stringent accounting 
standards and strong creditor and shareholder protection deter investors. Legal system is 
of no statistical significance indicating that the law of the host country does not fully 
reflect the level of such standards. The same result was obtained for media coverage, 
indicating that investors are either not concerned about the public scrutiny or they do 
not require the information provided by the journalists while the opposite is true for 
analyst coverage. However, this result suffers from a potential problem of causality 
identification. Lastly, investors do not seem to benefit from the introduction and/or 
enforcement of insider trading regulation. This might be due to the fact that such laws 
do not necessarily impact the financial markets as predicted in the extant literature.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. M&A TRENDS  
Researchers believe that cross-border acquisitions generate significant synergies and 
help to rapidly grow the business in a foreign country (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). 
Statistics show that managers from all over the world seem to agree with this notion. 
The most recent data provided by the United Nations on foreign direct investment 
shows that cross-border M&A has accounted for 29% of FDI inflows but this 
percentage is still significantly below the pre-crisis average of 47% (WIR, 2015). The 
worldwide flow of funds has been growing at a staggering rate. Between 1990 and 2014 
the level of global foreign direct investment increased 4 times and the same magnitude 
of change has been observed in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (WIR, 2015). 
Only in 2012, the UK and Ireland accounted for almost 22% of the European M&A 
activity by value of completed deals (Mergermarket, 2013). More than half of this 
amount can be attributed to cross-border outbound investments. Looking at our data on 
transactions carried out by UK acquirers in the last twenty years, we can see that the 
most popular foreign target country destination is the USA which obtained around one-
third of UK funds, followed by Germany and France with approximately 9% each. 
Australia and Sweden close the list of top five most popular locations for cross-border 
acquisitions. Given the increased levels of globalisation and the growing importance of 
acquisitions of foreign targets, this paper analyses how national-level corporate 
governance impacts the attractiveness of a particular country against other potential host 
nations. In order to do so, we look at various definitions of corporate governance and 
investigate the importance of introduction of such standards for investors.   
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1.2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
“At a general level corporate governance can be described as a problem involving an 
agent – the CEO of the corporation – and multiple principals – the shareholders, 
creditors, suppliers, clients, employees, and other parties with whom the CEO engages 
in business on behalf of the corporation” (Becht et al., 2002, p. 8). Financial literature 
particularly focuses on the principal-agent problem. It looks at the difficulty of ensuring 
that the CEOs work towards achieving Pareto efficiency which in most financial 
frameworks is defined as shareholder value maximisation. This goes back to the idea 
that a firm is effectively a nexus of contracting relationships between all the 
stakeholders but only shareholders have a claim on residual returns (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and therefore “all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group with the corporation, whether derived 
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the 
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appear” (Berle, 1931, p. 1049). 
Jensen (1986, 1989) proposed to solve the problem by leveraging the firm as much as 
possible and thereby limiting the management’s discretion when it comes to the 
allocation of free cash flows. However, despite the aforementioned advantages, 
potential costs of financial distress are high, hence companies have to finance their 
activities by issuing equity (Myers 1977). Given the need for the existence of stock in 
the capital structure and the fact that the level of protection of shareholders is lower than 
of other parties (Williamson, 1984, 1985), there is a strong need for corporate 
governance, especially when free-market mechanisms such as reputation building are 
not attainable (Kreps, 1990; Diamond, 1989).  
The literature provides a number of ways in which one can improve corporate 
governance. It has been proposed that one way of achieving this is through carefully 
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designed contracts. However, such agreements are most often incomplete and therefore 
do not assure that the shareholder value is maximised. This is because the parties may 
be unable to specify in the contract all the possible contingencies in sufficient detail, 
which would allow enforcement of such an agreement by third parties (courts), or may 
create contracts whose conditions are impossible to verify (Hart and Moore, 1988). 
Additionally, CEOs or the shareholders are likely to create an inefficient contract if all 
the stakeholders involved are not present during negotiations of such an agreement, or 
even when this is achieved parties may amend the terms of the contract in their favour at 
a later point in time (Becht et al., 2002). Changes are particularly likely when the 
shareholders are not active at monitoring the company because they own only a small 
stake (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, a poorly designed compensation 
package may incentivise risk-taking or even lead to the expropriation of shareholders, as 
many performance criteria such as stock price or sales volumes can be manipulated 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2005; Bebchuk et al., 2001, 2002). 
Consequently, other solutions to the principal-agent problem have been proposed and 
these include the introduction of the board of directors, or legal enforcement of duties 
but the above may also pose some difficulties during their implementation. For 
example, a very important question with regard to the introduction of the board of 
directors is who monitors the monitor and how do we assure there is no collusion 
between the board and the management. The existing empirical literature on the effect 
of independent boards of directors is rather mixed (see for example, Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Managers can also limit the negative implications of enforcement of 
fiduciary duties by taking out insurance, whereas court proceedings in general tend to be 
quite costly for the shareholders (Becht et al., 2002) and this may discourage them from 
taking legal action.  
 
 
12 
Generally, it has been pointed out that “the core purpose of corporate governance is to 
build long-term sustainable growth in corporate and shareholder value” (Lipton and 
Nussbaum, 2012, p. 3). When looking at shareholder protection it has to be kept in mind 
that such rules should also take into account potential expropriation of minority 
shareholders which can arise when large shareholders decide to collude with the 
management. Hence, for the regulation to be effective it has to reach the optimal trade-
off between managerial discretion and protection of small investors. However, high 
levels of corporate governance are not always sought after by international investors, as 
those limit the potential for extraction of private benefits, in many cases having a 
substantial effect on the amount of capital being attracted by a given country. As a 
result, we put forward that the level of corporate governance can have a significant 
impact on the direction of the flow of funds in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
and this forms a basis for our research motivation.  
1.3. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Building on this assumption we chose to investigate how different corporate governance 
features affect the acquirer’s decision regarding the location of the target to be acquired. 
We put forward that investors will be more inclined to take over companies in countries 
which enable them to extract additional benefits from their investments. Our definition 
of corporate governance includes eight dimensions: 1) Legal System, 2) Ownership 
Concentration, 3) Shareholder Protection, 4) Creditor Protection, 5) Accounting 
Standards, 6) Insider Trading, and 7) Media and 8) Analyst Coverage. The legal system 
indicates whether a given country focuses more on protecting shareholders or 
stakeholder, whereas ownership concentration provides us with an insight into the level 
of proactive monitoring and the potential problem of free-riding in case of an 
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acquisition. Protection of shareholders and creditors reflects the ease of expropriation of 
minority shareholders and debtholders, respectively. Increased transparency resulting 
from accounting standards, strong regulation of insider trading and thorough media 
coverage may act as a deterrent to investors who may prefer to have more discretion 
with regard to their investments, thus not wishing to disclose too much information and 
thereby making themselves subject to public scrutiny. However, we recognise that 
better accounting standards and analyst coverage facilitate cheaper acquisition of 
information about potential takeover targets. Overall, we propose that countries with 
lower level of corporate governance will attract more funds as they offer the possibility 
of extraction of additional benefits also through greater asymmetry of information. We 
hope that our analysis can provide a better understanding of choices made by investors 
regarding where they decide to pursue acquisitions. Furthermore, we wish to draw some 
conclusions concerning potential regulatory changes which can make countries more 
attractive to investors looking to acquire foreign targets. 
1.4. METHODOLOGY REVIEW 
Without doubt the spectrum of corporate governance literature is quite extensive, 
however for the purpose of this research we analyse the concept as it has been defined 
by La Porta et al. (1998). Hence, the pillars on which corporate governance is based 
include Shareholder Protection, Legal System, Ownership Concentration, Creditor 
Rights and Accounting Standards. The four latter measures are adopted directly from 
their paper. However, newer literature points out the shortcomings of the methodology 
adopted by La Porta et al. (1998) for the estimation of the first variable. We, therefore, 
opt for an index which we believe provides a more accurate depiction of the shareholder 
protection standards around the world as proposed by Spamann (2010). Furthermore, 
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we extend the definition of corporate governance to include insider trading and other 
variables aimed at measuring the degree of information asymmetry. The inclusion of the 
first additional variable is motivated by our belief that insider trading is a pivotal 
violation of good corporate governance standards and hence we incorporate the findings 
of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) into our framework. Additionally, we look at analyst 
coverage and the freedom of press which are seen as detrimental elements in achieving 
good corporate governance, as media lower the costs associated with the acquisition of 
information by investors, act as corporate monitors and can facilitate regulatory changes 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2002). We study cross-border takeovers by UK acquirers which 
took place between 1993 and 2012 and where there was a change of control in the 
foreign target. The number of host-countries is reduced to 48 which were initially 
analysed by La Porta et al. (1998). The values of the transactions for a given year and a 
given country are summed together and divided by the value of all outbound UK 
acquisitions in a given year to get a percentage of UK funds attracted by every country 
every year. Our sample includes 960 country-year observations. We regress the 
independent variable computed as described above on different measures of corporate 
governance, using a fractional logit model, as advised by Papke and Wooldridge (1996).  
1.5. GENERAL FINDINGS 
Our analysis has shown that higher corporate governance standards reflected in lower 
ownership concentration, more stringent accounting standards and strong creditor and 
shareholder protection deter investors. Legal system is of no statistical significance 
indicating that the law of the host country does not fully reflect the level of such 
standards. The same result was obtained for media coverage, indicating that investors 
are either not concerned about the public scrutiny or they do not require the information 
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provided by the journalists while the opposite is true for analyst coverage. However, 
this result suffers from a potential problem of causality identification. Lastly, investors 
do not seem to benefit from the introduction and/or enforcement of insider trading 
regulation. This might be due to the fact that such laws do not necessarily impact the 
financial markets as predicted in the extant literature.  
1.6. STRUCTURE OVERVIEW 
The existing literature on corporate governance determinants and our predictions are 
discussed in the Literature Review & Hypotheses. It is followed by the Data & 
Methodology section. The results are summarised in section 4 of this paper and the next 
section is devoted to robustness checks of our analysis. This section is then followed by 
Limitations, whereas the final remarks are presented in the Conclusion.  
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1. LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. Common vs. Civil Law 
The corporate governance systems around the world can be divided into the market-
based and the blockholder-based. The first one is typical for the US, UK and the 
Commonwealth countries and the latter is characteristic for countries located in 
continental Europe and their former colonies. The market-based system relies on 
common law framework and on effective enforcement of shareholder rights. It was 
established on fiduciary duty which allows for more discretion when dealing with 
previously unencountered problems and evolves depending on the rulings made by the 
judges. Those decisions are later on incorporated in the written law (Coffee, 1999). On 
the other hand, the blockholder-based system puts more emphasis on the rules 
protecting stakeholders rather than shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005). Civil law is 
based on the Roman system which centres around statutes and comprehensive legal 
codes and requires from the judges a more mechanical approach to court cases and 
leaves little room for interpretation and extension to new problems (Reese and 
Weisbach, 2002).  
Although these two systems are quite different in their nature, significant changes have 
been observed in the takeover regulation over the past decade which brought the UK 
and continental Europe closer together (Georgen et al., 2005). Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) claim that countries from Continental Europe have made 
improvements and a step towards the English legal system, while it has been also noted 
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that cross-border M&A activity became an important channel for effective worldwide 
convergence in corporate governance standards (Coffee, 1999).  
B. Spillovers 
The Spillover Hypothesis developed by Martynova and Renneboog (2008) states that: 
“a full takeover means a change of nationality of the acquired company and that the 
corporate governance standards of the bidder may be imposed on the target; what 
develops from here is that a target with poor corporate governance will benefit from the 
reformed system as the target’s improved standards may be a part of the total synergy 
value of the takeover” (p. 18). This is supported by Albuquerque et al. (2013) who 
provide evidence that positive spillovers of corporate governance do exist which may 
also affect the target’s rivals. Conversely, according to the Negative Spillover by Law 
Hypothesis, the bidders with weaker corporate governance than the target will 
underperform in the post-acquisition phase as the standards of the target are likely to 
become less strict. The assumption that the direction of the spillover is from the bidder 
to the target is shared by Starks and Wei (2013), who also expect a higher premium to 
be paid, if the bidder is coming from a weaker corporate governance system than the 
seller. Such premium functions as a compensation for the additional risk taken by the 
target shareholders, if they decide to keep the shares, or as a discount for the bidder in 
exchange for the provision of a better governance framework in a reversed scenario. 
Given the above, we would expect value-maximising UK bidders to be more attracted 
to markets which generally offer weaker corporate governance standards. Although the 
legal origin does provide us with some general indication on the level of such standards, 
the following sections of the literature review discuss in more detail the channels 
through which the legal system and corporate transparency affect M&A decisions 
regarding the location of the acquirer’s next target.  
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C. Legal System: Summary 
Overall, civil law puts more emphasis on protecting the stakeholders rather than 
shareholders, than in the case of common law (Benabou and Tirole, 2010; this might be 
due to different directions of the development of the financial markets in both legal 
regimes). Additionally, the former requires a more mechanical approach from judges 
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002) and does not evolve as easily as common law (Coffee, 
1999). However, in the past decade we have observed a significant convergence of the 
UK and continental European systems which resulted from regulatory changes 
(Martynova & Renneboog, 2011), but this legal evolution can also be partially 
attributed to the cross-border M&A activity and the spillover of corporate governance 
(Coffee, 1999). It has been argued that corporate governance standards of the bidder 
may be imposed on the target (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Hence, bidders from 
countries characterised by higher corporate governance standards can extract additional 
synergies by acquiring targets whose standards are not as high, even when the target’s 
poor corporate governance standard may sometimes make the acquisition more costly. 
Given the above, we expect that UK investors will be more attracted to markets which 
generally offer weaker corporate governance resulting from civil law.  
Hypothesis 1 
More UK funds will be allocated to countries governed by civil law 
2.2. OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 
A. Free-riding  
An important problem arises when the ownership is dispersed. If the shareholders invest 
only a small proportion of their wealth they are unlikely to bear the costs associated 
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with effective monitoring of the management. Given that corporate decisions attract so 
little oversight, managers may choose to act in their own interest rather than in the 
interest of the shareholders. In theory, this situation can be corrected through a hostile 
takeover, where the acquirer replaces the incumbent management, improves the 
inefficiencies and therefore increases the overall value of the firm. However, as pointed 
out by Grossman and Hart (1980), when the ownership is dispersed investors have a 
very high incentive to free-ride, also in case of a takeover offer. That is they are not 
willing to tender their shares hoping that majority of the shareholders will, which would 
enable them to benefit from the post-acquisition increase in the firm value. Hence, in 
such a situation shareholders will only dispose of their shares if the price includes the 
post-acquisition improvements. This reduces the acquirer’s gain to zero at which point 
he becomes indifferent whether the acquisition is finalised or not, so no transaction 
takes place. Grossman and Hart (1980) and Bradley (1980) show that this leads to an 
inefficient M&A market. 
B. Reasons for Existence of Dispersed Ownership 
However, why is ownership actually dispersed? The first reason mentioned by Becht et 
al. (2002) as to why we have numerous investors is the fact that their wealth might be 
relatively small when compared with the size of the company in question. Therefore, 
they can only afford to own a relatively small stake of the overall corporation. 
Secondly, even when individual investors have enough wealth to obtain a large block of 
shares in a firm they may choose not to and invest instead in multiple projects, thus 
diversifying and limiting their exposure. What is more, acquiring a large stake may be a 
lot easier than selling it in the future (Becht et al., 2002). The disposal might be 
especially problematic when the secondary market is characterised by low liquidity. 
This hypothesis has been first introduced by Warshow (1924) who has shown that the 
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number of shareholders in the US has increased 2.5 times between 1900 and 1923. Also, 
Berle and Means (1932) found that already in 1929 none of the largest 200 US 
corporations had large investors which lead them to believe that there is a clear 
separation of control and ownership. This hypothesis has been supported for both the 
US and the UK by many academics (Larner, 1966; Herman, 1981; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Cubbin and Leech, 1983; Leech and Leahy; 1991), but others have found contradicting 
evidence (Eisenberg, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Goergen and Renneboog (2001) 
claim that in the UK, a large proportion of the voting power is held by 1 to 5 
institutional investors and the general consensus is that in the US, UK and the 
Commonwealth countries the ownership is rather dispersed. On the other hand, in 
continental Europe the majority of shares in most companies is held either by one or a 
few investors. Also, Faccio and Lang (2002) agree that “concentration of ownership or 
control is the dominant form of corporate governance arrangement in continental 
Europe and other OECD countries” (Becht et al., 2002, p. 17). This is in line with the 
point of view of La Porta et al. (1999) who argue that the ownership structure is 
primarily determined by investor protection standards prevailing in a given country. 
C. Benefits of Large Investors 
Blockholders can be beneficial because higher ownership results in greater influence on 
the management (Walkling and Edmister, 1985). Their voting power enables them to 
select directors who represent their interests. When their control is sufficiently large, 
they can even appoint majority of the board, which gives them the power to control the 
managers, or at least to decide whom to hire and who should be dismissed from his 
duties. “Large shareholders can also exercise power by blocking ratification of 
unfavourable decisions, or by initiating decisions” (Becht et al., 2002, p. 26). What is 
more, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that they can facilitate acquisitions. In addition, 
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when there is dispersion of ownership and control, it is hard for the shareholders not 
only to monitor the management effectively but also to mitigate potential conflicts of 
interest (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006).  
 
Given that larger investors have fewer incentives to ‘free ride’ on takeover offers as 
they have more at stake (Grinblatt and Titman, 2001), it is not surprising that they are 
generally more active when it comes to voting on corporate matters (Jarrell et al., 1988). 
We would also expect them to focus more on profit maximisation, although more recent 
research puts forward the level of activism relates to the proportion of this company in 
an investor’s portfolio rather than the proportion of a company he holds (Fich et al., 
2013). We expect that at a country level these are likely to be highly correlated, despite 
the fact that this may not always be the case at company-level. A study on the 
performance of family-owned companies with high ownership concentration has shown 
that they consistently outperform their peers, regardless whether we choose an 
accounting-based or a market-based performance measure (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
In an M&A context, Fich et al. (2013) noted that “the size and active interest may 
mitigate the coordination problem among target shareholders, allowing institutions to 
bargain for a higher premium” (p. 5) and this is indirectly supported by Dahlquist et al. 
(2003) who show that the returns from acquisitions are lower for countries with 
concentrated ownership.  
D. Costs of Large Investors 
However, the concentration of ownership can also result in significant costs. Although 
dispersed shareholder base can incentivise managers to commit to the company and to 
show initiative (Burkart et al., 1997), the opposite effect is true for concentrated control. 
High degree of ownership concentration may lead to overmonitoring by large investors 
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as they may look beyond shareholder value maximisation and additionally target 
optimisation of private benefits. Researchers find evidence for the existence of 
tunnelling within Korean business groups (chaebols), i.e. the view that firms from the 
same business group focus more on the maximisation of value of the controlling 
shareholders, rather than on the value of the whole company (see for example Bae et al., 
2000; Baek et al., 2005 or Kim et al., 2005). This can potentially discourage the agents 
to undertake certain projects making them effectively less active as autonomous 
managers (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Pagano and Roell, 1998). However, research 
provides evidence that companies controlled by owners perform better than those run by 
agents (Radice, 1971; Cosh and Hughes, 1989; Leech and Leahy, 1991). Regardless 
whether the managers or outside investors hold the shares, those who obtain a large 
stake in the company are particularly prone to self-dealing (Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk et 
al., 2000; Zingales, 1995). This means that opportunistic actions of the majority 
shareholders can lead to the expropriation of the minority shareholders’ rights (Durnev 
and Kim, 2005). Although, existing research postulates that it is possible to reduce the 
risk of excessive monitoring and self-dealing by restricting the control of the 
blockholders or designing an optimal structure of shareholdings, others argue against it 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Burkart et al., 1997; Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999). The theoretical model of Bebchuk (1999) shows that dispersed ownership is 
unstable as shareholders will always have an incentive to acquire a larger stake in order 
to extract private benefits because otherwise this will be done by the managers.  
E. Problems Encountered by Large Investors 
Furthermore, even if we agree that the existence of large shareholders is highly 
desirable and that it can help overcome the lack of cooperation amongst investors, they 
can encounter problems when it comes to executing control. Corporate law sometimes 
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limits their potential to act. Prigge (1998) for example notes that employees appoint half 
of the board members in corporations in Germany, while the regulations of the London 
Stock Exchange do not allow blockholders who own more than 30 percent of the shares 
to appoint more than 5 out of 12 board members, regardless of the proportion they hold 
in the company (Wymeersch, 2003). Furthermore, some countries issue shares which 
give their holders a sole right to make board appointments (Becht and Mayer, 2001), 
while others allow for staggered boards. Although these can act as a powerful 
antitakeover defence, they may also diminish the power of large shareholders posing a 
requirement to win multiple consecutive proxy contests to replace the whole board 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002, 2004). Even if we assume that the shareholders somehow 
manage to collude and get a majority of votes, very often they cannot directly decide on 
many corporate decisions - e.g. in the US the shareholders cannot directly initiate a 
merger (Kraakman et al., 2004). Additionally, the agreed changes may take a lot of time 
to be implemented, hence their power may be weaker than initially perceived. 
F. Ownership Concentration: Summary 
Ownership structure is an important factor impacting corporate governance standards. A 
serious problem arises in case of ownership is dispersed. When shareholders decide to 
invest only a small part of their wealth in a given project their incentives to monitor this 
particular investment are small. On the other hand, such dispersion is also important in 
case of a takeover as it encourages shareholders to free-ride on other investors in hope 
that they will tender their shares pushing the price so high up that the merger may fall 
through. However, wide shareholder base is natural and in a way an effect of rational 
investment decisions. First, it occurs because the wealth of investors may be relatively 
small when compared to the value of the company. Second, even if investors have the 
necessary resources to acquire a significant stake they may chose not to do so and 
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diversify their shareholdings instead. Lastly, a large stake may prove problematic to sell 
when secondary market is illiquid. So, what are the benefits of the opposite scenario – 
i.e. when the ownership is concentrated? Large investors have greater incentive to be 
effective monitors and also have more power over managers which enables them to 
significantly impact corporate decisions. It has been argued that they are generally more 
active when it comes to voting on corporate matters (Jarrell et al., 1988). Fewer 
shareholders can also more effectively mitigate potential conflicts of interest and 
facilitate acquisitions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). However, it has been claimed that 
the existence of large investors may be detrimental to shareholder value maximisation. 
This is because concentrated ownership results in overmonitoring which may 
discourage managers to commit to the company and to show initiative (Burkart et al., 
1997). Additionally, large shareholders instead of focussing on profit-maximisation may 
prefer to use their power to extract private benefits, leading to the expropriation of 
minority shareholders (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Further, we note that the pro-forma 
power of large shareholders may be weakened in countries with different classes of 
shares, board appointment mechanisms and other complexities related to the 
introduction of the desired changes. Although large investors have potentially better 
bargaining power and can secure higher premia, we believe that their ability to facilitate 
acquisitions will be an attribute in the eyes of investors. Therefore, we conclude that 
UK acquirers will be more drawn to invest in countries with concentrated ownership 
base.  
Hypothesis 2 
More UK funds will be allocated to countries with concentrated ownership 
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2.3. SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 
A. The Problem of Expropriation of Minority Shareholders 
In the previous section we discussed how concentrated ownership can help overcome 
the principal-agent problem, but there is another clash of interests which arises between 
the controlling and non-controlling shareholders. It should be noted that investors who 
hold large stakes also incur costs associated with their monitoring function and thus 
should be compensated with some private benefits (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). Non-
controlling shareholders will appreciate the presence of controlling shareholders as long 
as the reduction in managerial agency costs is greater than the cost of private benefits 
extracted by those monitors (Gilson and Black, 1995). However, controlling 
shareholders have quite high incentives to secure higher than necessary private benefits, 
therefore expropriating minority investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The first way 
in which the controlling shareholders can extract private benefits is by diverting a 
disproportionate share of profits. Those  can take the form of a salary, transfer pricing, a 
subsidised personal loan, or simply theft of corporate assets (Burkart et al., 1998; La 
Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000). Another way of extracting the value is through 
the sale of the controlling stake as it incorporates the premium resulting from the 
ongoing profits derived from future private benefits yet to be extracted (Gilson and 
Gordon, 2003). Alternatively, the same result can be achieved by freezing out the 
minority. 
B. Causes and Potential Solutions 
The potential benefits derived from expropriation of minority shareholders incentivise 
investors to consolidate control (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Zingales, 1995), otherwise 
this potential benefit will be transferred to outside investors by means of a hostile 
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takeover (Zingales, 1995; Bebchuk, 1999). Hence, when shareholder protection is weak, 
consolidation of control is a natural response to potential threats created by outsiders. 
Obtaining a controlling stake will be less costly in environments which deviate from the 
one-share-one-vote rule. As noted by Harris and Raviv (1988a,b), whenever every 
holder of the residual claim is entitled to vote on corporate matters potential raiders 
have to pay the highest price to acquire control. Despite the fact that any deviations 
should normally be reflected in the price (i.e. voting shares should be more expensive 
than non-voting shares as they give the holder more power), such instruments make it 
easier to obtain a controlling stake which increases the risk of extraction of private 
benefits. Gilson and Gordon (2003) argue that the optimal solution to the problem of 
minority expropriation is the imposition of rigorous judicial review of the controlling 
shareholders and the company which would limit excessive wealth transfers but would 
still offer the advantage of focussed monitoring to non-controlling shareholders. This 
means that the introduction of appropriate rules could reduce the ‘minority discount’ 
(Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Another disincentive resulting from legal 
regulation noted by Burkart et al. (1998) is the fact that extraction of profits becomes 
then a costly and complicated process which may lead to potential legal proceedings. 
Obviously, the stricter is the regulation, the higher are the chances of being penalised 
for such actions. Summarising, stricter laws increase the potential cost of wrongdoing 
and therefore deter minority shareholders expropriation.  
C. Increased Shareholder Protection 
Introduction of such laws leads to a higher level of corporate governance which is turn 
results in value creation, as the focus on shareholder wealth maximisation increases and 
managerial actions can be more easily controlled. This result has been supported by La 
Porta et al. (1999). Furthermore, when better shareholder protection is achieved through 
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cross-border mergers (Spillover Hypothesis) the valuation effect impacts whole 
industries and companies generate higher Tobin’s Qʼs (Bris et al., 2008; Albuquerque et 
al., 2013). Given that well protected investors are able to secure higher premia (Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004), it is unsurprising that the analysed data shows lower acquirer gains 
for transactions involving targets from countries with a more restrictive legal system 
(Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). What follows is that acquirers are more likely to 
buy firms from abroad, if the shareholder protection in the home country of the bidder is 
stronger (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). This is because the relatively high cost of 
takeovers in countries which protect minority shareholders will encourage bidders not 
only to look abroad but also to focus on nations whose protection is weaker (Goergen et 
al., 2005). As we already mentioned, this is driven by the weaker legal system in the 
target country which allows for the expropriation of the existing shareholders. Given 
this threat companies located in countries which do not offer sufficient protection will 
find it difficult to raise capital unless they offer an extra return. Higher cost of funding 
leads to lower valuation and ultimately enables the bidder to finalise the transaction at a 
lower price. If the buyer is from a better corporate governance system, we expect that 
this will spill over to the target resulting in cheaper financing and thus value-creation 
post acquisition.  
D. Shareholder Protection: Summary 
The previously mentioned benefit resulting from the presence of large investors is that 
they actively monitor the company which is also beneficial to minority shareholders. In 
order to do so they have to incur significant costs and should be therefore compensated 
with some private benefits (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). Minority shareholders will be 
willing to allow this as long as the reduction in agency costs is greater than the loss 
from the private benefits extracted by large shareholder (Gilson and Black, 1995). 
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However, such a setting encourages majority investors to extract higher than necessary 
private benefits, thus expropriating the minority shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This can be done through a diversion of profits in the forms of a salary, transfer 
pricing, etc. The self-dealing opportunity encourages investors to consolidate control 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980; Zingales, 1995). Otherwise the unextracted private benefits 
will be transferred to outside investors in a hostile takeover (Zingales, 1995). It has been 
argued that the solution to the problem is the introduction of a legal framework which 
would limit the chance of expropriation of minority shareholders but would still offer 
them the benefit of increased monitoring of the managers (Gilson and Gordon, 2003). 
Introduction of such laws leads to a higher level of corporate governance and increases 
focus on value creation (La Porta et al., 1999). As a result well-protected shareholders 
tend to secure higher premia in acquisitions (Rossi and Volpin, 2004) which mean 
higher takeover costs and result in lower gains for acquirers (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). What follows is, investors try to look for targets abroad if the 
level of shareholder protection in the home country is high (Martynova and Renneboog, 
2008) and they will especially focus on those countries where such standards are 
particularly weak (Goergen et al., 2005). As a result firms with poor corporate 
governance will become targets of more efficient companies (Manne, 1965; Jensen, 
1993; Coffee, 1999).  This is because bidders are likely to choose such targets in order 
to maximise their return by offering a lower premium and to derive additional benefits 
from the expropriation of minority shareholders. Therefore, we predict that countries 
with weaker shareholder protection standards will be more attractive to UK investors 
who are involved in acquisitions where there is a change of control.  
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Hypothesis 3 
More UK funds will be allocated to countries with weak minority shareholder 
protection 
2.4. CREDITORS  
A. Introduction of Financial Leverage 
As already mentioned, Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed to solve the agency 
problem with the introduction of leverage, as this would limit the free cash flows used 
at manager’s discretion through the imposition of fixed obligations payable to corporate 
debtholders. Further research by Jensen (1986, 1989) looked at leveraged buyouts as a 
potential disciplining device for managers. It is important to understand why increased 
leverage would lead to a better alignment of managerial incentives with those of the 
shareholders. Although the manager is not personally liable for the debts of his firm, a 
default on debt payments may result in bankruptcy of the company. As a result the 
manager would be forced to look for a new position (Faccio et al., 2003) and his 
greatest loss would be the tarnished reputation in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a, b). The benefits of introducing debtholders have been discussed in a lot detail in 
the literature (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 
1989), but it was Esty and Megginson (2003) who noted that monitoring benefits should 
be greater when the protection of creditors is stronger. Therefore, it can be put forward 
that in order to achieve good corporate governance one has to also protect the 
debtholders.  
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B. Expropriation of Creditors: Why Do Debtholders Need Protection? 
Already Jensen and Meckling (1976) debated the agency cost of debt and pointed out 
that interests of the providers of debt financing need to be looked after, especially as 
managers may have other objectives than those of the creditors. For example, they may 
choose to pursue projects which may reduce the value of the firm’s bonds or of the 
overall company. This can be done by issuing more debt or distributing assets to 
shareholders instead of using them to service liabilities (Amihud et al., 2000). 
Additionally, earlier research has also shown that managers will be more inclined to 
engage in risky activities when the firm approaches default, taking a gamble which 
could potentially result in a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Adler, 
1992), as the debt providers are paid first in case of default. One way in which the 
bondholders can protect themselves under such circumstances is through the 
introduction of restrictive covenants which are particularly disliked by equity investors. 
These can effectively limit managerial actions which are likely to adversely affect the 
value of their bonds. Another way of protecting the bondholders is through regulation. 
The latter solution is more important in the context of this research. Unfortunately, 
although stronger creditor protection is an indication of good corporate governance 
standards, it can deter potential equity investors by shifting too much power towards the 
debtholders.  
C. Co-insurance of Cash Flows and the Case of Liquidation 
Many see debt as an effective way of aligning managerial incentives (Zender, 1991; 
Berglof and von Thadden, 1994; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) because it acts as a 
‘commitment device for liquidation’ when the performance is poor (Becht et al., 2002). 
In general, managers are likely to reduce their employment risk (Amihud and Lev, 
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1981) by engaging in activities which increase the stability of the firm, i.e. by reducing 
the overall riskiness of the business and therefore limiting the chances of becoming 
insolvent. Such a goal can be achieved through diversification, either across industries 
or geographically, as such actions reduce the volatility of cash flows (Kuipers et al., 
2008). This is commonly known as the co-insurance of cash-flows and leads to a 
reduction in bankruptcy risk (Asquith and Kim, 1982). However, such a reduction is not 
always beneficial to the shareholders and in many cases risk-minimisation can result in 
a redistribution of wealth from the shareholders to the bondholders (Galai and Masulis, 
1976; Denis et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, bankruptcy is sometimes inevitable. It has been shown that strong creditor 
protection incentivises managers to decrease bankruptcy risk by acquiring targets which 
reduce shareholder value but offer high recovery rates in distress. Such assets enable the 
management to postpone or avoid default by servicing debt, using the proceeds from 
liquidation of some of the assets (Acharya et al., 2011). Additionally, creditors of the 
distressed company may chose to initiate the sale of the firm as a whole or of some of 
its assets themselves in order to recover a larger portion of potential losses. This can be 
achieved more easily in countries with better creditor protection and more dynamic 
legal procedures relating to insolvency cases as disposal of distressed assets is very 
time-sensitive, but good protection of debtholders may be harmful to other parties 
involved, including the shareholders. This argument was supported by Acharya et al. 
(2011) who have shown that strong creditor protection “may lead to inefficient 
liquidation, which extinguishes the continuation option of a firm’s enterprise and thus 
hurts stockholder value” (p. 3) and imposes further private costs in case when the 
dismissal of management is requested. Though other research postulates that the 
strengthening of creditor protection in the US resulted in a delay in default and reduces 
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the value of assets (Adler et al., 2013). Overall, we argue that strong creditor protection 
will be reflected in shareholder value as it has a significant impact on managerial 
actions, which should act as a strong deterrent for foreign investors. 
D. Indirect Effects of Debt 
The assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) of 
capital structure irrelevance do not hold in a world with taxes, principle-agent problems, 
asymmetric information and bankruptcy costs. Given the outlined potential 
consequences of strong creditor rights and the fact that leverage is positively related 
with the probability of default (Ross, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1990), it is unsurprising 
that empirical data provides evidence for this risk-minimising effect of creditor 
protection and proves that it results in lower levels of financial leverage (Acharya et al., 
2011). This may be detrimental if the proportion of debt in the financing mix is at a 
suboptimal level, which would also lead to a higher than necessary cost of capital 
resulting from an excessive reliance on equity-financing. Furthermore, as already 
mentioned, managers bowing to the debtholders’ needs may also decide to limit the 
riskiness of the company not through the reduction in leverage but through the selection 
of safer projects for their portfolio. This, however, has been presented as a significant 
drawback when considering more entrepreneurial settings (Manso, 2005) and a 
hindrance to innovation (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009). As a result, it has been 
shown that stringent debt covenants and legal enforcement of violations reduce capital 
investments (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2009). On the other hand, the level 
of creditor protection depends on the country and to a large extent reflects the direction 
in which the market has developed. For example, the changes in regulation which took 
place over time are closely linked to the level of bank-industry ties (Roe; 1994). This is 
in line with Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) who claim that high levels of shareholder 
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protection and disclosure requirements, characteristic for common law countries, 
encouraged the development of public debt markets, while the regulation in Continental 
Europe has fostered the reliance on a bank-oriented system, especially prevalent in 
Germany, France, Italy or Spain (Inturragia, 2005). What follows is that debtholders in 
market-based environments tend to be more dispersed and this makes the commitment 
to liquidate stronger, increasing the complexity of debt restructuring resulting from lack 
of collusion (Hart and Moore, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). 
E. Jurisdiction Shopping 
Hence, a takeover decision can also depend on the creditor protection in the host 
country (La Porta et al., 1998). Some argue that the culture of the host nation plays a 
bigger role in determining the country’s creditor rights than the legal system (Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003). Regardless of the drivers behind creditor protection, it should be 
kept in mind that corporate assets are governed by the jurisdiction of the country in 
which they are located (La Porta et al., 2000) and therefore any settlement of claims in 
case of bankruptcy is undertaken by the court of the host country (Felsenfeld, 2000). 
More creditor-friendly nations can increase the chances of court proceedings resulting 
in negative consequences for firms which are financially distressed (Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2007). However, Felsenfeld’s territoriality principle is not so certain as steps 
have been undertaken to increase the cooperation between countries (Renneboog and 
Szilagyi, 2007). Goergen and Renneboog (2008) mention the Model Law on Cross-
border Insolvency set up by the United Nations Commission for International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) and explain that this entity has been created so that only one 
jurisdiction is in charge of bankruptcy proceedings, thus reducing legal uncertainty. The 
European Insolvency Regulation introduced in 2000 indicates that the main legal 
proceeding shall be based in the country of the firm’s centre of main interest (European 
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Council Regulation No.1346/2000). As pointed out by Franken (2005) there is 
significant ambiguity with regard to this definition. Such changes encourage creditors to 
look for legal systems which offer them the best protection of their claims and this leads 
to jurisdiction shopping (Renneboog and Szilagyi, 2007). However, the negative impact 
of creditor protection on shareholder value may imply that the same will be true for 
acquirers, i.e. investors will chose jurisdictions where the interests of debtholders do not 
attract that much attention from legislative bodies.  
F. Creditor Protection: Summary 
The introduction of leverage can act as a way of overcoming the principal-agent 
problem, i.e. the potential expropriation of shareholders, by limiting the free cash flows 
which can be used at manager’s discretion (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Although 
managers are not personally liable for the company’s debt, a default on debt payments 
and potential bankruptcy have significant implications for their reputation and later on 
their attractiveness on the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, b). However, there is 
a high likelihood of misalignment of managerial incentives with those of the 
debtholders. Given that managerial actions such as issuance of more debt, inappropriate 
distribution of assets (Amihud et al., 2000) and involvement in risky projects can lead 
to a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders (Adler, 1992), they also need 
additional protection either in the form of covenants or regulatory framework. Strong 
creditor protection limits the discretion of the management when it comes to day-to-day 
running of the business and is likely to incentivise them to reduce the riskiness of 
projects and overall leverage (Amihud and Lev, 1981). Additionally, it may encourage 
them to pursue co-insurance of cash flows (Asquith and Kim, 1982) and to invest in 
assets with high recovery potential in case of liquidation (Acharya et al., 2011). The 
above decisions can lead to a selection of projects which are ‘too safe’, a suboptimal 
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capital mix, excessive diversification – either geographically or across industries, 
becoming a serious hindrance to innovation. All of the above decisions are detrimental 
to shareholders and reduce overall capital investments. Hence, we expect that 
jurisdiction shopping will also be applicable to equity investors. However, contrary to 
the debtholders, they will avoid countries which give too much power to creditors, as 
high level of creditor protection limits their freedom and may destroy value.  
Hypothesis 4 
Less UK funds will be allocated to countries with high standards of creditor protection 
 
2.5. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS  
A. Information Asymmetry  
The problem of information asymmetry, an inherent part of any investment decision and 
day-to-day running of a business where there is separation of ownership and control, 
was first discussed in greater detail by Akerlof (1970). This paper sparked the 
emergence of a whole spectrum of literature which tries to analyse the allocative issues 
resulting from informational inefficiency (Stiglitz, 2000, provides an overview of 
research on this topic). In general, the complications resulting from differing 
information sets can be to some extent alleviated through the introduction of 
comprehensive accounting standards. Their importance is even more apparent in 
countries with weak investor protection as they become crucial for financial contracting 
(Hay et al., 1996). What is more, Black (2000) and Ball (2001) argue that good 
financial accounting is considered a prerequisite for the existence of active capital 
markets. 
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B. Transparency as a Disciplining Device 
Regular disclosure of financial information can additionally function as a disciplining 
device for the managers. The asymmetry between the principals and the agent offers 
him a range of opportunities to pursue his private objectives instead of those of the 
owners. Financial reporting can mitigate this problem by facilitating better monitoring 
by the equityholders and other monitors who can more accurately assess the 
profitability and success of the undertaken investments (Bushman and Smith, 2003). In 
most cases, information leads to a better alignment of managerial incentives and to a 
reduction in the risk of expropriation. It enables investors to make well-informed capital 
allocation decisions with respect to risk and return. What follows is that “the provision 
of the information shifts investment patterns towards those more accurately reflecting 
the true value of the firm, which in turn allocates investment resources more efficiently” 
(Weil, 2002, p. 9). This should result in a correction of inefficiencies in the market, as 
the firms which in Akerlof’s framework would be described as lemons now have to 
amend their strategies, offer a higher return or will go out of business.  
C. Implication for Financial Markets 
Increased transparency also means at least partial alleviation of the adverse selection 
problem by means of attracting more funds which effectively reduce the risk of 
illiquidity in the capital markets (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Brennan and 
Tamarowski, 2000) which has a significant impact on the cost of capital (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 2000). Therefore, it is unsurprising that Vishwanath and Kaufman (1999) 
perceive greater transparency to be advantageous for the whole economy, as the 
described allocative improvements should result in higher economic growth. On the 
other hand, they also argue that lack of such informational efficiency leads to higher 
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transaction costs and market failures. Therefore, the society as a whole should 
encourage greater openness and transparency (Stiglitz, 1999). However, in order to 
make efficient investment decisions the available information must also be reliable and 
based on consistent accounting standards which are comprehensive and coherent, 
resulting in an ease of comparability of opportunities by investors. Additionally, as 
noted by Dyck and Zingales (2002), “government-mandated information is the most 
reliable, because it is not affected by selectivity and is not provided in exchange for 
something” (p. 17). From the shareholders’ perspective better transparency gives them 
better knowledge of their own company and this is particularly important for smaller 
investors who do not have the resources and time to resolve the asymmetry. 
D. Underprovision of Information 
So, if transparency is so desirable, why is it not always at the optimal level? One reason 
is the cost associated with the collection and dissemination of information which can be 
substantial. Furthermore, it has been claimed in the literature that more concentrated 
ownership structures increase the potential benefits of monitoring by controlling 
shareholders. Hence, countries characterised by such an ownership structure will 
experience less demand for transparency as large shareholders can obtain the 
information without public disclosure, which (as we already noted) may adversely 
affect their competitiveness (Fan and Wong, 2002). However, transparency may be 
scarce even if the shareholders are in its favour. The pace of globalisation and search for 
the most attractive assets means that that supply of information in developing countries 
still lags demand (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999), but current literature points out 
that companies located in countries with insufficient supervision and disclosure 
standards can partially resolve this problem by cross-listing abroad (Bianconi and Chen, 
2009; Lang et al., 2003 or see an overview of literature on cross-listings by Karolyi, 
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2006). By doing this firms subject themselves to a more transparent regime (Bris and 
Cabolis, 2008) and the act of cross-listing can be perceived as a signal which should 
convince investors of the company’ superior quality.  
The reasons behind non-disclosure of information may be also strategic. The company, 
the management or even the shareholders may sometimes favour lack of transparency. 
Firstly, firms may prefer not to report on their engagements in great detail for tactical 
reasons, as giving away too much information could reduce their competitive advantage 
and have a negative impact on their market share or profits, thus reducing shareholder 
value. Secondly, the information sets of the managers are most likely to be far superior 
when compared to those of the shareholders. Information on poor performance or 
extraction of private benefits is usually frowned upon by the shareholders and may 
prove to be detrimental to the manager’s personal interests (Verrecchia, 2001). Hence, 
managers may avoid disclosing such information if it is not in their best interest to do 
so. Lastly, majority shareholders may also be reluctant to disclose too much 
information, as lack of transparency provides a window of opportunity to expropriate 
minority shareholders or other stakeholders linked to the company.  
E. Accounting Standards: Summary 
The problem of asymmetric information is inherent where there is a separation of 
ownership and control (Stiglitz, 2000), but there seems to be no consensus on the 
influence of transparency on the volume on M&A activity. Information asymmetry can 
be to some extent alleviated by the introduction of comprehensive accounting standards 
which act as a disciplining device for managers by enabling monitors to better assess 
the profitability and success of undertaken business projects (Bushman and Smith, 
2003), which effectively allows investors to make well-informed capital allocation 
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decisions with respect to risk and return. In the context of financial markets, increased 
transparency means alleviation of adverse selection problems which reduces illiquidity 
and improves allocative efficiency in the markets. However, in order to achieve this 
provided information has to be based on consistent accounting standards, 
comprehensive and reliable. Despite all the advantages, the degree of transparency 
remains at a suboptimal level in many countries. This can be a result of high costs 
associated with collection and dissemination of information, concentrated ownership 
structures or high pace of globalisation (Vishwanath and Kaufmann, 1999). 
Underprovision of information can also be a strategic decision. Companies may prefer 
to protect their competitive advantage by not disclosing information regarding their 
plans for the future, managers may prefer not to share unfavourable information about 
their recent projects and results, while majority shareholders may prefer lack of 
transparency as it gives them the opportunity to expropriate other stakeholders. In an 
M&A context, transparency is of crucial importance because it enables investors and 
managers to indentify profitable investment opportunities by comparing similar projects 
and assessing their riskiness and forecasted returns. Recent research relating to 
information asymmetry in M&A put forward that acquisitions will be more beneficial to 
acquirers where there is high quality of financial reporting as this would enable the 
acquirers to more accurately estimate the potential synergies and hence not destroy 
value by over-bidding (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Raman et al., 2013). The level of 
transparency would not only influence the returns but also the volume of transactions. A 
large degree of information asymmetry between the target and the acquirer constrains 
M&A activity, whereas high quality of audit has a positive effect in cross-border 
acquisitions (Davis-Friday and Skaife, 2009). This claim has been supported by DeLong 
and Buch (2001) who show that the frequency of transactions is lower when the cost of 
information acquisition is high. However, the need for disclosure of financial 
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information once the company is acquired may also be a potential deterrent. We put 
forward that the reluctance to disclose too much information will be the dominating 
effect which should result in a lower volume of transactions where there are stringent 
accounting standards.  
Hypothesis 5 
Less UK funds will be allocated to countries with high accounting standards 
2.6. INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
A. Definition of Insider Trading  
Although currently insider trading is a highly controversial practice, it was not regarded 
illegal in most of the countries in Europe until the beginning of 1990s (Posen, 1991). 
According to the SEC insider trading refers to “buying or selling a security in breach of 
a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of 
material, non-public information about the security. Insider trading violations may also 
include ‘tipping’ such information, securities trading by the person ‘tipped’, and 
securities trading by those who misappropriate such information” (SEC website, 2013). 
Analysis performed on data for 200 large US firms for the period of 1962-1968 shows 
that insiders tend to sell before a price decrease and buy prior to an increase in price 
(Jaffe, 1974). Insiders prove to be ‘superior forecasters’ (Lorie and Niederhoffer, 1968), 
whereas managers earn abnormal returns Ferreira (1995).  
B. Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulation  
Insider trading is expected to be an important factor influencing the decision where to 
invest and hence we introduce a variable which measures the time since the introduction 
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of insider trading laws. However, following the reasoning of Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002) we also investigate the enforcement of such laws, because sole introduction of 
the regulation may not be sufficient to deter insiders (Bhattacharya et al., 2000). In fact, 
there is a big discrepancy between the time when the laws were introduced and when 
they were enforced. While 80% of the countries adopted insider trading regulations by 
1998, only in 40% of them prosecutions took place (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). It 
has been noted that “the first enforcement of a law, however perfunctory it might be, is 
an event of paramount importance. The first prosecution signals to the world that we 
have gone from a regime where there had been no prosecutions to a regime where there 
has been at least one prosecution; this implies that the probability of future prosecutions 
has had a discrete jump up” (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002, p. 6). Thevenot (2012) 
argues that given the increased public enforcement in the period after the collapse of 
Enron the potential costs stemming from illegal insider trading increased and this 
disincentivised managers to extract private benefits from private information. The 
earlier empirical results by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) show that the introduction 
of insider trading regulation had no impact on the cost of equity until it was enforced, in 
which case the cost decreased but in their 2009 paper they claim regulation without 
enforcement is worse than no regulation as sometimes it may result in higher cost of 
capital. 
C. Insider Trading and Choice of Targets 
Manne (1966) believes that insider trading leads to a better alignment of incentives and 
is also an efficient way of compensating the managers for the information they generate  
which is also cheaper than well-designed compensation packages (Noe, 1997). On the 
other hand, Manne (1966) perceives insider trading also as a way of conveying 
undisclosed information to outsiders. Unfortunately, the signalling effect is somewhat 
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mixed. Purchases by insiders convey positive information about the firm’s future and 
lead to higher prices, but it is believed that the effect of sales by insiders is not as clear 
(Leland, 1992). Although Myers and Majluf (1984) put forward that sale of stock has a 
negative signalling effect, others point out that the disposal of shares by insiders might 
be motivated by the need to increase their liquidity and does not have to be a 
consequence of the existence of adverse information relating to the firm’s performance 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006). However, the strength of the signal will depend on what type of 
an insider is trading (Seyhun, 1986). According to the Information Hierarchy 
Hypothesis, trades by those insiders who may have better information about the true 
state of the company are more carefully watched than of those whose information may 
be more limited (Lin and Howe, 1990), because some insiders are simply more inside 
than others (Nunn et al., 1983). The value of information is additionally dependent on 
the existence of large shareholders. However, research shows that outsiders cannot use 
the signal extracted from insider’s trade decisions to earn abnormal returns (Seyhun, 
1986), despite the significant investments made to acquire data on trades carried out by 
those with private information (Doffou, 2003), pointing at significant corporate 
governance problems. 
 
Despite the fact that outsiders do not manage to extract value from private signals, 
Bhattacharya and Nicodano (2001) and Muelbroek (1992) claim that insider trading can 
benefit investors by making prices more informative which should result in better 
allocational efficiency in the securities markets as private information becomes public 
(Manne, 1966). According to Manne (1966), in the absence of insider trading, investors 
will want to be compensated for the information asymmetry and would demand higher 
return on their investments, increasing the overall cost of capital. Givoly and Palmon 
(1985) also see the advantages of insider trading. They perceive insiders as market-
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makers who install confidence in certain securities or even in the market overall. 
Additionally, Grossman (1986) finds that insider trading can increase the liquidity in the 
futures market but opponents claim that insider trading is both unethical and inefficient 
(Werhane, 1991). It can be effectively seen as an expropriation of property rights of the 
shareholders because insiders extract rents for their private benefit by trading on 
information which belongs to the whole firm (Moore, 1990). Besides, insiders’ 
competitive advantage distorts competition and leads to a situation where the outsiders 
can be excluded from the market (Doffou, 2003). It also makes the market riskier for 
outside investors (Moore, 1990) who have to protect themselves by increasing the bid-
ask spread (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). This results in a higher cost of capital – the opposite 
of what has been predicted by Manne. This explains the result of Masson and Madhavan 
(1991) who show that value of the firm is lower when there is insider trading. What 
follows, we ex ante expect insider trading to reduce accuracy of valuation and the net 
present value calculations of acquisitions, resulting from increased cost of capital and 
leading to a reduction in demand for targets in countries with weak insider trading 
regulation. 
D. Insider Trading and Bidding Process 
Although insider trading may be beneficial to investors as it allows the better informed 
to expropriate the less informed, it may also hurt the buyer in the acquisition process. 
Maug et al. (2008) divide the takeover process into two phases. The first one is the 
target price runup and the second is the announcement period. They put forward that “if 
there is insider trading, then we expect that more information about the increase in a 
total share price is revealed during or even before the runup phase, and that less 
information is revealed at the public announcement of the acquisition itself” (p. 4). 
Empirical results do indeed provide evidence that target firms experience a price 
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increase even before the announcement which may be interpreted as a proof for the 
existence of insider trading (Dodd, 1980; Keown and Pinketon, 1981; Asquith, 1983; 
Asquith et al., 1983; Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Cumming and Li, 2011). Although 
Maug et al. (2008) do not explain whether runups from insider trading mean that 
acquirers have to bear additional costs, we expect that such price increases are at least 
sometimes likely to result in an upward revision of an offer. Additionally, if the insider 
trading occurs before the commencement of the negotiations it is likely that the recent 
price increase will have an impact even on the initial offer, negatively affecting the 
buyer.  
E. Insider Trading: Summary 
Insider trading takes place when individuals use private information to execute trades 
which enables them to extract private benefits. The research shows that insiders indeed 
manage to generate abnormal returns from their trades. Manne (1966) argues that 
insider trading is beneficial to shareholders as it leads to a better alignment of 
managerial incentives with those of the equityholders and additionally provides an 
efficient compensation mechanism. However, others demonstrate that insider trading 
results in investment distortions (Bernardo, 2001) and in real life situations shareholders 
restrict the managers’ option to trade on such information (Bettis et al., 2000). What is 
more, research reveals that insider trading enables managers to extract private benefits 
when the firm is not doing well by disposing their shares and thereby signalling the 
company’s poor performance to the market. A further argument provided by Manne 
(1966) is that insider trading resolves some of the information asymmetry. 
Unfortunately, the signalling effect is not always clear (Leland, 1992). The power of the 
signal will depends on the person who generated it. However, research shows that those 
outsiders who decide to act on such signals do not earn abnormal returns (Seyhun, 
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1986). The existence of insider trading also has implications for capital markets. Some 
scholars put forward that the resolution of informational asymmetry is beneficial to 
investors as pricing efficiency installs confidence (Givoly and Palmon, 1985) and 
increases liquidity in the markets (Grossman, 1986). Others argue that it is a form of 
expropriation of property rights (Moore, 1990), which excludes outsiders from the 
market (Doffou, 2003) and thus makes the markets riskier (Moore, 1990), resulting in a 
higher bid-ask spread, raising the overall cost of capital. The literature also 
demonstrates that outsiders do not generally benefit from acting on such signals. Hence, 
transactions based on private information should discourage other market participants 
from buying or selling shares as investments are more risky. Although, we propose that 
insider trading may actually be beneficial to investors who should be drawn towards 
more informationally symmetric and therefore liquid markets, we also note that insider 
trading prior to the acquisition may hurt the buyer. Those individuals with private 
information may chose to acquire additional stakes during or even prior to the run-up 
phase which is likely to result in a higher offer price and a lower return for the acquirer. 
Hence, we conclude that the effect of insider trading regulations at a country-level is 
unclear but, following the research of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), we shall 
investigate not only the existence of such regulation but also the time at which it has 
been enforced.  
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Hypothesis 6a 
More UK funds will be allocated to countries where insider trading regulation has been 
introduced and enforced 
Hypothesis 6b 
Less UK funds will be allocated to countries where insider trading regulation has been 
introduced and enforce 
2.7. MEDIA COVERAGE 
A. Information Dissemination 
Media plays an important role in the corporate world and can easily influence corporate 
decisions (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). The first way in which it can impact the financial 
markets is through information dissemination (Dyck et al., 2008). Although news might 
have already been released, media allow them to reach broader audience (Chan et al., 
2003). This leads to a reduction in costs associated with the acquisition of information 
which can be substantial and have important implications for market participants. 
Individual investors may exhibit rational ignorance, as the potential benefit of the 
obtained information may outweigh the cost associated with its collection (Downs, 
1957). The dissemination feature allows better monitoring by the shareholders. At the 
same time well performing companies may become more efficient and attract additional 
funds. Empirical research proves this by showing that there is a strong link between 
stories covered in the media and stock price movements (Tetlock, 2007; Fang and 
Peress, 2009; Caretta et al., 2011; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011). However, as pointed 
out by Dyck and Zingales (2002), “demand for corporate governance news might 
 
 
47 
depend on the structure of corporate ownership. Thus, the extent of coverage and the 
consequent sanctioning role of the press are likely to be more important when a broad 
group of citizens have a personal interest in the outcomes, because of their direct or 
indirect (through pension funds) shareholdings” (p. 21).  
B. Media as Corporate Monitors 
The role of the media goes beyond information dissemination. It can also lead to a 
better alignment of managerial incentives with the aims of the shareholders. Evidence 
demonstrates that career prospects and future wages of the managers depend on the 
perception of their skills (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) but also on their 
performance when they are not monitored by the shareholders and have a chance to 
extract private benefits. Media help to discipline the managers by acting as corporate 
monitors, uncovering malpractices and sharing this information with the wider public 
(Dyck and Zingales 2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Barber and Odean, 2008; Core et al., 
2008). They can additionally “characterise manager’s actions and thereby, help to shape 
perceptions of those actions” (Liu and McConnell, 2013, p. 3). This will induce the 
investors to re-evaluate the future performance of the company on the basis of the 
disseminated news (Carretta et al., 2011). Prior research shows that coverage of 
corporate malpractices in Hong Kong leads to a 4.9% drop in share price and the size of 
the loss is positively correlated with the number of articles which initially cover the 
malpractice story (Chan et al., 2003). What is more, Dyck and Zingales (2004) noted 
that where the press is diffused, the extraction of private benefits is indeed less frequent, 
hence corporate governance standards are higher. We could argue that strong media 
coverage can to some extent increase the focus on shareholder value maximisation and 
be perceived as beneficial by investors.  
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C. Influence of Media on Corporate Decisions 
However, media enable selective reduction of costs associated with the collection and 
evaluation of information and thereby have the power to shape the reputation and the 
public image of companies and their directors (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). Dyck and 
Zingales (2002) postulate that managers may become sensitive to the way in which they 
are portrayed which pressures them to act in accordance with societal norms. If a 
managerial decision is disapproved in public, potential capital and reputational losses 
may outweigh the manager’s private benefits resulting from this particular investment. 
Such pressure may be beneficial or detrimental to the shareholders depending on what is 
well regarded by the public. “In countries where firing workers to increase profits is 
viewed negatively, creating the incentives for managers to do so will be extremely 
difficult, especially in highly visible companies” (Dyck and Zingales, 2002, p. 6). On 
the other hand, “where maximising shareholders’ value is the norm, any media account 
of underperformance has a significant impact” (Dyck and Zingales, 2002, p. 22). 
Additionally, it has been revealed that media can also influence capital allocation 
decisions made by the management. Journalists may encourage managers to abandon a 
project in hope that he will be able to recoup reputational losses (Liu and McConnell, 
2013). However, there is no consensus whether this effect is positive or negative 
(Zingales, 2000).  
 
The influence of the media is also significant for the attractiveness of the company in 
the capital markets. The models developed by Diamond (1989, 1991) and Gomes 
(2000) show that the manager’s reputation is very important not only for the 
shareholders, but for the financial markets in general. Given the ongoing need to secure 
new tranches of financing and the reputational effect on the cost of capital, self-
interested managers will show more discipline when their actions are observed by 
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providers of capital. Furthermore, attention of the media on companies with poor 
corporate governance can highlight structural issues and drive politicians to introduce 
better corporate laws (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). We shall not forget that politicians are 
also closely scrutinised by the public and lack of political action could also hurt their 
image.  
D. Media Coverage: Summary 
Media have a significant impact on corporate decisions and financial markets (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2002). This is attributable to their dissemination feature which allows the 
information (Dyck et al., 2008) to reach broader audience and to reduce the costs of 
information acquisition (Chan et al. 2003). Hence, we argue that increased media 
coverage can lead to a better alignment of managerial incentives with the aims of the 
shareholders, as it increases the impact of their actions on their reputation which is 
crucial for the managers in the labour market (Fama, 1980). The release of information 
enables investors to re-evaluate company’s prospects (Carretta et al., 2011). It has been 
shown that investors do indeed react negatively to news regarding corporate 
malpractices (Chan et al., 2003). What is more important, research has also shown that 
media coverage leads to a reduction in extraction of private benefits and hence increases 
corporate governance standards (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Additionally, media have 
the power to encourage the introduction of better reforms and improvements to 
corporate governance. They enable companies with good reputation to raise cheaper 
financing in the capital markets. However, building of the management’s reputation 
may prove costly to shareholders. Intensive media coverage means greater public 
scrutiny which, depending on the country and adopted social norms may mean that 
managers will deviate from shareholder-value-maximising behaviour making decisions 
which will grant them greater private benefits in the future. Some examples of such 
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behaviour may be bowing to environmental pressures, choosing not to fire some of the 
workforce or foregoing optimisation of taxation, all of which can be value-reducing 
(Dyck and Zingales, 2002). We recognise the importance of the information 
dissemination feature as it significantly lowers the costs associated with the collection 
of information which may be especially high when the target is located in another 
country. This is because, as noted by Brennan and Cao (1997), foreign investors have an 
information disadvantage when compared to local investors. However, we argue that the 
stronger effect will be the public scrutiny which may induce the managers to behave in 
a non-profit-maximising way. Hence, we use country-level press freedom as a proxy for 
both the quality and quantity of the available information.  
Hypothesis 7 
Less UK funds will be allocated to countries with more thorough media coverage 
2.8. ANALYST COVERAGE 
A. Analysts 
However, it is not only journalists who can help facilitate a better flow of information. 
In fact, financial analysts may be perceived as an even more reliable source when it 
comes to the acquisition of corporate news (Borden, 2006) and stronger incentives to 
remain objective (Dyck et al, 2009). It has been pointed out that journalists’ work may 
be to some extent influenced by the political and ideological beliefs of their editors or 
publishers (Borden, 2006). Therefore, financial analysts may be perceived as an 
alternative and more reliable source when it comes to collecting information on 
companies, especially as they have a skillset which enables them to better detect 
accounting fraud and point out financial inaccuracies (Borden, 2006). However, Bae et 
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al. (2008) hypothesise that “if the local advantage is location driven, we would expect 
that the local advantage is inversely related to the quality of the information put 
forward” and that “the local analyst advantage is significantly lower in countries with 
above-median accounting transparency” (p. 582). We expect analysts’ coverage 
intensity to be related to quite a few other variables. In line with Bhushanʼs (1989) 
research which documents that larger companies are usually followed by a greater 
number of analysts, we believe that companies with higher trading volume will attract 
more analyst attention (as trading volume is correlated with the size of the firm; Alford 
and Berger, 1999). The corporate ownership structure is also likely to influence the 
demand for analysts. Their services will be more sought after in locations where 
ownership is dispersed. In environments with concentrated ownership the information is 
more likely to be disseminated through private channels (Ball et al., 2000). The last two 
factors which can influence the discussed variable are economic freedom and the quality 
of public information available to investors (Chang et al., 2000). Countries which offer 
better disclosure requirements should have more analysts as such framework reduces 
costs associated with research (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al. (1999) present 
this proposition in a micro-company level setting).  
B. Incentives: Media vs. Analysts 
There is a clear advantage of analysts being corporate monitors. The financial theory 
predicts that monitoring will be done by investors who have a residual claim and their 
agents – analysts or auditors of financial statements (Fama, 1990). Given that the 
investors may be actually negatively impacted when fraud is revealed, they do not have 
a particularly strong incentive to disseminate this information. Hence, such news will 
only be available to those who have invested sufficient amount of resources to obtain 
the information. This is why analysts help to bring more efficiency to the markets. 
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Drawbacks of journalists coverage have been pointed out by Dyck et al. (2008). They 
argue that journalists’ career prospects may deteriorate if they decide to be the 
whistleblowers and such actions may in turn limit their access to valuable information. 
What follows is that that financial analysts may be better monitors although they are not 
directly compensated for detecting fraud. Instead they derive most value from enhanced 
reputation and better career prospects (Hong and Kubik, 2003) but this maybe to some 
extent limited by the conflict of interests which may arise if they want to report on one 
of their clients (Michaely and Womack, 1999). However, empirical data shows that 
whistleblowers are generally rewarded for their efforts either through promotions or by 
making it to the top of industry rankings (Dyck et al., 2008).  
C. Analyst Coverage: Summary 
In our research we recognise the superiority of information conveyed by financial 
analysts versus media. The former group usually posses much better analytical skills 
which enable them to accurately value companies and to spot any discrepancies which 
may be a sign of malpractice. The information delivered is highly focussed and is less 
prone to ideological manipulation than the content of the news published in the general 
media. Analysts also have stronger incentives to provide accurate and reliable 
information which helps them to build their reputation. Financial analysts make it easier 
for investors to identify attractive takeover targets. We, therefore, predict that investors 
will be attracted to locations where there is high analyst coverage.  
Hypothesis 8 
More UK funds will be allocated to countries with greater analyst coverage 
  
The table below summarises the hypotheses described above.  
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1. DATA 
The sample was collected from Thomson ONE Banker provided by the Thomson 
Financial Securities Data Corporation (UK database). It consists of mergers and 
acquisitions by UK companies that took place between January 1, 1993 and December 
31, 2012. The choice of the location of the acquirer has been motivated by fairly low 
number of publications on earnouts which study European transactions, the high level of 
M&A activity in the United Kingdom when compared with the rest of the countries in 
the region (WIR, 2015) and its physical proximity but different legal system when 
compared with the neighbouring nations. It includes transactions where the acquirer 
obtained a controlling stake in a foreign target. We limit the number of host-countries to 
the 48 initially analysed by La Porta et al. (1998). We sum the value of transactions for 
a given year in a given country and divide this number by the value of all the 
acquisitions of foreign targets in a given year to get a percentage of UK funds attracted 
by every country every year. The final sample consists of 960 country-year 
observations.  
The sample used encompasses several phases of M&A activity. These include the wave 
of 1993-2001, downturn of 2001-2002, the rise in takeover activity that started in 2003 
with a particularly high percentage of cross-border deals compared to the previous 
waves (Martynova and Renneboog, 2005), and the recent decline resulting from the 
financial crisis. Also, it is highly likely that our data set misses particularly many 
observations in the 1980s when information on transactions was not as well recorded 
and disseminated as it is now. 
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[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
The mean value of annual outbound investments by UK acquirers attracted by a given 
country over the period of 20 years ranges from USD74.5bn to USD1.5tr, which even 
when accounting for inflation (CPI) represents almost an 13-fold increase. The most 
popular destination in our sample is the US which on average attracted 37% of UK 
funds, followed by Germany and France with around 9%, while Australia and Sweden 
close the list of top 5 most sought after destinations with around 5%. 25% of all targets 
bought are located in common law countries. These countries attract on average 4.22% 
of UK funds each in any year, versus 1.38% invested on average in each of the civil law 
countries. Half of the sample relates to developing regions but the average percentage 
invested in such a country is only 0.34% of the total amount, versus 3.38% spent in 
every developed country every year.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
3.2. SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
A. Corporate Governance Indicators  
This research uses data on corporate governance as provided by Spamann (2010) and La 
Porta et al. (1998). The indices used include ‘Antidirector Rights’, ‘Creditor Rights’, 
and ‘Accounting Standards’. Additionally, we look at legal origin and ownership 
concentration and variables relating to insider trading laws and media/analyst coverage, 
as presented in the table below. We also use a wide spectrum of control variables which 
are described in more detail later on in this section of the paper. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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Reliability of the Antidirectors Rights Index 
Djankov et al. (2008) point out that the index measuring the degree of shareholder 
protection developed by La Porta et al. (1998) was formed on the basis of data collected 
in an ad hoc manner, whereas Spamann (2010) also adds that the original anti-directors 
index included many coding errors. The authors of the 2008 paper tried a new approach 
to better measure the shareholder protection and composed a revised index based on a 
questionnaire distributed to attorneys working at Lex Mundi law firms. The new index 
was supposed to focus more on corporate self-dealing and to be computed in a more 
theoretically consistent manner, which would lead to the creation of a more precise 
ranking. As noted by Spamann (2010), most of the previous coding discrepancies were 
accounted for and some of definitions were clarified, but the new index still did not 
provide an accurate depiction of the level on shareholder protection in the countries 
selected for this study. Hence, he decided to improve on that framework and this lead to 
the creation of a new index “that is conceptually continuous with the original but more 
clearly defined and more reliably coded” (p. 469). Although Martynova and Renneboog 
(2011) developed an index which also aims to measure corporate governance changes 
over time, it encompasses only the period between 1990 and 2005 which would exclude 
1/3 of our sample and also measures those parameters at four points in time, hence it is 
not truly dynamic. Given the above, Spamann’s index was selected as the most suitable 
basis for the analysis of antidirector rights in this paper.   
B. Control Variables 
We referred back to the existing literature on FDI flows where the research on M&A 
was scarce and included a range of variables which although do not relate to corporate 
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governance may influence the acquirer’s choice of host-nation. The motivation for the 
inclusion of the control variables listed in the above table is discussed next. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
GDP 
The literature on FDI puts forward that the size of the market (usually proxied as the 
GNP or GDP of a country) can to some extent reflect the market attractiveness (Busse 
and Hefeker, 2005). Vertical FDI can benefit from economies of scale and therefore 
lower average fixed costs but horizontal FDI would be indifferent towards the size of 
the host country. A survey conducted by the World Bank targeted 173 manufacturing 
investors and looked at the determinants which increase the likelihood of investing in 
one of the East Asian economies (Kawaguchi, 1994). The results have shown that size 
is one of the top three determinants which influence their decision, while Chakrabarti 
(2001) claimed that GNP/GDP per capita is probably the most important factor for 
investors. The existing research supports this finding. Lunn (1980) who looked at US 
investments in the EEC shows that size is a significant factor and this result holds not 
only for developing countries (Root and Ahmed, 1979; Schneider and Frey, 1985; 
Torrisi, 1985; Petrochilas, 1989; Wheeler and Mody, 1992) but also globally (Bandera 
and White, 1968).  
GDP Growth 
However, according to Ohlin (1933) flow of investment funds is driven not by market 
size but by high profitability in the growing markets and therefore high GDP rates may 
indicate potential for exceptionally attractive investment returns (Busse and Hefeker, 
2005). Newer research postulates that there might be a problem of endogeneity 
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(Carkovic and Levine, 2002) and there is mixed evidence on the effect of the GDP 
growth on FDI when we control for market size (Pearce et al., 1992). 
Physical Distance 
One of the factors not related to corporate governance but which may influence the 
acquirer’s decision where to invest is the location of the target. “The Church-Tower 
Principle implies that the difficulty for the lending bank in assessing the default 
probability of a borrowing firm increases with the distance to it” (Carling and 
Lundberg, 2002, p. 16). We can extend this framework to M&A transactions and state 
that one should only invest in companies near you simply because you know the market. 
This also explains home bias, i.e. investors’ preference to invest in firms located in their 
proximity (see for example Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Larger distance may mean 
higher information asymmetries while Basu and Chevrier (2011) provide evidence that 
in M&A it leads to lower abnormal returns for the acquiring company and greater 
likelihood of using stock as a medium of exchange.  
Cultural Distance 
An additional factor linked closely to the physical proximity is cultural distance. It is 
believed that it can increase the complexity of a transaction (Dewenter, 1995), while 
cultural clashes can reduce the value of synergies, thus decreasing the likelihood of 
merger success. Although Page (2007) argued that cultural distance can have a positive 
effect by facilitating innovation and helping to solve problems, recent research provided 
evidence in favour of a more negative prediction. It has been confirmed that returns for 
cross-border M&A are lower when the target and the acquirer are more culturally 
distant (e.g. Datta and Puia, 1995; Chakrabarti et al., 2003; Ahern et al., 2012). 
Additionally, this variable has been shown to have a significant effect not only on the 
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level of foreign direct investment (Guiso et al., 2009) but also on the volume of M&A 
(Ahern et al., 2012).  
Tax 
The rate of return on investment in a given country will depend on the rate of taxation. 
As a consequence, Mukherjee et al. (2004) identify tax savings as one of the reasons for 
M&A activity. Multinational corporations may locate their activities in tax havens in 
order to employ transfer pricing and increase firm value. Dharmapala (2008) finds that 
the so called tax havens attract a large fraction of FDI, but the multivariate analysis 
carried out by the World Bank found that taxation was of little or no importance to 
investors (Kawaguchi, 1994). A further observation by Dharmapala (2008) is that 
havens are more likely to be of British legal origin and to use English as their official 
language.  
Political Stability 
Another dimension of risk is political stability. “The threat of incidence of civil wars, 
political violence, trade sanctions or an all-out war increases the risk premium of 
investment project, thus reducing overall investment” (Busse and Hefeker, 2005, p. 14) 
and a survey of executives proves that it is the second most important determinant of 
FDI after the market potential (Aharoni, 1966), but the results from empirical research 
are mixed. While Bennett and Green (1972) find that decisions of US investors are not 
affected by the political developments in the host country, Levis (1979) notes that the 
level of investment will be higher if there are no aggressive acts against groups and 
officeholders but it will be lower when there are more strikes and riots in the host 
country (Schneider and Frey, 1985). Furthermore, the frequency of changes in 
government leadership is also likely to affect the attractiveness of a particular location 
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(Root and Ahmed, 1979). We use the Political Constraint Index Dataset developed by 
Henisz (2010) to control for this effect. 
Corruption 
Corruption is yet another factor which may be a significant repellent of funds. We 
expect that investors will be less likely to look for targets in countries which are corrupt 
as this increases their costs and riskiness of doing business. The empirical results by 
Wei (2000a,b) prove that corruption effectively deters FDI but research by Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) on US manufacturing FDI reveales that it is insignificant and this has been 
supported in further work by Busse and Hefeker (2005). 
Inflation 
One other important factor which can impact the acquirer’s decision are movements in 
the host country’s currency. A high level of inflation is perceived as undesirable by 
investors and shows lack of fiscal discipline at a country level. “A high rate of inflation 
is a sign of internal economic tension and of the inability or unwillingness of the 
government and the central bank to balance the budget and to restrict money supply” 
(Schneider and Frey, 1985, p. 165). High inflation reduces the stability of exchange 
rates and should also find a reflection in the discount rate used to assess the 
attractiveness of potential projects. This is supported in the empirical literature which 
confirms that inflation affects the level of FDI and high pace of appreciation in prices 
does indeed deter investors (see for example Apergis and Katrakilidis, 1998; Garibaldi 
et al., 2001; Busse and Hefeker, 2005).  
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Foreign Exchange 
The last two factors which we look at are related to foreign exchange. Changes in the 
value of currencies can also have an effect on investment decisions. Froot and Stein 
(1991) claim that “a depreciated currency can give foreigners an edge in buying control 
of productive corporate assets” (p. 1215), while it can also urge investors to relocate 
their funds from countries whose currencies have appreciated too much to remain 
profitable when exporting goods to those regions that still offer good rates of return. 
Although fluctuations in exchange rates can be hedged, a persistent shift in currency 
value cannot be offset using financial instruments and has to be dealt with by means of 
corporate strategy change. Some studies looking at US targets show that they tend to 
gain more when the currency of the buyer is strong (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; 
Swenson, 1993; Kang, 1993; Servaes and Zenner, 1994) but others find that the 
currency strength is of no effect (Cebenoyan et al., 1992; Feils, 1993 and Dewenter, 
1995a,b). We additionally control for the volatility of exchange rates in the target 
country as such movements may increase the riskiness of the overall project and thereby 
discourage potential investors.  
3.3. METHODOLOGY  
The proportion of funds invested in a given country (i) in year (t) is estimated using a 
fractional logit model, as presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). The motivation 
for using generalised linear model with a binomial distribution and a logit link function 
is based on the fact that the independent variable is expressed as a proportion and can 
only take values between 0 and 1. Hence, the OLS would be inappropriate for two 
reasons: a) it would predict values which may be outside of this particular range and b) 
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it could result in parameter bias where the dependent variable is equal to 0 and occurs 
frequently.  
The regressions include variables previously discussed and listed in the preceding 
section of Data and Methodology. The models use country-level clustering and 
incorporate variables which describe the corporate governance of a given country. The 
research investigates how these influence the proportion of funds flowing from the UK 
to a given country in a given year. The model is the following:  
 
, where 
 
- intercept, 
- vector of independent variables, , 
  - error term. 
A sample model is presented below:  
 
 
A list of the models created for the purpose of this research is presented together with 
the discussion and interpretation of the results in the following section. Given the wide 
range of potential control variables, in the main output tables we only use those that 
have exhibited some level of significance. Models including other control variables are 
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available in the appendix. Additionally, after investigating the correlation matrix, we 
report that dependent variables are not highly correlated with each other (highest 
correlation at 0.47 level). 
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4. RESULTS AND EVIDENCE 
4.1. ONE DIMENSION 
We first look at the impact of every dimension in isolation (Table 5). In Model 1 we test 
the significance of the common law legal system on the amount being invested in a 
given country in a given year. Contrary to our prediction, we find that the effect of law 
origin in the target country is not statistically significant. Further analysis leads us to 
believe that ownership concentration, shareholder protection level, accounting standards 
and enforcement of insider trading laws are not statistically significant either (Models 2, 
3, 5, 6). Stronger creditor protection as predicted in the hypothesis has a negative impact 
on the proportion invested by UK acquirers which is reduced by 0.39 percentage points 
for every one unit increase in the Creditor Rights Index (Model 4), while the 
introduction of insider trading laws reduces the amount invested by 0.03 percentage 
points. In a one dimensional setting we also discover that that the number of analysts is 
correlated with high numbers of UK investors and has a significant but small effect 
(Model 8, 0.13 percentage points). The opposite is true for press freedom index but this 
variable is of no statistical importance (Model 9). The models include between 862 and 
474 observations and are all statistically significant at a 1% significance level. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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4.2. MULTIDIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS 
Legal System 
Based on the Positive Spillover Theory (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a) and 
existing evidence provided by Albuquerque et al. (2013) we developed a hypothesis that 
bidders from common law countries should be encouraged to buy targets in locations 
which are governed by civil law, as they offer additional potential for extraction of 
private benefits (H1, Table 1). This has not seen support in the results provided by our 
one-dimensional analysis. Furthermore, the insignificance of this result holds even after 
we control for other dimensions of corporate governance (Models 10-13). This makes 
us reject our hypothesis and indicates that a potential adoption of a different legal 
system is not sufficient to attract or deter investors. 
Ownership Concentration 
Although this has not been observed in a one-dimensional setting, to our surprise and 
contrary to our hypothesis (H2, Table 1), concentrated ownership deters investors. The 
marginal effect of ownership concentration is a significant variable, decreasing the 
percentage invested in a given country in a given year by 5.88 percentage points (Model 
11). This may indicate that the free-riding problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980) may not 
be as severe, as initially perceived. On the other hand, in line with Jarrell et al. (1988) 
this outcome may be an indication that large investors are more active when it comes to 
voting on corporate matters. They can also be more successful when opposing unwanted 
bids or more efficient at leveraging their bargaining power while negotiating higher 
premia (Dahlquist et al., 2013) for their foregone extraction of future private benefits, 
both of which would effectively discourage investors resulting in a lower deal value for 
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a given country. However, the effect appears only in one regression, hence it is not very 
persistent.  
Shareholder Protection 
Although it has not been proven to be significant in a one-dimensional fractional logit 
(Model 3), in line with our hypothesis (H3, Table 1), we find that stronger shareholder 
protection deters investors. We see that the amount invested decreases by 0.73 
percentage points for one point increase in the index (Model 13). This implies that 
controlling shareholders should be able to extract private benefits either in the form of a 
salary, transfer pricing, subsidised personal loan, corporate theft, sale of a controlling 
stake or freezing out the minority (Burkart et al., 1988; La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et 
al., 2000; Gilson and Gordon, 2003) and the value of those private benefits should be 
greater than the monitoring costs incurred in the process. Furthermore, this result may 
indicate that the problem cannot be overcome by the imposition of rigorous judicial 
review as proposed by Gilson and Gordon (2003). An alternative explanation is that 
well protected shareholders do manage to secure an additional premium, as argued by 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) and this incentivises investors to look for cheaper targets and 
those can be found in countries where the shareholder protection is weak. This is 
because shareholders prone to potential expropriation will require an additional 
premium, increasing the cost of capital and thus reducing the net present value of such 
an investment. 
Creditor Protection  
The empirical outcome of this analysis supports our hypothesis (H4, Table 1) and the 
result from one-dimensional framework (Model 4) that strong creditor protection does 
deter investors, reducing the amount invested in a given country by 1.35 percentage 
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points for every one point increase in the creditor protection index (Model 10). This is 
because although leverage can be seen as a way of solving the problem of misalignment 
of managerial incentives (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the introduction of debt means 
that there is an additional group whose interest should also be taken care of and this can 
to some extent achieved through carefully drafted regulation. Our results provide 
evidence that the existence of such covenants and strict regulation have a significant 
impact on shareholders’ decision where to invest. This effect stems from the 
management’s need to reduce the overall riskiness of the company or investors’ concern 
with regard to potential inefficient liquidation in case of bankruptcy. It is unclear what 
feature of creditor protection is the main deterrent but it has been shown that strong 
creditor protection may lead to co-insurance of cash flows (Asquith and Kim, 1982), 
resulting in a suboptimal allocation of capital and potentially inefficient liquidation in 
case of bankruptcy (Acharya et al., 2011) and effectively becoming a drawback on 
entrepreneurial setting (Manso, 2005) and a hindrance to innovation (Acharya and 
Subramanian, 2009), all of which discourage investors and incentivise them to choose 
jurisdictions where the interests of debtholders do not attract as much attention from 
legal bodies.  
Accounting Standards 
As predicted, high accounting standards of the host country discourage investors to 
pursue acquisitions (H5, Table 1). A one point increase in the accounting standards 
index reduces the amount invested in a given country by 0.08 percentage points (Model 
11). High transparency should help to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry 
prevalent prior to the actual acquisition by helping investors to more accurately value 
the target and giving them better insight into how the company is performing. The 
facilitation of better monitoring is expected to lead to greater profitability (Bushman 
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and Smith, 2003) and more efficient allocation of resources (Weil, 2002), while also 
forming a basis for active capital markets (Black, 2000 and Ball, 2001) characterised by 
high liquidity (Diamon and Verrecchia, 1991) and lower cost of capital (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 2000) but the empirical evidence shows that the demanding accounting 
requirements indeed become more of a burden once the target has been taken over. 
From the acquirer’s perspective this might be caused by a couple of factors. Firstly, the 
owners who now control the majority of the shares do not require higher transparency to 
monitor the company as they should be able to effectively request that from the 
management and disclosing too much information post-acquisition could destroy their 
competitive advantage at a company level. Secondly, increased monitoring could mean 
fewer possibilities of extraction of private benefits through the expropriation of the 
minority shareholders or other third-parties. Hence, it is not surprising that investors 
prefer to pursue projects in countries which offer them the possibility of retaining their 
competitive advantage and allow for extraction of private benefits.  
Insider Trading  
Although the introduction of insider trading laws had a significant and negative effect in 
a one dimensional setting, both enforcement and existence of such laws prove to be of 
no importance when we include more variables in our model (Models 10-13). This 
stands in contrast to our initial hypothesis (no. 6a/b). However, the significance in the 
one dimensional framework may be due to the omission of other significant corporate 
governance variables present in the multidimensional regressions. Although as put 
forward by Manne (1966), insider trading should lead to informational improvements, 
installing confidence (Givoly and Palmon, 1985) and increasing liquidity in the markets 
(Grossman, 1986), our analysis shows that this is not necessarily true, unless the 
insignificance of the variable is a result of two clashing effects, the second being the 
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threat of expropriation of the acquirers by domestic investors. Regardless of the drivers 
behind these effects, we can conclude that any differences insider trading regulations 
are of no significance to UK investors who cannot benefit by expropriating minority 
shareholders after the acquisition, as they are governed by UK laws (sometimes 
additionally subject to US regulation in case of cross-listings) and do not seem to be 
particularly attracted by the potential increase in transparency and liquidity. This is in 
line with our hypothesis that the effect is ambiguous (H6a/b, Table 1).  
Analyst Coverage 
In accordance with Hypothesis 8 (Table 1), the number of analysts is a positive and 
significant variable. An increase in the average number of analysts per firm by one 
analyst increases the amount invested in a given country by 0.10-0.32 percentage points 
(Models 10-13). Although the effect is rather small, it is very persistent as the variable 
remains statistically significant in all the regressions. It has been argued that analysts 
have better incentives than journalists (Dyck et al., 2009) to remain objective and have 
a better skillset which can help them to provide informed judgement on the company’s 
financial state, making them active monitors. Hence, controlling shareholders may not 
always favourably perceive thorough coverage which may adversely affect their wealth 
and point at managerial malpractices such as extraction of private benefits. However, 
we perceive analyst coverage also as an indication of the transparency or the 
development of the financial market in a particular country. Of course, the information 
provided by analysts is a lot more focussed and specific than what is made public in 
general media. In addition, given the reputational consequences most of it is also highly 
reliable. Also, greater number of analysts in a given country means that the universe of 
potential targets with high visibility will be higher. Additionally, we can argue that 
analysts provide information investors are mostly interested in but there also might be a 
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problem of reversed causality, i.e. the coverage is the greatest where investors invest the 
most. 
Media Coverage 
On the basis of our analysis, we fail to obtain statistically significant results (Models 12-
13) with regard to the hypothesis that more thorough media coverage reduces the 
country’s attractiveness to investors (H7, Table 1). We have initially put forward that 
increased coverage should reduce the cost of information acquisition by facilitation 
information dissemination (Chan et al., 2003; Dyck et al., 2008) enabling better 
valuation and monitoring. The threat of uncovering of malpractices can lead to a better 
alignment of managerial incentives with those of the shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 
2002; Johnson et al., 2005; Barber and Odean, 2008; Core et al., 2008) and the existing 
research has indeed proven that coverage of such stories results in significant stock 
price movements (Tetlock, 2007; Fang and Peress, 2009; Caretta et al., 2011; Engelberg 
and Parsons, 2011), while diffusion of press is negatively correlated with the frequency 
of extraction of private benefits.  On the other hand, the increased scrutiny can make it 
harder for controlling shareholders to extract private benefits. The first explanation as to 
why the variable proves to be insignificant is that the information disseminated by the 
media is not what investors demand and find useful to value a company. We also may 
argue that the increased media monitoring does not concern investors. An alternative 
explanation is that these two act in opposite directions, i.e. the presence of free media 
makes valuations easier and hence attracts investors but some of them may be reluctant 
to invest in countries where they will be closely monitored by journalists because they 
do not want to make themselves subject to public pressure resulting from such press 
freedom.  
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Control Variables  
In the models discussed above we have chosen to mainly control for the GDP of the 
host country and its pace of growth (annual GDP change). In line with Busse and 
Hefeker (2005) and Kawaguchi (1994) we find that the size of the market can to some 
extent reflect the market attractiveness for potential investors. However, it is not only 
the size but also the growth rate of a country that attracts investors, as argued by Ohlin 
(1933) and Busse and Hefeker (2005). Although the causality is not clear (Carkovic and 
Levine, 2002), our research documents that the two are positively correlated. Previous 
studies also indicated that physical distance may also play a role because as argued by 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) investors prefer to invest in their proximity, also because 
farther away targets are likely to be characterised by higher information asymmetries 
(Basu and Chevrier, 2011). However, the empirical results have shown that the physical 
location of the target country is not as important as its culture (physical distance is 
statistically insignificant). In line with Ahern et al. (2012), we prove that countries 
which are culturally more similar to the acquiring company attract more funds. This 
may be partially explained by lower complexity of transactions involving firms with 
similar cultural backgrounds.  
The remaining control variables have proven to be of no statistical importance, 
indicating that most of the decisions made by UK investors are motivated by corporate 
governance factors, market size/growth and its similarity in terms of culture. Criteria 
such as foreign exchange fluctuations, volatility, inflation, political stability and 
corruption seem to be neglected by investors (empirical results available in Table 10 in 
the appendix section).  
 The test of joint significance shows that all of the above models are statistically 
significant.  
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[Insert Table 6 around here] 
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1. ALTERNATIVE SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION MEASURES 
As one of robustness checks we additionally look at two alternative measures of 
shareholder protection. First, we re-run all the models (Table 7) using the Antidirector 
Rights Index as provided in La Porta et al. (1998). The results of the regressions 
regarding creditor protection and analyst coverage remain broadly in line with the ones 
obtained using Spamann’s index. However, variables describing ownership 
concentration and the level of shareholder protection are now insignificant. Contrary to 
our hypothesis, we find that common law legal system encourages UK investors to 
acquire abroad (Model 14). Acquisitions involving different legal systems may result in 
further complications which may arise during potential court proceedings when the 
transaction is not fully successful. UK investors may be more inclined to invest in 
common law countries as such transactions would simplify the legal process and would 
also give them more protection in case of any difficulties arising during or after the 
acquisition.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
The second alternative is the Antidirectors Rights Index as provided by Djankov et al. 
(2008). One difference between the results obtained using the newer index when 
compared to the results generated using data aggregated by La Porta et al. (1998) is the 
negative effect of concentrated ownership and accounting standards (Table 8, Model 
19). However, this result is in line with our findings when we employ Spamann’s Index 
to measure the level of shareholder protection.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
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In none of the models is the level of shareholding protection, press freedom and 
introduction and enforcement of anti-insider trading regulation a significant variable. 
All of the models describes above are statistically significant.  
5.2. INDEX COMPONENTS 
In our regressions we include two variables which are actually indices. In order to check 
the robustness of our results, to understand the mechanisms better and to analyse 
potential issues relating to the way the indices used were composed, we additionally test 
the significance of the components within each of the indices. The first one is the 
Shareholder Protection Index, the components of which are ‘Proxy By Mail Allowed’, 
‘Shares Not Blocked Before Meeting’, ‘Cumulative Voting/Proportional 
Representation’, ‘Oppressed Minority’, ‘Preemptive Right to New Issues’ and 
‘Percentage of Shares to Call an Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting’, all of which are 
described in more detail in the Data and, Methodology section. The analysis shows that 
only three of the variables in that index are of statistical significance. Not surprising is 
the positive effect of ‘Proxy By Mail’ (Model 22) which enables shareholders, also 
those incumbent ones, to exercise their power when it comes to voting on corporate 
matters from abroad. However, the analysis indicates two opposing results, because on 
one hand the preemptive right to new issues, which effectively acts as a poison pill adds 
complexity to potential transactions and deters investors. On the other hand, investors 
are attracted by countries which offer cumulative voting and proportional representation 
as this makes it easier for investors to increase voting influence without obtaining full 
control. This is because in such cases investors can appoint board members of their 
choice or convince other investors to vote in favour of certain motions. If proportional 
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representation is not in place, this would be harder to achieve due to concentrated 
control.  
The second index which we investigate more closely is the Creditor Protection Index. It 
is made of four components, which are ‘No Automatic Stay on Assets’, ‘Secured 
Creditors Paid First’, ‘Restrictions for Going into Reorganisation’ and ‘Management 
Does Not Stay in Reorganisation’. The description of all the variables is available in 
subsection 3.2., as in the case of the previous index. Having analysed all the four 
components, we spot that only one of the variables which has an impact on creditor 
protection is significant in the context of our research. The only variable which seems to 
drive the negative impact of ‘Creditor Protection’ is the condition that the management 
does not stay in reorganisation, which obviously provides an indication that more power 
is given to the creditors rather than the shareholders and those running the business.  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
As shown above not all the index components are significant and as in the case of 
shareholder protection measures some of the variables work in opposing directions. 
This obviously brings more noise into our analysis and hence it is not surprising that the 
previously built models do not show consistent results with regard to creditor and 
shareholder protection. 
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6. LIMITATIONS 
Corporate Governance Measures 
For the purpose of this research we use the widely adopted index by La Porta et al. 
(1998). The measures of different dimensions of corporate governance, as provided by 
the aforementioned authors, are static, i.e. the index does not change over time. One 
could argue that corporate governance does not change from year to year. However, 
given that in this paper we look at transactions which took place between 1993 and 
2012 in 48 countries, it is likely that the standards have evolved, especially in the 
developing countries which had to adapt their systems to the changing environment, in 
order to catch up with the level of corporate governance of the already developed 
countries. Additionally, the study includes a range of variables which are time-invariant 
and they may capture the described effect or some other time-invariant, country-specific 
characteristic.  
Limited Data 
Apart from the information provided by La Porta et al. (1998), in our research we also 
include data on introduction and enforcement of insider trading regulation, which leads 
to a minor loss in the number of observations in our models. Further reduction occurs 
when we add data on analyst coverage. However, the variable which limits the number 
of observations in our models the most is the press freedom. In addition, the described 
variables are also static in their nature which limits the accuracy of our research. 
 
 
77 
Shareholder Concentration 
In the context of this research we have looked at shareholder concentration as defined in 
La Porta et al. (1988), which may not be the most accurate depiction of shareholder 
activism. The most accurate proxy would be the approach proposed by Fich et al. 
(2013) which has been described in section 2.2.C. 
Ideas for Future Research 
The above analysis has provided some insight into the importance of different 
dimensions of corporate governance standards for international investors. In order to 
deepen our analysis and understanding of investors’ behaviour, one could look at 
corporate governance at a company level, which would additionally provide guidance 
for corporations which aim to make themselves more desirable to international equity 
investors. Although some dimensions of corporate governance should apply uniformly 
at country level (e.g. legal system, shareholder protection regulation, accounting 
standards, insider trading regulation, media coverage intensity), others should be studied 
separately for each transaction, as they will vary from one target company to another 
(e.g. ownership concentration, creditor protection reflected in debt covenants, analyst 
coverage). Further research could also analyse transactions carried out by investors 
based in countries other than the UK, especially those with relatively poor corporate 
governance standards in order to get a broader picture of the drivers behind FDI flows.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have looked at the impact of corporate governance standards on 
takeover decisions of UK investors. Overall, we put forward that higher standards 
should deter investors, with the exception of thorough analyst coverage which we 
assumed should have a positive effect on the volume of transactions. While the 
assumption stemmed from the fact that analysts have better incentives and skillset to 
actively monitor companies, we also recognised that investors who already acquired a 
company may not also like that kind of attention. Overall our assumption found support 
in the empirical evidence which may be an indication that more thorough investor 
coverage should lead to increased transparency and larger universe of well-covered 
targets making them more visible to cross-border investors. However, one should also 
be cautious interpreting the results as there may exist potential problem of reversed 
causality. Media coverage has proven to be of no statistical significance. Although 
media decrease the costs of information acquisition, the increased visibility of potential 
malpractices can lead to a better alignment of managerial incentives and lower the 
probability of extraction of private benefits. Our result may be an indication that 
investors are either not concerned by the public scrutiny or they are not interested in the 
information provided by journalists. Alternatively, the two effects can be cancelling 
each other out.  
The results with regard to accounting standards, shareholder and creditor protection are 
in line with our predictions, i.e. all of the above have a negative effect on the amount 
being invested in a given country. Despite the fact that higher accounting standards 
increase transparency reducing the cost of capital, increasing liquidity and making it 
easier to find reliable accounting information necessary to value a target, they also 
reduce the potential for extraction of additional benefits by investors and may hinder 
 
 
79 
competitive advantage. Higher accounting standards are perceived as more of a burden 
by potential buyers after the change of ownership. The same effect holds for higher 
shareholder protection which makes potential expropriation of other investors more 
troublesome and costly. Better protection of shareholders also means that they require a 
lower cost of capital which then is reflected in higher target valuation incentivising 
acquirers to look for targets in countries where such standards are weaker. The same can 
be concluded for creditor protection. Strict standards may result in suboptimal 
allocation of resources by the management and give rise to the threat of inefficient and 
premature liquidation in case of bankruptcy, encouraging investors to look for targets in 
countries where creditor protection is weak.   
Furthermore, international investors do not seem to benefit from the introduction or 
enforcement of insider trading regulation in the host country, as this variable remains 
insignificant. This might be due to the fact that the acquirers are mainly subject to UK 
regulations or US, in case of most cross-listings making the regulation of the host 
country less important than in the case of domestic investors. However, to our surprise 
we found that legal origin is of no statistical significance. Only robustness checks have 
shown that the legal system can impact the investors’ decision where to invest but the 
result stood in contrast to our initial prediction. We discovered that, contradictory to the 
Spillover Hypothesis, UK investors prefer locations with the same legal system as at 
home. This might be driven by reluctance to get involved in complex legal proceedings 
which may arise when the target is from a civil law system. Lastly, although we 
expected that concentrated ownership should help facilitate acquisitions by reducing the 
free-riding problem, our results have shown the opposite. The proposed explanation is 
that higher ownership concentration not only increases the ability to collude but also the 
capacity to negotiate higher premia, deterring investors or simply blocking potential 
acquisitions. One important take-away from this analysis is that the prevalent strive 
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towards higher corporate governance standards will not necessarily lead to higher 
inbound M&A, as generally perceived. In fact, our results prove the opposite. Further 
research looking into corporate governance at a company level could provide valuable 
information with regard to the extent corporate governance impacts acquisition 
decisions in cross-border setting.  
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9. APPENDICES 
Table 1 - Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis No. Variable 
Predicted 
Effect 
1 Codified Law + 
2 Concentrated Ownership + 
3 Shareholder Protection - 
4 Creditor Protection - 
5 Accounting Standards - 
6 Insider Trading Regulation -/+ 
7 Media Coverage - 
8 Analyst Coverage + 
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Figure 1 - UK Outbound M&A 1993-2012 
(in millions USD) 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Sample Statistics 
 
   
  % of annual funds invested % of all the countries 
Panel A. Target Countries (top 5) !!
USA! 37.00%! *!
Germany! 9.26%! *!
France! 9.19%! *!
Australia! 5.42%! *!
Sweden! 5.14%! *!
! ! !
Panel B. Legal System  !! !!
Average!per!common!law!country! 4.22%! 25.00%!
Average!per!civil!law!country! 1.38%! 75.00%!
! ! !
Panel C. Country Characteristics! !! !!
Average!per!developed!country! 3.38%! 50.00%!
Average!per!developing!country! 0.34%! 50.00%!
! ! !
!
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Table 3 - Summary of Independent Variables 
Name Description Source 
Legal System 
Legal Origin Equal to 1 if the target country is governed by common law and 0 otherwise La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Ownership Concentration 
Ownership The average percentage of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders in 
the 10 largest nonfinancial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Shareholder Protection 
Antidirector 
Rights Index 
An index corrected by Spamann and based on the original data aggregated by La 
Porta et al. (1998). The index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country allows 
shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to 
deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting; (3) cumulative voting 
or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) 
an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) shareholders have preemptive 
rights that can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote or (6) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median). The 
index ranges from zero to six 
Spamann (2010) 
Creditor Protection 
Creditor Rights An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when 
(1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum 
dividends to file for reorganisation; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession 
of their security once the reorganisation petition has been approved (no automatic 
stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that 
result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does 
not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganisation. The index ranges from 0 to 4 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Accounting Standards 
Accounting 
Standards 
Index created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual reports on 
International accounting their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into 
seven categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum of three 
companies in each country were studied. The companies represent a cross-section of 
various industry groups; industrial companies represented 70 percent, and financial 
companies represented the remaining 30 percent 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
 Insider Trading  
Insider Trading 
Laws 
Equal to 1 if the country has already introduced anti-insider trading laws, for a given 
country for a given year, 0 otherwise 
Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) 
Insider Trading 
Enforcement 
Equal to 1 if the country has been a prosecution under these laws in the past, for a 
given country for a given year, 0 otherwise 
Bhattacharya and 
Daouk (2002) 
Media 
Analyst Coverage The average number of analysts per firm as collected from IBES for the paper 
Analyst Activity Around the World 
Chang et al. (2000) 
Press Freedom 
Index 
The countries are scored according to six general criteria. Using a system of 
weighting for each possible response, countries are given a score between 0 and 100 
for each of the following criteria: Pluralism, Media Independence, Environment and 
self-censorship, Legislative Framework, Transparency and Infrastructure 
Reporters without 
Boarders 
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Table 4 - Summary of Control Variables 
Name  Description  Source 
Control Variables 
GDP GDP in US dollars for every year and every country World Bank 
GDP Change GDP change for every year and every country World Bank 
Physical Distance Physical distance between countries in miles K. Skrede 
Gleditsch 
Cultural Distance Made up of six factors: Power Distance, Individualism versus 
Collectivism, Masculinity vs. Femininity, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
Long-term vs. Short-term Orientation, Indulgence vs. Restraint; rated 
0-100 
Hofstede 
Tax Corporate tax rate for every year and every country KPMG 
Political Stability Dataset containing 90 variables that measures various features of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.  
Henisz  
Corruption An index measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
Inflation Rate of inflation expressed as a percentage for each of the years and 
every country 
World Bank 
Exchange Rate 
Change 
Annual appreciation/depreciation of the local currency calculated 
from the exchange rate expressed as local currency units for a US 
dollar, for every country and every year  
World Bank 
Exchange Rate 
Volatility 
Volatility calculated as the absolute percentage change in the local 
currency units for a US dollar against last year, for every country and 
every year  
World Bank 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! 
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Table 5 - One Dimension 
Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
 
!
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where 
country-level clustering has been used. The first nine variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also include control variables such as ‘GDP 
growth’, ‘Log GDP’, ‘Distance’ and ‘Cultural distance’. All the variables are described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control variables). 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Common Law 0.0031
(0.0072)
Ownership -0.0442
(0.0299)
Shareholder Protection -0.0007
(0.0024)
Creditor Protection -0.0039**
(0.0018)
Accounting Standards 0.0003
(0.0007)
IT Enforcement -0.0006
(0.0004)
IT Laws -0.0003*
(0.0002)
No. of Analysts 0.0013***
(0.0005)
Press Freedom -0.0003
(0.0003)
GDP growth 0.0009** 0.0010** 0.0011** 0.0013*** 0.0014** 0.0014** 0.0007** 0.0013*** 0.0006
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Log GDP 0.0162*** 0.0147*** 0.0168*** 0.0164*** 0.0181*** 0.0185*** 0.0133*** 0.0129*** 0.0154***
(0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Cultural Distance -0.0113*** -0.0125*** -0.0124*** -0.0123*** -0.0126** -0.0159** -0.0103** -0.0129*** -0.0093**
(0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0052) (0.0080) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0043)
Distance -1.46e-06 -1.64e-06 -1.32ee-06 -1.42E-06* -1.45e-06 -2.13e-06 -1.60E-06 -4.47e-07 -1.21e-06
(1.14e-06) (1.10e-06) (9.44e-07) (8.26e-07) (1.05e-06) (1.92e-06) (1.29E-06) (9.16e-07) (6.94e-07)
No. of observations 862 802 822 822 747 547 822 742 474
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-squared 265.8 404.18 252.83 255.33 223.88 273.15 649.31 213.07 205.81
Pseudo R2 31.94% 32.32% 32.34% 32.30% 34.00% 39.22% 32.42% 32.95% 60.07%
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Table 6 - Multidimensional Analysis Results 
Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
!
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable 
is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where country-level clustering has been 
used. The first nine variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also 
include control variables such as ‘GDP growth’, ‘Log GDP’, ‘Distance’ and ‘Cultural distance’. All the 
variables are described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control 
variables). 
!
 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Common Law 0.0280 0.0049 0.0162 0.0110
(0.0177) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0217)
Ownership -0.0519 -0.0588* -0.0004 -0.0289
(0.0370) (0.0336) (0.0393) (0.0462)
Shareholder Protection -0.0024 0.0042 -0.0021 -0.0073*
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0039) (0.0041)
Creditor Protection -0.0135** -0.0021 -0.0016 -0.0070
(0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0066)
Accounting Standards -0.0005 -0.0008* -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007)
IT Enforcement 0.0006 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0008)
IT Laws -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Analysts 0.0032*** 0.0018*** 0.0010** 0.0014*
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Press Freedom -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004)
GDP growth 0.0011 0.0008* 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Log GDP 0.0100** 0.0053 0.0106*** 0.0137**
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0039) (0.0055)
Distance -1.41E-06 -1.11E-06 -2.00E-06 -2.10E-06
1.36E-06 1.07E-06 1.23E-06 1.63E-06
Cultural Distance -0.0122*** -0.0013
(0.0042) (0.0066)
No. of observations 527 667 364 288
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-squared 744.28 1,131.28 672.15 695.93
Pseudo R2 41.17% 36.39% 62.62% 66.74%
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Table 7 - Robustness Check 
La Porta et al. (1998) Antidirector Rights Index  
Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable 
is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where country-level clustering has been 
used. The first nine variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also 
include control variables such as ‘GDP growth’, ‘Log GDP’, ‘Distance’ and ‘Cultural distance’. All the 
variables are described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control 
variables). 
 
 
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17
Common Law 0.0359** 0.0050 0.0145 0.0149
(0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0204)
Ownership -0.0643 -0.0562 0.0099 -0.0472
(0.0421) (0.0408) (0.0431) (0.0628)
Shareholder Protection -0.0026 0.0005 0.0016 -0.0007
LLSV (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0060)
Creditor Protection -0.0139** -0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0042
(0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0063)
Accounting Standards -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007)
IT Enforcement 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007)
IT Laws -0.0002 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Analysts 0.0031*** 0.0018*** 0.0011** 0.0014*
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Press Freedom -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005)
GDP growth 0.0012* 0.0008** 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Log GDP 0.0099** 0.0062* 0.0101*** 0.0118**
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0055)
Distance -1.52E-06 -1.11E-06 -2.04e-06 -2.38e-06
(1.32e-06) (1.08e-06) (1.28e-06) (1.61e-06)
Cultural Distance -0.0105** -0.0062
(0.0042) (0.0066)
No. of observations 527 667 364 288
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-squared 612.08 1,257.29 800.17 825.49
Pseudo R2 41.16% 36.25% 62.60% 66.56%
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Table 8 - Robustness Check 
Djankov et al. (2008) Antidirector Rights Index  
Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
!
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable 
is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where country-level clustering has been 
used. The first nine variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also 
include control variables such as ‘GDP growth’, ‘Log GDP’, ‘Distance’ and ‘Cultural distance’. All the 
variables are described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control 
variables). 
!
!
Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
Common Law 0.0314** 0.0034 0.0017 0.0131
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0213)
Ownership -0.0538 -0.0614* 0.0044 -0.0414
(0.0381) (0.0343) (0.0377) (0.0502)
Shareholder Protection -0.0011 0.0039 0.0013 -0.0029
DLSV (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0055)
Creditor Protection -0.0132** -0.0033 -0.0014 -0.0036
(0.0060) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0071)
Accounting Standards -0.0006 -0.0008* -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007)
IT Enforcement 0.0005 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0007)
IT Laws -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Analysts 0.0031*** 0.0019*** 0.0011** 0.0013*
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Press Freedom -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0005)
GDP growth 0.0011* 0.0007* 0.0004 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Log GDP 0.0010* 0.0052 0.0100*** 0.0121**
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0054)
Distance -1.50E-06 -1.26E-06 -2.11E-06 -2.17E-06
(1.39e-06) (1.13e-06) (1.37e-06) (1.73e-06)
Cultural Distance -0.0118*** -0.0056
(0.0045) (0.0064)
No. of observations 527 667 364 288
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Chi-squared 633.17 1,508.16 750.52 672.20
Pseudo R2 41.13% 36.33% 62.60% 66.58%
! 
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Table 9 - Robustness Check 
Index Components - Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
 
!
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where 
country-level clustering has been used. The six/four nine variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also include control variables such as ‘GDP 
growth’, ‘Log GDP’ and ‘Distance’. All the variables are described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control variables). 
Model 22 Model 23
Proxy By Mail Allowed 0.0169*** No Automatic -0.0043
(0.0053) Stay on Assets (0.0057)
Shares Not Blocked 0.0104 Secured Creditors 0.0121
Before Meeting (0.0070) Paid First (0.0082)
Cumulative Voting/ 0.0183*** Restrictions for Going -0.0032
Proportional Representation (0.0036) into Reorganisation (0.0052)
Oppressed Minority -0.0029 Management Does Not -0.0342***
(0.0060) Stay in Reorganisation (0.0125)
Preemptive Right -0.0133**
to New Issues (0.0060)
% of Shares to Call an -0.0397
Extraordinary Shareholder Meeting (0.0379)
GDP growth 0.0008** 0.0014***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Log GDP 0.0125*** 0.0179***
(0.0013) (0.0017)
Distance -2.00e-06 -6.55e-07
(9.92e-07) (0.0000)
No. of observations 908 No. of observations 868
P-value 0.0000 P-value 0.0000
Chi-squared 1,486.19 Chi-squared 261.35
Pseudo R2 32.71% Pseudo R2 31.79%
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Table 10 - Additional Control Variables Analysis 
Fractional Logit (Marginal Effects) 
  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
        
Common Law  0.0025 0.0055 0.0110 
  (0.0280) (0.0199) (0.0219) 
Ownership -0.0677 -0.0600 -0.0288 
  (0.0580) (0.0469) (0.0465) 
Shareholder Protection -0.0092 -0.0059 -0.0073* 
  (0.0061) (0.0044) (0.0041) 
Creditor Protection -0.0050 -0.0060 -0.0070 
  (0.0086) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Accounting Standards 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0000 
  (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
IT Enforcement 0.0002 -1.53e-06 0.0002 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) 0.0008 
No. of Analysts 0.0007 0.0017** 0.0014* 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Press Freedom 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 
  0.0004 0.0005 (0.0004) 
        
        
GDP growth 0.0011 0.0003 0.0007 
  (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
Log GDP 0.0080 0.0096 0.0137** 
  (0.0088) (0.0063) (0.0055) 
Distance -2.86E-06 -2.46E-06 -2.09E-06 
  2.11E-06 1.55E-06 1.60E-06 
Cultural Distance -0.0067 -0.0052 -0.0013 
  (0.0098) (0.0075) (0.0064) 
Tax  0.0017     
  (0.0010)     
Political stability -0.0229     
  (0.0454)     
Corruption   -0.0064   
    (0.0046)   
Forex     -0.0034 
      (0.0526) 
Forex volatility -0.0968     
  (0.0903)     
Inflation    0.0008   
    (0.0006)   
No. of observations 182 288 288 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Chi-squared 564.80 1,002.66  739.24 
Pseudo R2 78.96% 66.84% 66.69% 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a fractional logit model, where the dependent variable 
is the proportion of UK funds in year t, invested in country i and where country-level clustering has been 
used. The first eight variables refer to different dimensions of corporate governance but the models also 
include control variables such as ‘GDP growth’, ‘Log GDP’and ‘Distance’. All the variables are 
described in more detail in Tables 3 (corporate governance variables) and 4 (control variables). 
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Uncertainty, information asymmetry 
and the use of earnouts in mergers 
and acquisitions 
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ABSTRACT 
There are numerous options available for acquirers involved in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) when it comes to deciding on the method of payment for a company about to be 
purchased. Each payment currency has different implications for solving information 
asymmetry issues. This research focuses on factors which increase the probability of 
employing a contingent payment agreement (also known as an ‘earnout’; see p. 114 for 
definition) in both, a domestic and a cross-border setting. Based on the review of 
literature together with the existing theory of M&A, we expect information asymmetries 
to be an important determinant of the method of payment for a transaction. Hence, an 
earnout which allows the bidder to mitigate the losses resulting from such a transaction 
is expected to be more popular in an environment with more unknown factors. By 
means of univariate analysis and a series of probit models, we examine a dataset 
consisting of 37,099 observations - acquisitions made by UK companies between 1983 
and 2012 in 150 countries. The empirical findings show that the likelihood of using an 
earnout increases when a privately-owned target is being acquired, where a larger share 
of the company is being purchased, with increasing deal value, for targets which are 
from the ‘high-technology’ or ‘services’ sector. In all transactions this probability 
decreases with increasing sales and if the target is from the same industry as the 
acquirer (only domestic transactions). As expected, earnouts are used less frequently in 
case of MBOs. Looking only at cross-border acquisitions, we find that when purchasing 
a target from a developing country and also in a common legal system there is a higher 
chance of utilising a contingent payment agreement. In order to explain the latter 
finding, we can put forward that the reason for this discrepancy might lie in the 
enforcement difficulties in the post-merger period in case of countries with a different 
legal system and the impossibility of creating an exhaustive earnout contract. Another 
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interesting finding is that knowledge of the industry does not influence the likelihood of 
using and earnout, while the opposite is true for acquisition experience, but only if the 
buyer has carried out international deals. 
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1. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 
1.1. M&A ACTIVITY AND MOTIVES BEHIND CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 
The rise of globalisation resulted in a very significant increase in cross-border M&A. 
Stronger global competition forced companies to be more flexible and time-efficient 
when implementing strategic changes. Unlike greenfield investment, mergers and 
acquisitions are a quick way to enter new markets or increase the company’s presence in 
certain segments or locations. They also serve as a way of responding to the moves of 
rivals or to take opportunistic decisions which may arise unexpectedly. In the last 30 
years the value of global M&A has increased by around 700 percent, going from USD 
48.5 billion in 1987 to USD 399 billion in 2014 (WIR, 2015). The growth in this 
activity can be attributed to various macro factors such as development of and 
investment in technology, innovation in capital markets, their improved accessibility by 
firms and an increase  in competition globally accompanied by coincidence of consumer 
preferences worldwide (Sudarsanam, 1995). The recent recession especially present in 
the developed countries has urged investors to merge vertically in an attempt to a) hedge 
rising commodity prices (Garfinkel and Hankins, 2011), b) lower their supply costs 
(Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011) or c) simply look for alternative target countries where 
the economies are still growing. Nevertheless, one should also keep in mind that 
acquisitions of foreign targets are different from domestic transactions. Although Conn 
et al. (2005) and Sudarsanam (1995) suggest that cross-border acquisitions generate 
additional value to the acquirers compared to domestic transactions, there are a number 
of potential complications associated with cross-border deals, which can result in 
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negative returns to the bidding firm’s shareholders. This paper focuses on information 
asymmetries, moral hazard and risk and how these influence the method of payment 
chosen by the acquirer in case of both, domestic and cross-border transaction. The 
following section will present the problem of uncertainty in M&A and discuss potential 
methods of payment.  
1.2. RESEARCH MOTIVATION  
Given the growing importance of M&A transactions for corporate strategy and their 
potential adverse effects for the acquiring companies, we decided to better understand 
the motivation of the managers who make decisions with regard to the mode of payment 
in an acquisition. When it comes to the payment currency the bidder has numerous 
options. This paper focuses on one specific attempt at the reduction of risk: earnouts. 
An earnout is a contingent payout agreement which in its simplest form can be split into 
two components: the fixed amount paid at the time of the acquisition and a further 
consideration to be paid to the seller conditional on meeting pre-defined criteria 
specified in this agreement (more on possible criteria in section 1.4). This stems from 
the fact that an earnout can be effectively perceived as a form of insurance against 
negative future scenarios. Therefore, we put forward that this method of payment will 
be used more often where the information asymmetry and risk are more severe. The 
extant literature on the probability of using an earnout in the context of information 
asymmetry is rather scarce (see section 2.3.). This paper tries not only to include a more 
holistic definition of information asymmetry by studying deal- and country-specific 
characteristics but also takes into account additional risk factors. It shows how investors 
change their approach to risk-management when they are faced with cross-border 
transactions rather than acquisitions of domestic targets, as becoming involved in cross-
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border transactions brings about many additional complexities which otherwise would 
not be of any importance. An additional contribution of this work refers to the dataset 
used, as the existing literature does not focus to a great extent on transactions carried 
out by UK acquirers who are particularly active participants of the global M&A market. 
 
1.3. HYPOTHESES RELATING TO METHOD OF PAYMENT 
Although, along the lines of Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970), in well-
functioning markets the medium of exchange chosen is irrelevant from the economic 
point of view (Fishman, 1989), the markets are not perfect and therefore as a 
prerequisite, the subsequent sections of this chapter summarise hypotheses relating to 
payment currencies covered in the existing literature. 
A. Risk-sharing Hypothesis 
The information asymmetry problem, as described by Akerlof (1970), is inherent in all 
businesses. It is also present in mergers and acquisitions, as the seller usually possesses 
more information about the target than the acquirer. What follows is that “in the absence 
of perfect information regarding the target company’s future, the possibility of valuation 
(estimation) error becomes quite high. And as the level of uncertainty regarding the 
target’s prospects increases, the likelihood of valuation error increases” (Varaiya and 
Ferris, 1987, p. 64). Recent experimental studies in this field have confirmed these 
suppositions (Anand and Zhou, 2012). For example, research on auctions found that “an 
increase in uncertainty about the common value leads to a substantial decrease in 
efficiency” (Goeree and Offerman, 2002, p. 641). Despite all the efforts, the bidder will 
rarely manage to collect all the data needed to achieve an identical dataset as that of the 
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target’s management. This means that we can extend the “Market for Lemons” findings 
to the M&A context. Based on this assumption, it can be suggested that less successful 
deals will be accomplished, whereas potentially appealing targets will not be acquired 
(Akerlof, 1970, in Reuer et al., 2004). However, acquirers try to reduce this risk and 
maximise their chances of completing a value-generating acquisition in informationally 
imperfect environments. It has been shown (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; DeMarzo and 
Duffie, 1995; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1996) that managers are more likely to use 
hedging where the level of information asymmetry is higher and this can be done 
through payment method selection. 
A cash offer implies that the shareholders retain the same level of control over their 
company; thus there is no dilution of ownership or power. In a cash offer, the bidder 
indirectly agrees to take on all the uncertainty relating to the true value of the target. If 
the acquirer offers equity, the transaction is completed and the target is worth less than 
initially expected, the shareholders of both companies will be adversely affected, as the 
lower-than-expected value of the target decreases the value of the combined company. 
This is known as the risk sharing hypothesis (Martin, 1996). Also, if the target 
shareholders anticipate that the acquisitions will be made through a share exchange they 
might be inclined to disclose more information to the acquirer in order to realise higher 
gains in the future when selling their shares.  
B. Misvaluation Hypothesis 
New M&A literature focuses more on behavioural corporate finance in order to explain 
the phenomenon of merger waves. It has been noted that periods of high merger activity 
coincide with times of high market valuations (e.g. see Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001). 
More recent research proposes that M&A activity is to a large extent driven by these 
market misvaluations. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point out that overvaluation of equity 
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can incentivise firms to become involved in equity-financed acquisitions. “In a more 
general framework, firms with overvalued equity might be able to make acquisitions, 
survive, and grow, while firms with undervalued, or relatively less overvalued, equity 
become takeover targets” (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, p. 309). It has been proven that 
bidders are generally overvalued relative to their targets and this holds for both, cash 
and equity offers (Dong et al. 2003). Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) show that 
“acquirers with high firm-specific error use stock to buy targets with relatively lower 
firm-specific error at times when both firms benefit from positive time-series sector 
error” while cash acquisitions are more common for undervalued targets and by 
acquirers with lower level of overvaluation (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004, p. 
46). Jensen (2005) perceives this as a managerial problem and refers to it as an ‘agency 
cost of overvalued equity’.  
C. Signalling Hypothesis 
The bidder’s shareholders together with potential outside investors do not know the true 
value of their shareholding. It is only after the acquisition announcement that more 
information about the transaction is revealed, which then allows market participants to 
adjust their judgement about the value of the bidder’s stock. If the managers of a 
bidding firm are convinced that the true value of their firm’s shares is higher than the 
current share price, they will prefer not to issue equity, suggesting cash instead (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). Hence, the market may interpret the financing choice as a signal 
about a firm’s under- or overvaluation, revising the share price of the firm offering cash 
(shares) upwards (downwards). What is more, analogous to the signalling hypothesis as 
presented by Leland and Pyle (1997) where companies with good prospects and in good 
financial health should send a strong signal to the market prior to the IPO to raise more 
cash, the acquirer can show confidence in the prospective synergistic benefits and the 
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value of the target by choosing cash as a method of payment and forgoing options 
incorporating risk-sharing features. In other words, a cash bid is interpreted as a positive 
signal about the target’s quality along with its predicted future performance. Therefore, 
the target’s share price rises more in case of an all-cash deal than for an equity 
exchange. Overall, Fishman (1989) concluded that cash offers have lower signalling 
costs and they also pre-empt other firms from bidding.  
Recapitulating, the currency used to acquire the target may be a signal that conveys 
information regarding the value of the bidder to market participants, hence decreasing 
information asymmetries between the firm’s management, bidder’s and target’s 
shareholders, as well as outside investors (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fishman, 1989; 
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), or simply a way to mislead 
them.  
D. Cash Flow Hypothesis 
An additional hypothesis is related to cash flows. The model developed by Jensen 
(1986) shows that managers of companies which produce cash flows in excess of 
profitable investment opportunities are more likely to waste the surplus on projects with 
a negative net present value. This has been supported by Ng and Young Baek (2006) 
who have also proven that acquisitions made by cash-rich bidders diminish operating 
efficiency. What is more, the managers are more likely to spend this surplus on projects 
which will increase their private benefits rather than to return the money to the 
shareholders, in the form of dividends or share buy-backs. Also McCabe and Yook 
(1997) argue that an acquisition of a target using cash will lead to a better alignment of 
incentives between the shareholder and the management; this is due to the reduction in 
free cash flows and possible increased indebtedness. Therefore, it is proposed to 
pressure managers into issuing more debt and paying out dividends in order to 
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discipline them and to avoid the agency problem (Jensen, 1986). This may be 
problematic because as it has been shown by Berger et al. (1997) managers prefer lower 
levels of leverage and such levels usually increase “in the aftermath of entrenchment-
reducing shocks to managerial security, including unsuccessful tender offers, 
involuntary CEO replacements, and the addition to the board of major stockholders” (p. 
1411). 
E. Investment Opportunity Hypothesis 
The last one is the Investment Opportunity Hypothesis. As shown by Myers (1977), 
firms with good growth opportunities prefer to issue equity rather than debt. The cash 
flow preservation is motivated by the willingness to take advantage of future investment 
opportunities (Chatterjee and Kuenzi, 2001), rather than using the cash flows to service 
future debt payments. Lang et al. (1991) and Jung et al. (1996) propose that equity 
gives more discretion in terms of the use of prospective cash flows than debt and allows 
firms to seize arising investment opportunities. Therefore, companies with good growth 
prospects will prefer to choose stock, whereas others will offer cash. This has been 
tested by Martin (1996), Jung et al. (1996) and Sehgal et al. (2012) and the empirical 
results are consistent with the theory.  
1.4. RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND EARNOUTS 
The ‘Market for Lemons’ describes a setting in which one party has an information 
advantage, i.e. in our context, knows that the target is worth less and does not wish to 
share this knowledge with the buyer. An earnout is in fact a kind of a call option for the 
target’s shareholders. In this case the final payment depends on the target’s future 
performance and its ability to meet the predetermined goals (Reuer et al., 2004). “By 
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tying the target’s consideration in the acquisition to future performance, the earnout can 
bridge a valuation gap between the target and the acquirer that is caused by 
disagreement about the target’s expected future performance” (Cain et al., 2011, p. 
152). The target’s performance is usually assessed against some financial metrics 
(Hussey, 1990). The American Bar Association (2004) points out that earnouts can be 
based on different metrics measuring financial performance, with the most common 
ones being EBITDA, EBIT, pre-tax net income, gross profit or sales. However, the last 
criterion poses a serious threat from the buyer’s perspective as it does not take into 
account the related costs (American Bar Association, 2004). When entering an earnout 
contract the bidder agrees to make a certain initial cash or stock payment to the target, 
as well as later payments of the earnout (fixed or variable amount based on a 
mathematical formula), which is contingent on the target’s ability to achieve a pre-
specified financial target (Sudarsanam, 1995). The duration of the earnout varies but in 
most cases the period of time specified in the contract ranges from 2 to 5 years, whereas 
the proportion of the acquisition value resulting from an earnout varies depending on 
the transaction but is rarely lower than 10-20%, as for a lower proportion the potential 
costs may outweigh the benefits (American Bar Association, 2004). “The fixed 
proportion of the acquisition price will pertain to that portion of the target’s value on 
which both the acquirer and the target can agree, while the contingent portion reflects 
the difference between the target’s and the acquirer’s estimate value” (Cain et al., 2011, 
p. 11). An example of a contingent payout agreement can be found in the Appendices 
section.  
As pointed out by Lu (2010), information asymmetry may not be the only source of 
uncertainty. Given the above, this paper distinguishes between information asymmetry 
and a situation characterised by a high degree of uncertainty resulting from other 
factors. The companies may have diverging opinions regarding the company’s outlook 
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and more specifically the prospective earnings that the target is supposed to generate. 
As already stated, “the target might think its value is higher simply because of an over-
optimistic business plan. Only a target who really believes in its potential is really 
willing to accept an earnout” (Iannotta, 2010, p. 142). Scenarios illustrating situations 
where the cash flows are hard to predict include: a) a business in its first phase where 
there is very little data which could be used to extrapolate its performance, b) a 
company introducing a new product where its popularity with customers remains to be 
unknown, c) situations where the target has many intangible assets, d) a company in 
distress which should be restructured, however the success of such restructuring is 
unknown as it depends on many external factors, e) a firm from an industry which 
might be affected by an external shock causing a change in the historical rates of return, 
or f) where the success of the business is dependent on the commitment of the 
owner/management in the post-acquisition phase (see for example Officer et al., 2009). 
Looking at the aforementioned scenarios, we see that future earnings are to a large 
extent dependent on the direction in which the company, the product, the management 
or the industry will go.  
However, in the case of contingent payout agreement the risk of overvaluing, thus 
overpaying for the target firm is reduced. “Although earnout provisions may alleviate 
private information problems, these arrangements can also influence the incentives of 
the party managing the selling firm’s assets post acquisition” (Datar et al., 2001, p. 
202). In situations where the target’s management has to continue running the company 
the buyer may become worried about the seller’s incentives (Holmstrom, 1979) and 
align these through the use of a contingent payout agreement (Ouchi, 1979). It has been 
pointed out that earnouts can also be used as a risk management tool (Deloitte, 2011). 
Such a contract can facilitate the deal by bridging the valuation gap resulting from 
differing opinions regarding investment outlooks, accounting for a big portion of the 
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uncertainty involved in a transaction. In short, “an earnout can be presented as a method 
to overcome the buyer’s struggle in determining the present value of future growth of 
the target company” (Nyman and Ohlsson, 2010, p. 15). As summarised in the paper by 
Cain et al. (2011), its design is dependent on the uncertainty regarding the target’s 
value, its growth opportunities and the degree to which the firms will be integrated post-
acquisition.  
Apart from the benefits of a contingent payout agreements associated with overcoming 
information asymmetries and valuation risk, they may be helpful in distinguishing 
superior targets among others of lower quality. More precisely, only the firms that are 
capable of achieving the required results will accept an earnout (Ang and Kohers, 
2000). Additionally, the bidder can benefit from the deferred payment by not being 
required to raise funds to finance the acquisition immediately (Sudarsanam, 1995). 
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2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
2.1. RESEARCH ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
On average M&A destroy rather than create value. However, this result can depend on 
the characteristics of the deal. It has been shown in the literature examining US and UK 
market that acquisitions of public targets do not create value (see for example Asquith, 
1983, 1987; Holl and Kyriazis, 1997; Draper and Paudyal, 2006; Fueller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Conn et al., 2005), but private targets do (see for example Hansen 
and Lott, 1996; Chang, 1998; some of the above papers or da Silva Rosa et al., 2001 for 
the Australian market). What is more, small acquirers outperform large ones (Moeller et 
al., 2004) and bidder’s returns decrease with the relative target-bidder size (see Jensen 
and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; or Servaes, 1991), but the opposite occurs 
in case of private acquisitions (Fueller et al. 2002). ‘Glamour’ acquirers tend to destroy 
value (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), whereas Lang et al. (1991) and Servaes (1991) find 
that high Q bidders have higher announcement abnormal returns but the opposite is 
claimed by Moeller et al. (2004). Maloney et al. (1993) examined influence of leverage 
on M&A and prove that announcement-period acquirer returns are higher when the 
leverage of the bidder is higher. There is no consensus on diversifying acquisitions. 
While Morck et al. (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994) or Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that 
they destroy value, others including Billett and Mauer (2000) or Hadlock et al. (2001) 
find that these transactions generate positive, although small abnormal returns.  
Eun et al. (1996) argue that cross-border M&A can result in wealth gains, in particular 
when the bidders acquire targets with R&D competencies. However, as discussed 
previously, cross-border M&A are associated with additional risks and higher 
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information asymmetries (Boeh, 2011). Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) when 
studying around-the-announcement stock performance of US bidders for years 1985-
1995 noted that the returns in cross-border acquisitions are lower than those in the 
domestic ones (this difference in returns is defined as “the cross-border effect”). 
Moreover, they discover that acquisitions resulting in an increase of international and 
industrial diversification demonstrate lower announcement returns compared to other 
cross-border deals. Another study by Conn et al. (2005) shows that cross-border 
takeovers of public targets generate zero returns around the announcement. Yet another 
research examining 207 cross-border acquisitions by US financial companies during the 
1989-1999 period finds that cross-border bidders experience insignificant positive 
around-the-announcement returns but these vary depending on the location of the target 
(Kiymaz, 2004). After looking at international acquisitions by US MNCs it has been 
found that if the corporation expands to the target’s country for the first time, it 
experiences significantly positive excess returns, especially high when the acquisition 
involves geographical and industrial diversification (Doukas and Travlos, 1988). At the 
same time, the evidence provided by Chari et al. (2004) shows that the market reacts 
positively to cross-border acquisitions of targets located in emerging countries by 
acquirers from developed markets and this effect can be attributed to transfer of 
majority control. Also, “contrary to general perception, cross-border acquisitions 
perform better in the long run if the acquirer and the target come from countries that are 
culturally more disparate” (Chakrabarti et al., 2009, p. 1). In a broader context, it has 
been argued that global diversification does not destroy firm value (Doukas and Kan, 
2006). What is more, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) having investigated large intra-
European bids discovered that target firms gain 9% but the buyers can appreciate in 
value only by 0.7% on average - this is largely dependent on deal characteristics, with 
hostile takeovers generating more value than friendly ones, UK targets and bidders 
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creating more value than Continental European bids and high market-to-book targets 
causing negative price reaction for the bidder. They also mention that the method of 
payment in a deal is an important determinant of the acquisition’s success. The next 
section elaborates on the effect of the particular methods of payment on acquirers’ 
returns. 
2.2. RESEARCH ON CASH AND STOCK OFFERS IN ACQUISITIONS 
A. Returns 
As noted before, method of payment has important implications for the shareholder 
returns in M&A (Myers and Majluf 1984; Travlos 1987). Empirical evidence provided 
in the literature regarding the effect of cash and stock acquisitions on shareholder 
returns is quite extensive for domestic takeovers and generally supportive of the theory 
described in the preceding chapter. Overall, the returns to the bidding firm’s 
shareholders from an acquisition are, taking the most favourable view, slightly positive 
but usually notably negative (Roll, 1986; Bradley et al., 1988). However, Asquith et al. 
(1987) and Loughran and Vijn (1997) have anticipated that negative returns are a 
consequence of using stock as a method of payment (in the short run and long run). 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) provide evidence for this finding for the UK market. 
Also, Fueller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2005) show that 
stock transactions generate loses in the short run. This is in line with Travlos (1987) 
who found that stock-only acquisitions usually lead to significant losses, but cash-only 
acquisitions bring ‘normal’ returns. Whereas, Wansley et al. (1983a) discovered that 
returns are significantly higher in acquisitions using cash when compared to stock 
exchanges. Contrary to the original expectations, it has been concluded by Chang 
(1998) that, on average, bidding firms do not experience abnormal returns in cash 
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offers; such gains are observed in stock offers for private companies, whereas 
employing an equity exchange to acquire publicly listed companies produces negative 
abnormal returns to the bidding firm’s shareholders. Similar evidence for domestic 
takeovers by UK firms is obtained by Conn et al. (2005), who also note that in 
international acquisitions the effect of method of payment on bidders’ wealth is 
insignificant. Another study finds that in relatively larger deals acquirers have a 
restricted choice of payment currencies and investors value stock bids higher than cash 
offers, which contradicts the signalling hypothesis (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
Eckbo et al. (1990) identified a separating equilibrium in which the true value is 
revealed when using a mix (cash/equity); the monthly returns for such an offer brought 
large, significant abnormal returns. One additional consequence of a method of payment 
is the premium paid. Payments in equity received from bidders with weaker shareholder 
protection will have to be higher to compensate for the extra risk taken (Starks and Wei, 
2013).  
2.3. RESEARCH ON EARNOUTS IN ACQUISITIONS 
A. Returns 
There is limited data about the effect of use of earnout contracts on bidders’ returns 
from M&A transactions. A study by Ang and Kohers (2000) discovers that the 
employment of the earnout contract results in positive announcement returns for the 
acquirer. What is more, these gains are significantly higher for earnouts than other 
methods of payment (Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam, 2012). Mantecon (2009) studies 
the effect of various methods of uncertainty avoidance, including all-in-stock payment, 
equity joint ventures, earnouts plus toehold investments on returns of cross-border 
acquirers. One of the findings of his research is that while the application of an earnout 
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contract generates value for domestic acquirers, cross-border bidders do not benefit 
from its use. Ang and Kohers (2000) also find that in case of higher information 
asymmetries for bidders acquiring private targets the use of earnout results in 
considerably higher event period abnormal returns for the acquirer compared to cash or 
stock transactions. A recent study by Conn et al. (2005) advocates that in cross-border 
deals the method of payment (cash or stock) does not affect the stock performance 
significantly, because unlike the domestic bidders that often acquire targets with 
overvalued equity, cross-border acquirers exercise greater due diligence before entering 
the deal.  
B. Likelihood of Using an Earnout 
Datar et al. (2001), having investigated the probability of using an earnout in cross-
border acquisitions, proves that cross-border deals are less likely to bring into play 
earnout as a method of payment when compared to the US domestic deals. They explain 
this result by target’s unwillingness to accept deferred payments because of possible 
future conflicts arising from discrepancies in calculations of the payment amounts 
resulting from the difference in accounting practices. Recent research identifies other 
motives behind the decision to use earnouts. Reuer et al. (2004) after examining the 
determinants of contingent payout utilisation during 1995-1998 find that US bidders 
choose this method of payment when they acquire targets in the services sector, high-
tech industry or when they have no previous acquisition experience. Furthermore, 
contingent payout is most likely to be used when there are few acquisitions taking place 
within a given industry and when the target is a small private firm in an industry 
different from that of the bidder (Datar et al., 2001). The same is true for subsidiaries, 
targets from high-technology industry, goodwill-intensive businesses but also private 
companies in general (Datar et al., 2001). These examples support the supposition of 
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Cain et al. (2011), who study the specific factors influencing contract design. They 
show that earnout contracts are most preferable when high information asymmetries are 
involved and when moral hazard problems are likely to arise. The paper also provides 
evidence that the amount of the contingent payout agreement is related to the 
information asymmetries (proxies) and the period of uncertainty (Cain et al. 2011).  
It can be noticed that the amount of literature devoted to earnouts is not particularly 
extensive. In addition, from the above summary of the existing work on the 
aforementioned topic we can see that very little research has been carried out analysing 
UK acquirers involved in cross-border acquisitions. This study aims to fill this gap in 
the literature by looking into factors increasing the probability of using a contingent 
payout agreement in a domestic and cross-border context. It aims to include a whole 
range of deal characteristics - deal-specific, country-specific but also taking into account 
business cycles and market volatility in order to develop a better understanding of 
dynamics of M&A processes while at the same time analysing risk and uncertainty. The 
subsequent chapter presents the reader with the research hypotheses. 
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3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
3.1. HYPOTHESES 
The review of literature section gave a brief overview of what has been written until 
today on the topic of methods of payment in cross-border acquisitions. Thus, we know 
that cash has low signalling costs but also does not allow for risk-sharing in the post-
acquisition phase. On the other hand, stock payments enable the buyer to shift some of 
the risk towards the target but they also convey negative information regarding the 
market’s overvaluation of the underlying securities. The third mode of consideration is 
the contingent payment agreement which does not have such a strong signalling effect 
as cash but permits some risk-hedging. The general hypothesis in this paper is that 
earnouts are more likely to be used in circumstances where the transaction is risky or 
where the information sets of the buyer and the seller differ significantly. Due to the 
distinctiveness of international acquisitions Lee and Caves (1998) argue that companies 
involved in such transactions experience higher profit ambiguity. Also Reuer et al. 
(2004) note that valuation problems are particularly pronounced in such a context. This 
is because acquirers involved in international transactions encounter different 
accounting standards and disclosure practices increasing their transactions costs 
(Markides and Ittner, 1994; Datta and Puia, 1995) and impeding the process of due 
diligence. “The internationalisation of assets into the buyer’s operational structure is 
further complicated by cultural peculiarities that determine how strategies are 
formulated and business is conducted. Acquiring firms may also encounter legal 
systems with different protection of property rights, a factor that adds uncertainty to 
future cash flows” (Mantecon, 2009, p. 640). Boeh (2011) discovers that firms involved 
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in cross-border M&A are more likely to employ mechanisms to reduce information 
asymmetry compared to those involved in domestic deals. Moreover, there may be 
additional agency costs arising in the post-acquisition phase where the target’s value is 
dependent on the ‘current’ owners or managers (Datar et al., 2001). 
Based on the literature discussed above, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 
The deal-specific features reflecting higher asymmetry of information or higher risk will 
increase the likelihood of employing an earnout as a method of payment 
 
We also believe that the asymmetry of information will be higher for transactions where 
the target and the acquirer are located in different countries. 
Hypothesis 2 
The likelihood of using a contingent payment agreement will be higher for cross-border 
transactions than for those undertaken domestically, ceteris paribus 
 
However, we also keep in mind that the target country characteristics may have an 
impact on the riskiness or the level of information asymmetry of the transaction in 
question. 
Hypothesis 3 
The country-specific features reflecting either higher asymmetry of information or risk level will 
increase the likelihood of using a contingent payment agreement in the transaction 
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3.2. SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
The above hypotheses have been formulated on the basis of conclusions drawn from the 
reviewed literature regarding methods of payment in M&A but also on our predictions 
about information asymmetries and all signalling effects implied by the chosen payment 
currencies. The examination of the above assumptions required a collection of suitable 
variables all of which are discussed in the following section. 
Ownership 
Research suggests that private targets experience higher discounts than public 
companies which are usually characterised by more dispersed ownership structures 
(Koeplin et al., 2000) and are linked to higher transactions costs, discouraging acquirers 
to engage in deals with large investment outlay (Shen and Reuer, 2005). Also, “the 
process of going public can reduce information asymmetries because information about 
the target company may be revealed through a variety of sources, including roadshows 
and through the disclosures required for registration and listing” (Reuer, 2005, p. 17). 
This means that public targets exhibit lower levels of information asymmetry as the law 
requires them to follow certain financial regulations and to regularly provide financial 
data to investors (Datar et al., 2001). Due to the above arguments it is predicted that 
earnouts will be a lot more popular in acquisitions of private, rather than public targets 
in cross-border acquisitions (UK regulation does not permit the use of earnouts in 
acquisitions of public targets based in the UK). Another ownership structure included in 
this research is a joint venture. This already is a way of improving the information 
asymmetry (Mantecon and Chatfield, 2007). Given that such an investment results in 
resolution of such asymmetries and usually leads to a full acquisition (Nanda and 
Williamson, 1995), we put forward that earnouts should be less popular in transactions 
involving joint ventures and the same should hold for subsidiaries as most of the 
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information should have been obtained by the buyer prior to the acquisition. Given the 
above, we include in our analysis dummy variables to indicate whether the company 
being acquired is public, private, a subsidiary or a joint-venture. 
Size 
Reuer and Ragozzino (2009) propose that “the value of using an earnout-will be greater 
in a full acquisition in which a larger investment outlay is made” (p. 8). Smaller targets 
are easier to integrate; hence, even in a situation where we are dealing with a potentially 
risky target - its probable impact on the valuation of the newly created entity might be 
negligible, reducing the willingness to get involved in time-consuming and costly 
drafting of an earnout contract. Previous researches have shown that purchasing more 
expensive targets relative to the size of the acquiring company may point at managerial 
motives behind the transaction, such as empire-building (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; 
Roll, 1986: Morck et al., 1990). For this reason large relative size might mean, quite 
counter-intuitively, that the management of the acquiring company might be less 
inclined to choose a contingent payout agreement. Despite this last argument we put 
forward that larger relative size should encourage the use of earnouts. 
Apart from the relative size we also add a logarithm of the deal value and sales which is 
a proxy for size. Overall, the integration of a bigger target is much more challenging 
than of a smaller one. Hence, in line with Reuer and Ragozinno (2009), we put forward 
that the likelihood of using an earnout will be positively related to the value of the stake 
acquired. We also use a ‘percentage of shares acquired’ variable as acquiring a larger 
proportion of the target can be potentially more risky. 
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Financial Health 
Another aspect which tries to reflect the volatility of the business is the gearing of the 
target. Targets with a higher gearing can be expected to have higher cash flows 
variance. Increased level of debt means that future shareholders may experience major 
adverse changes in the share price in case of lowered cash flow levels. Given that the 
acquisition process may add up to the overall volatility of the business, the new owners 
should have a much greater interest to insure themselves against a situation in which 
there is a significant decline in the value of the target after it has been acquired. Hence, 
we are expecting deals involving heavily geared targets to be associated with a higher 
probability of using a contingent payout agreements. On the other hand, we can look at 
targets with high cash-to-assets ratios which should be a lot less risky as the 
accumulated cash reserves can act as a buffer to any shocks the company may 
experience. For this reason we expect acquirers purchasing cash-rich targets to be less 
inclined to use an earnout. 
Acquisition Experience 
It has been put forward that acquirers may develop skills which help improve the 
performance of their M&A deals given their past experience (Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001). Furthermore, Barkema et al. (1997) and Dyer and Singh (1998) have proposed 
that such companies may exhibit superior partnering capabilities. Following Johanson 
and Vahlne (1977), the risk levels enjoyed by companies with a wider spectrum of 
M&A experience will be substantially lower than those for inexperienced firms. Hence 
hedging, e.g. using earnouts, diminishes with the level of acquirer’s experience, both 
domestic and international. We define acquisition experience as the number of 
acquisitions before the focal transaction. 
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MBO 
Management buyouts are also present in our sample and given that the acquirers have 
been running the company in the past, there is very little information which they already 
do not have. Therefore, the likelihood of using an earnout in acquisitions should be 
greatly reduced when management is on the buy-side of the transaction, hence we 
include an ‘MBO’ dummy.  
Industry 
The problem of differing information sets is especially pronounced for bidders that are 
acquiring targets in unrelated businesses (Reuer et al., 2004). If the acquirer and the 
target are from the same industry, they may have better information about resources, 
suppliers, market demand, operational arrangements, etc. (Gordon, 1991). The opposite 
should hold for inter-industry deals (see e.g. Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Montgomery 
and Hariharan, 1991). The existence of such information asymmetries may induce the 
buyer to hedge the risk by employing an earnout contract. On the other hand, targets 
involved in inter-industry acquisitions may find it harder to signal the true value of their 
resources (see e.g. Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993) 
explicitly requesting a contingent payment offer. Given the above, we introduce two 
different dummies. One is the ‘Same Macro Industry’ dummy and the second dummy 
(‘Same SIC’) is slightly more specific and based on 5-digit SIC codes. 
Similarly, we include a variable ‘high-technology’ to account for high-growth 
companies with unproven technologies which invest vastly in research and development 
as these tend to own non-tangible assets which cannot be recorded on a balance sheet, 
making them more difficult to value (Amir and Lev, 1996; Datar et al., 2001). What is 
more, the assessment of transferability of those non-tangible assets is limited during the 
negotiations process (Coff, 1999). We incorporate a variable which represents 
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companies from the services sector (‘services’) as their valuation may be highly 
dependent on the goodwill items whose worth might change in the post-acquisition 
phase. Overall, the above variables are included based on the assumption that earnouts 
are more likely to be employed in the purchases of high-growth companies with non-
tangible assets which are not documented in the balance sheet.    
Cross-border 
As pointed out in the previous sections cross-border deals are more complex. What is 
more, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) show that there are fundamental differences 
between domestic and international acquisitions - at a government, market and capital 
markets level. Cross-border transactions involve greater information asymmetries 
(Reuer et al., 2003) and hence we expect that international deals will more often employ 
contingent payout agreements.  
GDP Growth 
We investigate real Gross Domestic Product growth, as the ease of reaching a decision 
whether or not to invest in a rapidly growing economy vs. one which develops at a 
slower pace may be different. Luypaert and Huyghebaert (2007) point out that 
companies may be somewhat hurried to invest in countries which are growing to benefit 
from the momentum and/or look to increase operating capacity. This has been supported 
by Steiner (1975) and Guerard (1985 and 1989) who found a positive relationship 
between GDP growth and M&A activity.  
Risk & Stability 
It has been shown by Méon and Gassebner (2010) that political risk decreases M&A 
flows. As such behaviour is most probably caused by risk-aversion, we assume that 
earnouts might be more popular where the political instability is more severe. Also, 
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lower market returns and volatility add to the riskiness of acquisitions, we therefore 
hypothesise that earnouts might be used more often in times of lower stock market 
growth and bigger deviations from the mean.  
Physical Distance 
“The Church-Tower Principle implies that the difficulty for the lending bank in 
assessing the default probability of a borrowing firm increases with the distance to it” 
(Carling and Lundberg, 2002, p. 16). We can extend this framework to M&A 
transaction and state that you should only engage in business in a proximity to your own 
location simply because you know the market. This also explains home bias, i.e. 
investors’ preference to invest in firms located in their proximity (see for example 
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Basu and Chevrier (2011) provide evidence that larger 
distance in M&A leads to lower abnormal returns for the acquiring company and greater 
likelihood of using stock as a medium of exchange. Given the fact that larger distance 
may mean higher information asymmetries, we include this variable in our model.   
Legal System 
As shown by La Porta et al. (1998) methodology, we adopt the type of legal system in a 
given country as a proxy for investor protection, as contract enforcement and protection 
of acquirer’s interests might be more difficult in civil law systems (La Porta et al., 
1997). This means that the riskiness, as perceived by the shareholders, should be lower 
for projects which are based in common law countries. We bring in a dummy variable, 
which equals one if the target is from a common law country, zero if it is civil law to 
control for those differences. 
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Language 
Following a similar line of reasoning, we include a ‘language’ dummy. The underlying 
assumption is that valuation of targets located in countries with the same official 
language will be simpler because the process of gathering information will be easier and 
less costly. The dummy is equal to 1 if English is considered to be the official language 
in the target country and zero otherwise.  
Targeted Market 
Several macroeconomic variables are present in this analysis in order to consider their 
effect on the probability of using an earnout in both, cross-border and domestic deals. 
We include a ‘Developing’ dummy, which takes the value of one if the target is from a 
developing country, according to The World Factbook (2009) classification, zero if it is 
already developed. We expect that if a firm acquires a target in a developing country, 
the potential need to ‘insure’ the transaction will be greater as there will be more 
unknows involved in the acquisition process (see Chae et al., 2009).  
Year effects: Business Cycles, Waves, Herding 
Macroeconomic factors, other than those listed above may influence the results of our 
investigation. Martin (1996) argues that the business cycle phase is likely to affect the 
choice of the payment currency - stock acquisitions may be preferred by bidders in 
periods of stock market expansion. Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982), Choe et al. (1993) 
have shown that the likelihood of using stock is higher in times of increased economic 
activity. In the last paper, the authors claim that in such circumstances firms face lower 
adverse selection costs, greater stability in asset prices together with better investment 
opportunities. In addition, plentiful changes in M&A regulation, financial and legal 
environment took place over the sample period. As put forward by Yook (2003), 
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characteristics of particular episodes of M&A activity may influence the results of the 
study. Despite of the lack of empirical support for this supposition, we account for year 
effects by including year dummies. 
The variables which are included in this analysis are listed in the table below with the 
expected effect on the likelihood of using a contingent payment agreement.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
4.1. DATA AND SAMPLE STATISTICS 
The dataset has been collected from Thomson ONE Banker provided by the Thomson 
Financial Securities Data Corporation (UK database). It consists of mergers and 
acquisitions by UK public companies (listed on the London Stock Exchange) that took 
place between January 1, 1983 and December 31, 2012. The choice of the location of 
the acquirer has been motivated by fairly low number of publications on earnouts which 
study European transactions, the high level of M&A activity in the United Kingdom 
when compared with the rest of the countries in the region (WIR, 2015) and its physical 
proximity but different legal system when compared with the neighbouring nations. The 
data represents a set of transactions announced over the above period (completed, 
pending and withdrawn). However, it only includes deals that have the following 
characteristics. Firstly, the transaction has to involve a change in control. Secondly, 
bidders and targets classified as financial institutions have been removed from the 
sample, as they may be subject to different degrees of information asymmetry. The final 
sample includes 37,099 transactions, 26,668 (71.89%) of which are domestic and 
10,431 (28.11%) are cross-border. Targets are located in 150 countries around the 
world. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Basic sample statistics are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that the majority of cross-
border acquisitions took place in the US (31.89% of all cross-border deals). Earnout is 
employed as the payment currency in 9.18% of all transactions; the proportion is 
slightly higher for cross-border deals (9.70%) than in case of domestic deals (8.97%). 
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Most targets acquired abroad or domestically are private companies (55.97% and 
57.27%, respectively). Acquisitions of targets in related industry make up over 68.89% 
of all takeovers (domestic/cross-border).  
‘Mean Deal Value’ is USD 106.48 million, while the ‘Median’ is USD 8.35 million, 
which shows that the observations within the sample are relatively dispersed in terms of 
size. The average percentage of shares acquired is 95.65%, whereas the average 
percentage of shares owned after the transaction is 97.95%. In case of cross-border 
transactions 13.79% of targets are located in developing countries, 37.55% in English 
speaking countries, and 43.54% in places with the same legal system. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 depicts the yearly distribution of the deals within the sample, which is 
consistent with the merger activity pattern (merger waves) described by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2005). That is, we observe a larger number of deals taking place during the 
market boom of 1988-1989, a decline in merger activity during 1991-1993 followed by 
a rise of the number of M&A in the late 1990s, which ended with a sharp downward 
correction at the period of the ‘dot-com’ market collapse. Another rise of the merger 
activity is to be seen during 2004-2007, which changed into a downturn in 2008-2012. 
Also, it is highly likely that our data set misses particularly many observations in the 
1980s when information on transactions was not as well recorded and disseminated as it 
is now. 
4.2. UNIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
For the purpose of the univariate and multivariate analyses we have used both 
qualitative and quantitative variables with the following definitions.  
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[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Given the obtained data, we first run a number of univariate tests to see whether the 
probability of using earnouts differs depending on deal or country characteristics. 
However, this framework is very limited. To get a deeper understanding of the drivers 
behind the decision to incorporate an earnout in a transaction we include a series of 
Probit Models. The multiple regression analysis contains the described above control 
variables which we expect to have an effect on the probability of choosing a contingent 
payout agreement.  
In the Probit Model, we take account of deal- and country-specific characteristics. This 
methodology allows us to understand characteristics which encourage targets to employ 
a contingent payment agreement over any other payment method. It also enables us to 
observe the interaction of these characteristics. The CDF model is the following:  
, where 
 - intercept, 
- vector of independent variables, , 
 ε - error term. 
A series of dummies helps to observe their effect on all the transactions recorded in our 
data set and a sample model for cross-border acquisitions is presented below:  
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We estimate the coefficients [α, β1, β2, … , β14] using a normal Cumulative Distribution 
Function. A more detailed description of the models’ specifications is available in the 
Results and Evidence section, which outlines the observations of the analyses. 
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5. RESULTS AND EVIDENCE 
5.1. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
After investigating the dataset, we find that around 9.18% of all transactions are carried 
out using a contingent payout agreement. The difference between this proportion in 
domestic (8.97%) and cross-border (9.70%) transaction is small (0.73%), but 
statistically significant. Deals involving targets from different macro industries do 
utilise more earnouts (11.51% vs. 8.13%). Also, ‘high-technology’ and ‘services’ 
targets are more often bought using a contingent payout agreement than non-high-
technology or non-services targets (H: 15.44% vs. 8.34% and S: 11.74% vs 8.65%). 
‘MBO’ transactions do use earnouts but as predicted by theory these are less common 
than when there is managerial involvement (1.83% vs. 9.23%). We also look at how 
these variables change when we control for whether it is a domestic or a cross-border 
transaction and discover that earnouts are used more often when buying targets from the 
same macro industry abroad rather than at home (9.38% vs. 7.66%). The same is true 
for ‘Same SIC’ transactions (9.41% vs. 6.19%). When studying MBO, ‘Services’ and 
‘High-technology’ transactions we see that the difference is statistically insignificant. 
Another part of our analysis involves cross-border variables and we conclude that 
acquisitions of companies located in developing countries do not involve earnouts as 
often as those located in developed countries (6.76% vs. 9.28%). Common-law targets 
are more often bought using contingent payout agreements and same is true for 
countries with the same official language but these two variables are highly positively 
correlated with each other. All of the above differences are statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
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5.2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS  
The enclosed table exhibits the outputs from the multiple regressions estimated using a 
series of probit models, which enable us to look at the relationship between the 
probability of using an earnout as a method of payment and a number of variables 
which reflect various aspects of information asymmetry discussed in the previous 
chapter. As outlined in the Methodology section, the variables which have been chosen 
for the models relate to macro and micro setting of any deal. 
A. Earnouts - Overall Sample  
The first step taken in order to get a better understanding of patterns which can be 
observed in the aforementioned dataset was running an ‘overall’ regression, i.e. a model 
which uses the whole dataset without breaking it down into ‘domestic’ and ‘cross-
border’ (All). First, we test the Hypothesis 1 and investigate whether the deal-specific 
characteristics have an impact on the probability of using an earnout. The models 
incorporate the knowledge of the target’s macro industry and more specifically 5-digit 
SIC code. Acquirers purchasing shares in companies with the same SIC code are less 
likely to use contingent payout agreement (marginal effect -0.0257/-0.0248, All IV, All 
V); this is also true for targets operating in the same industry as the acquirer (marginal 
effect between -0.0214 and -0.0175, All I-III). As shown in the previous studies, the 
probability of utilising an earnout contract is significantly higher when the target is from 
a ‘services or ‘high-technology’ sector, increasing the chances by ~6% and ~8% 
respectively (All I-VI). The percentage of shares bought is statistically significant and 
positive, as expected, but the effect is rather small (marginal effect 0.0008-0.0013, All 
I-VI). A similar conclusion can be reached looking at the deal value of the transaction 
where the effect is positive, statistically significant but relatively small (marginal effect 
0.0031-0.0038, All I-III). These models show that, as supported by extant literature, 
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transactions involving ‘public’ targets significantly decrease the probability of using an 
earnout (marginal effect between -0.1279 and -0.0913, All I-III, this is only possible in 
cross-border acquisitions), whereas those involving private targets show the opposite 
trend (marginal effect 0.1384-0.2946, All I-VI). All of the above results are in line with 
Hypothesis 1. Surprisingly, transactions involving subsidiaries and joint ventures 
increase the likelihood of using an earnout (All IV-VI). On the other hand, as expected, 
MBO transactions involve such contracts less frequently (marginal effect between -
0.0934 and -0.0771; All I, II, IV, V) but the probability is also negatively related to 
sales (marginal effect between -0.0112 and -0.0076). Then we test the second 
hypothesis which puts forward that cross-border transactions should show higher 
asymmetry of information. Therefore, we expect them to utilise earnouts more often, 
however, we find that the effect is negative (but insignificant, All I-VI). In the end we 
look at the third hypothesis and investigate country-specific features. One surprising 
result is a positive effect of GDP growth (marginal effect 1.8488, All VI). Although 
expected to be significant, past acquisition experience does not seem to play a role in 
the overall sample (only one model with significant variable and very small effect -
0.0009 but negative so in line with theory, All VI). Market return, volatility (control 
variables) and political stability are insignificant (All II, III, V, VI). The latter result is 
not in line with the predictions. The pseudo-adjusted R2 ranges from 9.94% to 13.04%. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
B. Earnouts in Domestic Deals 
As in case of the overall model, we find that the SIC dummy is negative (marginal 
effect -0.0416/-0.0390; Domestic III, IV) and significant. The same is true for Macro 
Industry dummy but the effect is slightly smaller (-0.0342/-0.0346; Domestic I, II). 
Also, ‘services’ and ‘high-technology’ exhibit a similar pattern where both categories 
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increase the chances of observing an earnout being used in a transaction (Domestic I-
IV). Sales have again a negative impact and are highly significant which contradicts our 
hypothesis (Domestic III-IV). This is also true for deal value which has a negative effect 
(marginal effect -0.0093/0.0081, Domestic I-II). This might be due to the fact that in the 
light of the UK Takeover Code, earnouts can only be utilised in acquisitions of private 
targets which are on average smaller than listed companies. The percentage bought has 
positive effect on the probability of using an earnout (Domestic I-IV). The above result 
is in line with our expectations. The effect for subsidiaries and joint-ventures is negative 
and significant which unlike the results for the overall sample is in line with our 
predictions (Domestic III-IV). In accordance with theory, managerial involvement has a 
strong negative effect (marginal effect between -0.1156 and -0.1070, Domestic I-IV). 
Apart from the effect for deal value and sales, the results which are statistically 
significant support our first hypothesis and show that information asymmetry indeed 
increases the likelihood of using an earnout. The control variables - market return and 
volatility are of no significance (Domestic II, IV), whereas unexpectedly only those 
acquirers who have been involved in international acquisitions will be less inclined to 
use earnouts (Domestic IV) - domestic experience is of no importance (Domestic I, III). 
The models have an explanatory power of 4-8% and all the regressions run in this 
subset are significant.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
C. Earnouts in Cross-border Deals 
Although we predict that both ‘Same SIC’ and ‘Same Macro Industry’ should play a 
role also in a cross-border context our data shows that these are statistically insignificant 
(CB I-VIII). Assessing the importance of the other deal-specific characteristics, we find 
that as in the two previous sections, both ‘high-technology’ and ‘services’ sector targets 
 
 
147 
increase the likelihood of using an earnout (CB I-VIII). The effect of the percentage of 
shares acquired is still positive and significant as in the overall regressions but small in 
case of cross-border transactions (marginal effect 0.0016-0.0022, CB I-VIII). The log of 
the deal value plays no role but the negative effect of sales is still present and significant 
(marginal effect between -0.0080 and -0.0071, CB V-VIII). For cross-border 
transactions involving ‘public’ targets there is a strong negative effect of earnouts 
(marginal effect between -0.1042 and -0.1224, CB I-IV) and a positive one for ‘private’ 
companies (marginal effect 0.1199-0.2479, CB I-VIII). The results for joint venture and 
subsidiaries are positive and significant (CB V-VIII). Market volatility, return (CB II-IV 
& VI-VIII) and political stability (CB III and VII) have no influence on the likelihood.  
At the same time cross-border experience lowers the probability of using a contingent 
payout agreement, which is in line with the hypothesis. In one model GDP growth (CB 
VI) does have a positive and rather strong effect, which contradicts prior expectations.   
The next set of variables incorporates cross-border characteristics in order to test the 
third hypothesis. We find that the distance between the target and the acquirer is of 
marginal importance and negative but statistically significant and this opposes our 
predictions but might be related to the fact that bulk of cross-border deals involves 
targets from the US (CB IV). We also show that earnouts are more likely to be used 
when the target is located in a developing country (marginal effect close to 0.0543, CB 
IV). On the other hand, the legal system also seems to play a role. Targets from 
common law countries are more likely to be engaged in a contingent payout agreement 
(marginal effect 0.0486, CB IV), which is in line with the previously discussed theories 
that countries of English legal origin have the highest corporate governance standards 
with respect to shareholder protection and therefore offer better law enforcement. The 
above results support our hypotheses. Language of the target country is insignificant 
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(CB IV, VIII) and the explanatory power of the models as specified in the cross-border 
context is between 8.91% and 16.80% and all the models are still significant.  
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
According to Spillman (2004), lawyers, accountants, M&A consultants and others 
typically involved in an acquisition process agree that in majority of cases earnouts do 
not fulfil their purpose. Although, they can help to 'close' a deal they, often bring 
'enforcement' problems in the post-merger phase (Cunningham, 2007). If the bidder 
expects legal complications in the future (especially likely in codified law systems) or 
knows that the target may be reluctant to accept it, he may forgo the inclusion of such a 
contract even when the information asymmetries are there. Ideally, an earnout contract 
should specify target's obligation for all future contingencies and for all periods until the 
end of the contract, but such solution is not viable. What follows is, one should only 
consider such a contract, if the bidder trusts that his relationship with the target will be 
good after the takeover (Blayney, 2005). "An earnout that makes sense in principle can 
become a disaster due to poor drafting, inattention to details and the law of unintended 
consequences" (Spillman, 2004). These can explain why they fail to generate value in 
domestic acquisitions, even more so in cross-border transactions where information 
asymmetries are stronger. Besides, international deals involve different accounting 
standards, legal systems, practices, etc. which may make the drafting of a close-to-
optimal contract more complex. Coopers and Lybrand (1993) carried out a survey in 
which they investigate 100 top companies' causes of failures and triumphs after the 
acquisition. Two out of three most commonly cited causes of unsuccessful transactions - 
target management attitudes and cultural clashes, and poor knowledge of industry or 
target - are exacerbated in the context of cross-border M&A. Also, some of the target 
countries may make short-run manipulation of the financial performance measures 
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stated in the contract much easier. Although such practices, if not prohibited by the 
contract, guarantee the target the rest of the payment, they can prove to be deleterious to 
the acquirer. This together with the impossibility of creating an exhaustive contingent 
payout contract unravels why earnouts perform worse than initially expected. 
D. Robustness Checks 
We also check the models’ robustness by adding variables with relatively few 
observations and so when investigating the overall sample we see that by including 
variables controlling for gearing (All I), cash-to-assets ratio of the target (All II) and the 
relative size of the deal (All III), the ‘Same Macro Industry’ becomes insignificant, also 
managerial involvement seems to be of no importance. The SIC or the macro sector of 
the target also has no importance if we spilt the dataset and look separately at the 
domestic sub-sample (Domestic I-VIII) while controlling for gearing and the relative 
size which are insignificant. When accounting for gearing, relative size or cash-to-assets 
ratio in a cross-border setting we see that ‘Sales’ becomes insignificant (CB I, II). Also, 
the effect of percentage of shares acquired becomes inconsistent throughout the models 
(CB I-V) and in the cross-border sub-sample there is only one model which shows a 
positive significant effect for ‘Services’ (CB V).  
[Insert Tables 8, 9, and 10 around here] 
Recapitulating the results, we can assume the information asymmetry is significantly 
lower in case of public targets than in transactions involving private ones. This is 
consistent throughout the models and in line with existing literature. Joint-ventures and 
subsidiaries increase the likelihood of using an earnout which given the low level of 
information asymmetry might be an attempt to keep the management involved post-
acquisition. Relative size and financial health of the target do not seem to influence the 
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chances of using a contingent payout agreement. As predicted MBOs have a negative 
effect as managers are likely to have a pretty accurate picture of the company’s 
standing. The deal value has a positive effect in general but decreases the chances for 
using an earnout at home, as this payment method cannot be used in transactions 
involving public targets. Sales have a negative effect which may be caused by the fact 
that the target has a good business momentum and is likely to perform well in the 
future, even post-acquisition. The percentage of shares acquired has a positive and 
significant effect only abroad which means that buyers want to reduce risk in 
transactions where they chose to buy a larger proportion of the company. Predictions 
regarding acquisitions from services and high technology industry are in line with the 
results and consistent in all three scenarios. Cross-border transactions decrease the 
likelihood of using an earnout but this might be driven by potential legal complications 
which may arise in an international context. Past acquisition experience does not seem 
to be sufficient unless it has been acquired through cross-border deals. Also, industry 
knowledge, both macro industry and SIC, is only useful in domestic deals and it is not 
transferable when it comes to international acquisitions. 
When interpreting our findings one should recognise that the strength of these results 
may be affected by factors that have not been accounted for in our analysis, including 
deal-specific characteristics and exogenous factors. These limitations are further 
described in the following chapter. 
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6. LIMITATIONS 
The fundamental assumption underlying this research is the one of a profit-maximising 
setting. We believe that all agents are rational, their actions are driven by the profit 
motive and that risk is undesirable. What is more, we regard it true that an agent will 
choose a method of payment which mitigates the risk of adverse changes in target’s 
value and tries to alleviate potential information asymmetries. Given this set of 
assumptions, we have investigated factors which can influence the probability of using 
an earnout. We believe that the managers should make their decisions based on what 
gives the highest probability of maximising firm value. 
Principal-agent Problem, Managerial Hubris, Control and Ownership 
It might be the case that managers are driven by various motives and these can be 
divided into three categories: a) synergies, b) agency-related, c) managerial hubris 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). The first motive rests upon the supposition that the 
main goal of the manager is shareholder-wealth-maximisation. It is, therefore, expected 
that the outcome of an acquisition should be positive, whereas the way in which the 
gains are to be divided is based on the bargaining powers of the parties involved. This 
would mean that managers should be rational and should choose a method of payment 
which would lower informational asymmetry in order to assure profit maximisation 
from the transaction in the future. However, this is not always the case. 
Although, Gupta et al. (1997) have revealed that synergies are the key motive for M&A, 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) additionally infer that personal interests do frequently 
induce managers to become involved in takeovers or mergers. What follows is that their 
decisions do not have to be driven by looking to minimise information asymmetries or 
hedging. An example of such an alternative managerial objective might be corporate 
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growth. As shown by Conyon and Murphy (2002), it is the size rather than the 
performance which has the highest influence on financial rewards of those in charge. 
Managers are, as a result, inclined to use their free-cash-flow for empire building. A 
phenomenon observed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) shows that managers will pursue 
strategies which lead the company to higher dependence on their expertise increasing 
their job security. “When an investment provides a manager with particularly large 
personal benefits, he is willing to sacrifice the market value of the firm to pursue that 
investment” (Morck et al., 1990, p. 32). In this context we can assume that managers 
might be willing to pick cash over any other payment method for two reasons. The first 
is that their main objective is growing the company, whether through increasing sales 
volume or the number of employees rather than improving profitability, which means 
they will be less concerned with potential risks which the transaction might entail. This 
is related to the second reason, i.e. the ease of financing projects with cash. Many stock-
financed acquisitions may lead to shares dilution if the transaction requires the buyer to 
issue more equity and this is troublesome for the management, but also not welcomed 
by the existing shareholders. Hence, we suppose that an agent makes a conscious, 
informed decision which is deleterious to the shareholders.  
Roll (1986), on the other hand, proposed a theory of managerial hubris, which assumes 
that managers simply display overoptimism regarding their own abilities. “If there is an 
equal probability that mangers are over- and underestimating the synergies of potential 
mergers or acquisitions, and managers make a bid after having overestimated synergy 
values, they may mostly pay too much for the target” (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004, 
p. 33). Research based on European M&A data for the period 1993-2000 has identified 
managerial hubris as one of the important factors leading to poor investment decisions 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). If we assume that managers have such deep faith in 
their own abilities and expertise, we can argue that they will be less prone to use tools 
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which aim to reduce the overall riskiness of the transaction, forgoing the use of 
contingent payout agreements or stock in favour of cash, as they are overly optimistic 
that the expected synergies will materialise. 
Tax Considerations 
A possible supplementary aspect affecting the decision about the method of payment, 
but one which is not related to information asymmetry, is taxation. The payment 
currency is a vital factor when it comes to ruling whether an acquisition is taxable or 
not. “Generally speaking, a tax-free merger can occur only if the owners of the acquired 
firm maintain a continuity of ownership after the merger. As a consequence, mergers 
consummated by an exchange of cash would necessarily be taxable” (Carleton et al., 
1983, p. 816); such gains must be recognised in the same year as the merger takes place. 
The gains in an equity exchange, however, will be recognised once the securities are 
sold.  
Earnout Limitations 
Despite the benefits of solving uncertainty offered by an earnout contract, there are 
several difficulties associated with its use. Sudarsanam (1995) identifies the following: 
• conflict of interests, when the target firm seeks to increase short-run profits at the 
expense of long-run objectives of the acquiring firm; 
• deferred integration of the two firms since the target remains independent until the 
earnout is paid; 
• difficulties associated with post-earnout management of the target firm.   
However, “the risk imposed on the target owners via an earnout includes both the 
original business risk associated with the future economic success of an enterprise and 
the uncertainty associated with the competence of the acquiring company in managing 
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the operations of the target” (Datar et al., 2001, p. 203). Given the above, it can be that 
the level of risk which has to be taken on by the target’s management may outweigh the 
benefits leading to rejection of the consideration method, meaning that the either we are 
looking at the mode of payment alteration or the transaction falls through.  
The need for assessment of target’s performance in the post-acquisition phase means 
that a full structural integration cannot take place, therefore one cannot realise 
immediate synergies resulting from the transaction (e.g. Capron, 1999). This means that 
companies which are looking for immediate synergies might be less likely to employ 
such tools in acquisitions (Capron, 1999). 
One of the possible explanations of the low popularity of this payment method might be 
the problem with the earnout contract design, further enforcement issues in the post-
merger period and the possibility of short-run price (or other performance measure) 
manipulation (Sherman and Janatka, 1992; Boyce and Hewitt, 1998). Several 
practitioners (Spillman, 2004; Blayney 2005; Cunningham, 2007) noted that this is the 
reason why earnouts often fail in domestic M&A. “Earnouts can be complex to 
negotiate because parties must agree on such terms as the duration of earnout payments, 
the metric to be used, accounting methods, payment caps, the identification of certain 
contingencies and potential acceleration provisions, and so on” (Reuer and Ragozzino, 
2009, p. 4). Nonetheless, this proposition might a fortiori be applicable to cross-border 
deals, as the drafting and the enforcement process abroad is likely to be complicated by 
cultural matters and differences in the legal environment. Even without the additional 
complications, Shannon and Reilly (2011) from Potter, Anderson & Corron LLP 
provide numerous examples of legal cases where the parties involved in the transaction 
were disputing whether the earnout target was satisfied or whether the company has 
been managed properly post-closing. They also show that the achievement of the pre-
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specified targets depends on the buyer’s management after the acquisition and also the 
way the buyer accounts for the financial performance in the same period. Thus, this may 
lead to many potential conflicts of which probability increases if the contracts are not 
structured with utmost care. Hence, the risk of post-merger difficulties may have a 
negative signalling effect and thus result in unfavourable market reaction to the 
acquisition announcement.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
Over all this research shows that in line with our first hypothesis deal-specific features 
reflecting higher asymmetry of information and risk increase the chances of using an 
earnout contract. Larger deal value, percentage of shares acquired and transactions 
involving non-listed companies increase the probability of employing a contingent 
payout agreement. Bidders acquiring companies with large sales levels seem to use 
contingent payout agreements less often. This may show that investors think that such 
momentum is strong enough to last even after the acquisition takes place. Acquirer’s 
knowledge of the industry lowers the chances of using an earnout but only in a domestic 
setting, as managers involved in acquisition processes within the same industry but 
abroad do not seem to feel equally comfortable paying the whole sum upfront. This 
might be due to the fact that the knowledge of the industry at home is less useful in 
international transactions. Furthermore, targets in sectors characterised by a large 
proportion of intangible assets are more likely to be acquired with a contingent payout 
clause embedded in the contract. 
With regard to our second hypothesis, we find that, contrary to our initial supposition 
and evidence from univariate analysis, cross-border transactions do not involve earnout 
contracts more often than the domestic ones. This might be because legal system plays 
an important role due to the fact that enforcement of such contracts is a lot more 
complicated in countries ruled by codified law which are largely present in our dataset. 
Despite our predictions resulting in the third hypothesis, we find that investors acquiring 
foreign targets do not use earnouts to limit market risk, volatility or political stability. 
However, they do seem more inclined to hedge themselves when investing in 
developing countries and those that exhibit higher growth. This might be due to the fact 
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that buyers may be reluctant to believe that this level of expansion will continue and 
think that the projections for the business might be too ambitious. To our surprise, 
distance has a negative impact but one should take into account high presence of US 
targets in our sample which generally exhibit greater transparency resulting from 
corporate governance standards when compared with companies in other countries 
around the world. We see positive impact of the same legal system dummy resulting 
from the complexity of contract enforcement in countries which are not governed by 
common law. Language is statistically insignificant. The robustness tests additionally 
make us reject our initial hypothesis and show that gearing and cash-to-assets ratio are 
also insignificant as it is likely that these are already factored in the price offered for the 
target. 
Although the risk-sharing hypothesis states that bidders will offer stock rather than cash 
if they are concerned about the true value of the target, we can provide a broader 
interpretation and state that the risk-sharing hypothesis assumes that investors will 
chose a method of payment which enables them to hedge some of the risk when the 
information asymmetry is high. This is indeed supported by our results which indicate 
higher incidence of using earnout contracts when the potential estimation error or risk 
are more severe. Our analysis does not however provide sufficient evidence to reach 
conclusions with regard to misvaluation and signalling hypotheses. Although the results 
show that market performance does not impact the probability of using an earnout 
contract, we would need to further study the terms of such a contract. This is because 
the terms of a contingent payout agreement can be settled both in cash and stock. The 
same can be concluded in the context of the signalling hypothesis. On the other hand, 
cash flow hypothesis would require further analysis of cash generation capacity of 
acquirers versus their peers in the sector, which has not been performed in this research. 
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Given the above, the existing research provides managers with an overview of payment 
methods which can be used to reduce the potential negative consequences resulting 
from high information asymmetry and proves that investors indeed perceive earnouts as 
an effective way of achieving such a goal. It shows prospective acquirers’ when 
earnouts are most popular and that some risk factors, such as political stability or market 
volatility, are not addressed through a contingent payout agreement. The analysis also 
provides a list of factors indicating high information asymmetry. Future studies could 
further explore the specifics of earnout contracts and market anomalies. This would 
show if managers try to take opportunistic actions during times of stock overvaluation 
and then investigate if the probability of using an earnout contract is influenced by the 
utilised method of payment. If the results would have proven that investors chose stock 
when the company is undervalued and cash otherwise, this would support the signalling 
hypothesis. This then would allow us to study if the acquirers are equally concerned 
about risk when trying to send a specific signal to the market. One particularly 
interesting area of future research relates to cash flow generation capabilities and 
whether companies which are cash-rich (versus peers) do exhibit a tendency to destroy 
value which can also take a form of unnecessary risk-taking – in our case not using an 
earnout. 
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Table 1 - List of Variables and Expected Effect 
Feature Name Description Impact Hypothesis 
Transaction Characteristics 
Public Target is a public company - 1 
Private Target is private company + 1 
Subsidiary Target is a subsidiary - 1 
Joint Venture Target is a joint venture - 1 
Relative Size Relative size of target to acquirer + 1 
Deal Value Deal value + 1 
Shares Acquired (%) Percentage of shares acquired + 1 
Sales Target’s sales for the last twelve months + 1 
Gearing The gearing of the target + 1 
Cash Cash to assets ratio - 1 
Experience Number of acquisitions carried out by the buyer - 1 
MBO Transaction with managerial involvement - 1 
Industry Characteristics 
High-technology Target is from a high-technology industry + 1 
Services Target is from the services industry + 1 
Same Mac Target and acquirer from the same macro industry - 1 
Same SIC Target and acquirer have the same SIC code - 1 
Market Characteristics 
Market Return Market return on the S&P 500 for last 12 months - Control Variable 
Market Volatility Volatility of the market as shown by VIX  + Control Variable 
Target country characteristics 
Cross-border Same ultimate parent nations of target and acquirer + 2 
Distance Physical distance between the acquirer and the target + 3 
Law Same legal system in target’s country + 3 
Language Same official language in target’s country - 3 
Developing Low development level + 3 
GDP Growth GDP growth of the target country - 3 
Political Stability Political stability of the target country + 3 
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Table 2 - Sample Statistics 
      Cross-border (n = 10,431) Domestic (n = 26,668) 
  N % n % 
Panel A. Target Countries (top 5) !! !! !!
USA 3,326 31.89%  -   -  
Germany 914 8.76%  -   -  
France 850 8.15%  -   -  
Netherlands 541 5.19%  -   -  
Australia 507 4.86%  -   -  
        
Panel B. Use of Earnouts  !! !! !! !!
Earnout 1,012 9.70% 2,393 8.97% 
Other methods of payment 9,419 90.30% 24,275 91.03% 
     
Panel C. Target Status !! !! !! !!
Public 638 6.11% 1,248 4.68% 
Subsidiary 3,643 34.93% 9,814 36.80% 
Private 5,838 55.97% 15,273 57.27% 
Joint Venture 233 2.23% 284 1.07% 
Government 79 0.76% 49 0.18% 
! ! ! ! !
Panel D. Relatedness of the bidder and the target  
Same Macro Industry 6,928 66.42% 18,621 69.83% 
Different Macro Industry 3,503 33.58% 8,047 30.17% 
 
Same SIC Code 3,400 32.60% 
  
40.86% 10,897 
Different SIC Code 7,031 69.41% 15,771 59.14% 
! ! ! ! !
Panel E. Industry 
Hi-technology 1,681 16.12% 2,702 10.14% 
Services 1,565 15.00% 4,775 17.91% 
! ! ! ! !
Panel F. Country-level Characteristics 
Developed Country 9,011 86.21% - - 
Developing Country 1,420 13.79% - - 
     
Same Language 3,917 37.55% - - 
Different Language 6,514 62.45% - - 
     
Same Legal System 4,541 43.54% - - 
Different Legal System 5,890 56.46% - - 
! ! ! ! !
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Figure 1 - Annual Distribution of Deals in the Sample 
(no. of deals) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
500 
1 000 
1 500 
2 000 
2 500 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
86
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
04
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
 
 
175 
Table 3 - Description of Variables 
Feature Name Type Description 
Public Dummy  One  if the target is a public company and zero otherwise 
Private Dummy  One if the target is private company and zero otherwise 
Subsidiary Dummy  One if the target is a subsidiary and zero otherwise 
Joint Venture Dummy  One if the target is a joint venture and zero otherwise 
Relative Size Quantitative  Relative size of the deal size to acquirer’s enterprise value 
Deal Value Quantitative  Log of  deal value in USD 
Shares Acquired (%) Quantitative  Percentage of shares acquired 
Sales Quantitative  Log of  target’s sales for the last twelve months before the acquisition 
Gearing Quantitative  The gearing of the target 
Cash Quantitative  Cash to assets ratio of the target 
Experience Quantitative  Number of acquisitions carried out by the buyer in the past years   (last 5 years excluded) 
MBO Dummy  One for  transactions with managerial involvement and zero otherwise 
High-technology Dummy  One if the target is from a high-technology industry and zero otherwise 
Services Dummy  One if the target is from the services industry and zero otherwise 
Same Mac Dummy  One if the target and acquirer are from the same macro industry and zero                   .otherwise 
Same SIC Dummy  One if the target and acquirer have the same SIC code and zero otherwise 
Market Return Quantitative  Market return on the S&P 500 for last 12 months 
Market Volatility Quantitative  Volatility of the market as shown by VIX for the last 12 months 
Distance Quantitative  Physical distance between the acquirer and the target - as provided by                     .Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (University of Essex) 
Law Dummy  One if the target is from the same legal system as the acquirer and zero .otherwise 
Language Dummy  One if the target’s country official language is English and zero otherwise 
Developing Dummy  One if the target is from a developing country and zero otherwise 
Cross-border Dummy  One if the target is located abroad and zero otherwise 
GDP Growth Quantitative  GDP growth of the target country in the year of the acquisition 
Political Stability Quantitative  Political Stability Index value for the target country, for the year of           .acquisition - Worldwide Government Indicators 
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Table 4 - Univariate Analysis 
Variable All 
Cross-border  
vs.  
Domestic  
Mean 9.70% 
Mean 8.97% 
p-value 0.029 
Difference 0.73% 
Same Macro Industry 
 vs.  
Different Macro Industry 
Mean 8.13% 
Mean 11.51% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference -3.38% 
Same SIC  
vs.  
Different SIC 
Mean 6.96%  
Mean  10.57% 
p-value  0.000 
Difference  -3.61% 
High-technology  
vs.  
Non-High-technology 
Mean 15.44% 
Mean 8.34% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference 7.10% 
Services  
vs.  
Non-Services 
Mean 11.74% 
Mean 8.65% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference 3.09% 
Management Buy-out  
vs.  
Non-Management Buy-out 
Mean 1.83% 
Mean 9.23% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference -7.40% 
Variable Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Same Macro Industry  
Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Mean 7.66% 
Mean 9.38% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference -1.72% 
Same SIC  
Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Mean 6.19% 
Mean 9.41% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference -3.22% 
High-technology  
Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Mean 16.10% 
Mean 14.40% 
p-value 0.129 
Difference 1.70% 
Services  
Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Mean 11.67% 
Mean 11.95% 
p-value 0.762 
Difference -0.28% 
Management Buy-out  
Domestic vs. Cross-border 
Mean 1.55% 
Mean 6.67% 
p-value 0.151 
Difference -5.12% 
Variable Country-level 
Developing  
vs.  
Developed Countries 
Mean 6.76% 
Mean 9.28% 
p-value 0.000 
Difference -2.52% 
Common Law  
vs.  
Codified Law 
Mean 9.33% 
Mean 8.35% 
p-value 0.021 
Difference 0.98% 
Same Language  
vs.  
Different Language 
Mean 9.33% 
Mean 8.43% 
p-value 0.026 
Difference 0.90% 
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Table 5 - Multivariate Analysis 
All Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  All I All II All III All IV All V All VI 
Same Mac -0.0175*** -0.0197*** -0.0214***       (.0048) (.0053) (.0072)       
Same SIC       -0.0248*** -0.0257*** -0.0123       (.0066) (.0070) (.0093) 
Services 0.0637*** 0.0651*** 0.0699*** 0.0513*** 0.0487*** 0.0597*** (.0073) (.0079) (.0103) (.0100) (.0107) (.0145) 
High-technology 0.0919*** 0.0945*** 0.0910*** 0.0797*** 0.0818*** 0.0632*** (.0084) (.009) (.0113) (.0124) (.0132) (.0158) 
Log Deal Value 0.0031** 0.0038*** 0.0036*       (.0013) (.0014) (.0019)       
Log Sales        -0.0112*** -0.0098*** -0.0076***       (.0019) (.0021) (.0026) 
Shares acquired 
% 
0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
(.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) 
Public -0.0913*** -0.1014*** -0.1279***       (.0071) (.0075) (.0079)       
Private 0.1384*** 0.1423*** 0.1442*** 0.2217*** 0.2439*** 0.2946*** (.0049) (.0054) (.0072) (.0147) (.0178) (.0281) 
Joint Venture       0.2423*** 0.1957*** 0.5024***       (.0798) (.0905) (.1276) 
Subsidiary       0.1458*** 0.1740*** 0.2890***       (.0210) (.0259) (.0559) 
MBO -0.0835*** -0.0771**   -0.0934** -0.0889**   (.0169) (.0204)   (.0145) (.0169)   
Cross-border -0.0051 -0.0061 0.0022 -0.0004 0.0035 -0.0005 (.0049) (.0054) (.0077) (.0072) (.0079) (.0109) 
Market Return   -0.0154     0.0339     (.0279)     (.0428)   
Market Volatility   0.0009     -0.0009     (.0016)     (.0027)   
GDP growth     0.2285     1.8488***     (.2964)     (.5708) 
Political Stability     0.0097     0.0225     (.0111)     (.0185) 
Acq. Experience -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0009* (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) (.0005) 
No. of 
observations 22,313 18,794 10,659 9,510 7,839 3,894 
Chi-squared 
probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 9.94% 9.95% 10.60% 11.41% 11.56% 13.04% 
Observed P 0.1507 0.1535 0.1631 0.1418 0.1414 0.1459 
Predicted P 0.1225 0.1253 0.1284 0.1053 0.1032 0.0938 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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Table 6 - Multivariate Analysis 
Domestic Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  Domestic I Domestic II Domestic III Domestic IV 
Same Mac -0.0342*** -0.0346***     
(.0061) (.0068) 
 
  
Same SIC     -0.0390*** -0.0416*** 
    (.0082) (.0088) 
Services 0.0872*** 0.0899*** 0.0600*** 0.0611*** 
(.0091) (.0099) (.0124) (.0135) 
High-technology 0.1277*** 0.1324*** 0.0814*** 0.0880*** 
(.0115) (.0122) (.0157) (.0170) 
Log Deal Value -0.0093*** -0.0081***  
  
(.0016) (.0017) 
 
  
Log Sales      -0.0263*** -0.0234*** 
    (.0023) (.0025) 
Shares acquired % 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
(.0002) (.0003) (.0004) (.0004) 
Joint Venture     -0.0614 -0.0979** 
    (.0353) (0.0227) 
Subsidiary     -0.0637*** -0.0652*** 
    (.0080) (.0088) 
MBO -0.1156*** -0.1142*** -0.1102** -0.1070** 
(.0127) (.0146) (.0150) (.0158) 
Market Return   -0.0222   -0.0140 
  (.0338)   (.0520) 
Market Volatility   -0.0014  
0.0001 
  (.0009) 
 
(.0013) 
Domestic Experience  0.0019   0.0010   
(.0005)   (.0008)   
Cross-border 
Experience 
  0.0020   -0.0022*  
  (.0008)    (.0012) 
No. of observations 15,743 13,223 6,879 5,651 
Chi-squared probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 4.63% 4.36% 7.70% 8.16% 
Observed P 0.1482 0.1512 0.1420 0.1407 
Predicted P 0.1381 0.1406 0.1213 0.1186 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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Table 7 - Multivariate Analysis 
Cross-border Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  CB I CB II CB III CB IV CB V CB VI CB VII CB VIII 
Same Mac     0.0160 0.0123 0.0051 0.0148 
    (.0105) (.0123) (.0162) (.0122) 
Same SIC 0.0081 0.0025 0.0030 0.0024     (.0090) (.0103) (.0128) (.0104)     
Services 0.0595*** 0.0672*** 0.0565*** 0.0639*** 0.0510*** 0.0500*** 0.0346 0.0424** (.0140) (.0160) (.0196) (.0162) (.0187) (.0210) (.0254) (.0205) 
High-technology 0.0694*** 0.0668*** 0.0596*** 0.0631*** 0.0637*** 0.0559*** 0.0246 0.0523*** (.0131) (.0144) (.0175) (.0146) (.0187) (.0199) (.0224) (.0199) 
Log Deal Value 0.0022 0.0017 0.0030 0.0019     (.0024) (.0027) (.0034) (.0028)     
Log Sales      -0.0080*** -0.0075** -0.0073* -0.0071** 
    (.0030) (.0035) (.0043) (.0035) 
Shares acquired % 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0020*** 0.0016*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0018*** 0.0019*** (.0003) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0005) (.0006) (.0005) 
Public -0.1042*** -0.1209*** -0.1224*** -0.1203***     (.0117) (.0122) (.0154) (.0121)     
Private 0.1230*** 0.1199*** 0.1312*** 0.1209*** 0.2061*** 0.2400*** 0.2459*** 0.2479*** (.0090) (.0101) (.0133) (.0103) (.0256) (.0324) (.0422) (.0331) 
Joint Venture     0.4194*** 0.5271*** 0.6953*** 0.5532*** 
    (.1406) (.1596) (.1802) (.1570) 
Subsidiary     0.1318*** 0.1890*** 0.2059*** 0.2025*** 
    (.0367) (.0500) (.0695) (.0517) 
Market Return  0.0033 0.0064 0.0157  0.1111 0.1252 0.1058 
 (.0515) (.0601) (.0520)  (.0763) (.0899) (.0761) 
Market Volatility  -0.0004 0.0039 -0.0001  -0.0063 -0.0006 -0.0054 
 (.0031) (.0038) (.0031)  (.0049) (.0057) (.0048) 
GDP growth  0.0518  -0.1137  0.7676**  0.5740 
 (.2493)  (.3020)  (.3934)  (.4699) 
Political Stability   0.0028    -0.0059  
  (.0108)    (.0168)  
Cross-border 
Experience 
-0.0008 -0.0011* -0.0007 -0.0014** -0.0027*** -0.0029*** -0.0025*** -0.0030*** 
(.0006) (.0006) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0008) (.0009) (.0008) 
Developing    0.0543**    0.0267 
   (.0228)    (.0458) 
Distance    -0.0158*    0.0076 
   (0.0085)    (0.0118) 
Language     0.0058    -0.0105 
   (.0236)    (.0326) 
Law    0.0486*    0.0613 
   (.0280)    (.0435) 
No. of observations 6,544 5,278 3,194 5,118 2,610 2,070 1,070 2,029 
Chi-squared 
probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 9.73% 8.91% 9.93% 9.14% 15.29% 15.36% 16.80% 15.69% 
Observed P 0.1530 0.1603 0.1641 0.1591 0.1341 0.1420 0.1430 0.1400 
Predicted P 0.1216 0.1304 0.1293 0.1290 0.0819 0.0864 0.0788 0.0843 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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Table 8 - Robustness Check 
All Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  All I All II All III All IV All V All VI 
Same Mac 0.0036 -0.00840 -0.0181       (.0099) (.009) (.0131)       
Same SIC       -0.0241** -0.0264*** -0.0163       (.0093) (.0074) (.0181) 
Services 0.0360** 0.0446*** 0.0564*** 0.0243* 0.0354*** 0.0533** (.0173) (.0139) (.0173) (.0151) (.0127) (.0261) 
High-technology 0.0452** 0.0626*** 0.0752*** 0.0340** 0.0343*** 0.0541** (.0217) (.0162) (.0177) (.0195) (.0143) (.0261) 
Log Deal Value -0.0015 0.0024 -0.0082** -0.0078**     (.0034) (.0028) (.0036) (.0031)     
Log Sales          -0.0029 -0.0099**         (.0023) (.0047) 
Shares acquired % 0.0010** 0.0014*** 0.0020*** 0.0009** 0.0012*** 0.0015** (.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0003) (.0007) 
Public -0.0785*** -0.1110*** -0.1994***       (.0162) (.0122) (.0148)       
Private 0.1011*** 0.1051*** 0.1948*** 0.1728*** 0.1839*** 0.3644*** (.0166) (.0121) (.0129) (.0221) (.0177) (.0367) 
Joint Venture       0.2011* 0.2348*** 0.4691***       (.1701) (.1162) (.1747) 
Subsidiary       0.0899*** 0.1110*** 0.3964***       (.0271) (.0226) (.0869) 
MBO   -0.0028           (.0153)         
Cross-border -0.0142   -0.0206 -0.0066 0.0021 0.0102 (.0177)   (.0129) (.0168) (.0126) (.0192) 
Acq. Experience -0.0006 -2.82e-05 -0.0010* -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0013 (.0007) (.0005) (.0006) (.0006) (.0004) (.0009) 
Gearing -0.0000     -0.0000     (0.0001)     (.0001)     
Cash/Assets   -0.0251     0.0185     (.1152)     (.0874)   
Relative Size     -0.0005     -0.0001     (.0007)     (.0003) 
No. of observations 2,646 4,794 4,451 2,730 4,367 1,517 
Chi-squared probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 17.34% 14.59% 10.84% 16.83% 14.39% 14.53% 
Observed P 0.1225 0.1475 0.24 0.1095 0.1069 0.2017 
Predicted P 0.0719 0.0985 0.1975 0.0628 0.0667 0.1345 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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Table 9 - Robustness Check 
Domestic Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  
Domestic  
I 
Domestic 
II 
Domestic 
III 
Domestic 
IV 
Domestic  
V 
Domestic 
VI 
Domestic 
VII 
Domestic 
VIII 
Same Mac -0.0188 -0.0170 -0.0205 -0.0020  
  -0.0589   
(.0177) (.0176) (.0176) (.0181) 
 
  (.0434)   
Same SIC         -0.0423 -0.0436   -0.0640         (.0261) (.0263)   (.0357) 
Services 0.1104*** 0.1082*** 0.1115*** 0.1097*** 0.0804** 0.0837** 0.1450*** 0.1251** (.0227) (.0267) (.0227) (.0231) (.0361) (.0366) (.0620) (.0609) 
High-technology 0.0953*** 0.0960*** 0.0966*** 0.1017*** 0.0120 0.0136 -0.0555 -0.0728 (.0244) (.0245) (.0244) (.0251) (.0348) (.0353) (.0507) (.0391) 
Log Deal Value -0.0099** -0.0113** -0.0086* -0.0084*  
  -0.0293**   
(.005) (.0048) (.0048) (.0050) 
 
  (.0120)   
Log Sales          -0.0264*** -0.0284   -0.0477***         (.0066) (.0067)   (.0110) 
Shares acquired % 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0038*** 0.0018 0.0027** 0.0019 0.0013 (.0007) (.0007) (.0007) (.0008) (.0011) (.0012) (.0016) (.0016) 
Joint Venture         -0.1135 -0.0883   0.2806         (.0743) (.0900)   (.2925) 
Subsidiary      
  -0.0982*** -0.1070*** 
 
-0.0498 
    
 
  (0.0290) (0.0286) 
 
(.0486) 
Market Return       0.0049   0.0912           (.0832)   (.1423)     
Market Volatility      
0.0007 
 
0.0125 
 
  
    
 
(.0049) 
 
(.0080) 
 
  
Acq. Experience -0.0008               (.0008)               
- Domestic    0.0003  
  
 
  
 
  
  (0.0011) 
 
  
 
  
 
  
- Cross-border     -0.0040** -0.0039** -0.0084*** -0.0090*** -0.0045 -0.0069     (.0017) (.0018) (.0029) (.0031) (.0038) (.0043) 
Gearing      
  
 
  0.0028 0.0021 
    
 
  
 
  (.0030) (.0026) 
Relative Size -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 (.0026) (.0025) (.0027) (.0026) (.0009) (.0008) (.0012) (.0011) 
No. of observations 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,601 962 925 342 318 
Chi-squared 
probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 3.43% 3.40% 3.59% 3.62% 8.63% 9.81% 9.56% 16.65% 
Observed P 0.2592 0.2592 0.2592 0.2618 0.2131 0.2141 0.1754 0.1698 
Predicted P 0.2398 0.2408 0.2388 0.2437 0.1852 0.1810 0.1461 0.1618 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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Table 10 - Robustness Check 
Cross-border Deals (Marginal Effects) 
  CB I CB II CB III CB IV CB V 
Same Mac -0.0247 0.0062       (.0297) (.0075) 
 
    
Same SIC     0.0033 -0.0122 0.0025     (.0197) (.0159) (.0102) 
Services -0.0144 0.0220 0.0120 0.0337 0.0664*** (.0330) (.0280) (.0279) (.0399) (.0160) 
High-technology 0.0605* 0.0295** 0.0427* 0.0302 0.0662*** (.0396) (.0250) (.0255) (.0285) (.0143) 
Log Deal Value     0.0081 -0.0044 0.0017     (.0054) (.0043) (.0027) 
Log Sales  -0.0092 -0.0016       (.0070) (.0021)       
Shares acquired % 0.0006 0.0006* 0.0017*** 0.0009* 0.0017*** (.0010) (.0003) (.0006) (.0004) (.0003) 
Public     -0.1891*** -0.1106***       (.0155) (.0397)   
Private 0.3760*** 0.1195*** 0.1447*** 0.0276 0.3066*** (.0816) (.0570) (.0206) (.0259) (.0333) 
Joint Venture 0.7875***       0.3103*** (.1847)       (.1014) 
Subsidiary 0.4559*** 0.0755***  
  0.2261*** 
(.1372) (.0477) 
 
  (.0473) 
Market Return 0.1564 0.1002** 0.0354 0.1560* 0.0023 (.1383) (.0634) (.0869) (.0898) (.0513) 
Market Volatility -0.0010 0.0035 0.0028 0.0023 -0.0004 (.0078) (.0031) (.0054) (.0056) (.003) 
GDP growth 0.8395 -0.0667 0.5816 -0.5695 0.0709 (1.2798) (.2793) (.6243) (.6218) (.2486) 
Cross-border 
Experience  
-0.0044*** 0.0003 -0.0022** 0.0007 -0.0011* 
(.0015) (.0004) (.0011) (.0008) (.0006) 
Cash/Assets   0.0111   0.0003     (.0262) 
 
(.0581)   
Relative Size 0.0115   -0.0000     (.0392)   (0.0009)     
Developing 0.0203 0.0475 0.0069 0.1576   (.0794) (.0790) (.0433) (.1585)   
Distance 0.0131 -0.0022 -0.0087 -0.0054   (0.0265) (0.0081) (0.0167) (0.0000)   
Language  -0.0407 -0.0158 0.0176 -0.0145   (.0574) (.0151) (.0426) (.0317)   
Law 0.0636 0.0528** 0.0478 0.8687***   
(.0776) (.0424) (.0484) (.0515)   
No. of observations 495 445 1,600 447 5,278 
Chi-squared 
probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 25.21% 33.29% 11.14% 29.89% 9.00% 
Observed P 0.1818 0.0674 0.2075 0.0940 0.1603 
Predicted P 0.0864 0.0113 0.1606 0.0307 0.1294 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the dependent 
variable is the probability of using an earnout contract in a transaction. The independent 
variables included are used as proxies which reflect the level of information asymmetry. 
All the variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks into the factors which can increase the chances of deal completion. 
The existing consensus leads us to believe that the reasons to acquire another company 
can be broadly divided into three categories: a) synergistic benefits, b) agency-related 
goals, and c) managerial hubris (including overconfidence; Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). More recent work also discusses the importance of market valuations and their 
impact on merger waves, whereas the literature identifies additional reasons underlying 
cross-border takeovers (Conn et al., 2005; Sudarsanam, 1995; Kuipers et al., 2003). 
However, not all bids lead to a takeover. Betton et al. (2008) having investigated 35,727 
takeover attempts which took place between 1980 and 2006 find that on average only 
78% of those attempts are successful and the costs of failed acquisitions can be very 
high. One could argue that it is due to lack of managerial commitment, but regardless 
whether managers are motivated by synergistic benefits, managerial entrenchment or 
hubris, the theory shows that they should be fully dedicated to their acquisition projects. 
Given the high costs of unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions, we decided to put 
together a list of actions which should increase the chances of deal completion and test 
the validity of our theory. Such a list would help the acquirers to limit the risk of 
incurring those high costs. Although most of the existing literature studies US 
transactions, we instead look at the UK market. Despite the above, we put forward that 
the main contribution of this research is the recognition of the problem of endogeneity 
in the existing models. To address this issue we use the two-stage residual inclusion 
(2SRI) methodology which enables us to separate the indirect effect, i.e. the effect of 
other variables included in the model on the premium, from their direct effect on bid 
success. The most important conclusion is that although the size of the premium is 
significant, one should also keep in mind the impact of hostile transactions, competing 
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bids and the inclusions of a termination fee. From the above we can infer that managers 
should find it worthwhile to use pre-emptive bidding and pursue bilateral negotiations. 
If this is not a viable option, the acquirer shall take measures which would limit the 
chances that competing bids will arise. Careful selection of the target based on its 
financial and market performance can also increase the likelihood that the deal will be 
successful. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes and tests a list of factors which are expected to increase the chances 
of deal success. In the first section, we assess why managers want to acquire other 
companies at home and abroad. We then discuss the implications of failed takeover 
attempts and have a look at the existing literature. At the end of this part we discuss the 
motivation for our research and explain how it differs from other extant work on 
probability of deal success.  
1.1. REASONS BEHIND TAKEOVER ATTEMPTS 
Managers can have a great impact on the takeover process, before and after the 
acquisition (for a summary of existing work see McCarthy and Weitzel, 2009). There is 
a whole array of literature which tries to shed some light on the managers’ motivations 
and to explain why acquisitions take place in general. The existing consensus leads us to 
believe that the reasons to acquire another company can be broadly divided into three 
categories: a) synergistic benefits, b) agency-related goals, and c) managerial hubris 
(including overconfidence; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). However, more recent 
work also discusses the importance of market valuations and their impact on merger 
waves. We additionally explore other reasons which specifically motivate cross-border 
transactions. In order to get a better understanding of which transaction’s/target’s 
characteristics might be of high importance, we investigate the following acquisition 
triggers. 
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A. Synergies  
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) introduce the concept of dominant logic. It relates to the way 
a company remains profitable which is closely linked to the concept of core competency 
– a particular strength of a firm which is hard to imitate and which benefits the end 
customer (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). This notion relies on a belief that companies 
have specific features which help them to maintain their competitive advantage. 
Takeovers motivated by synergistic benefits aim to leverage these qualities to an even 
greater extent. A synergy can be more accurately defined as “the additional value that is 
generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that would not been available 
to these firms operating independently” (Damodaran, 2005, p. 3). According to 
Andrews (1971), an acquisition will produce synergies if a distinctive competence of 
the firm is matched with the existing market opportunities. In general, the sources of 
such value creation are usually driven by a reduction in costs or an increase in revenues 
(Chatterjee, 1986). Lubatkin (1983) recognises three main types of synergies: collusive, 
operational and financial, although current literature usually mentions only the latter 
two. Damodaran (2005) categorises economies of scale, greater pricing power, 
combination of different functional strengths and higher growth in new or existing 
markets as operational synergies, while financial synergies can be generated through the 
use of cash slack, increased debt capacity, creation of tax benefits and diversification. 
Theory predicts that synergistic acquisitions will be carried out by managers who focus 
on shareholder-wealth-maximisation. Research by Bradley et al. (1988) supports this 
hypothesis with empirical evidence, i.e. the results of their event study show that the 
value of the combined entity increases by 7.4% on average and the gain is shared by 
both parties involved in the transaction.  
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B. Market for Corporate Control 
The second motive is disciplining incumbent management of the target company. 
Manne’s (1965) theory of market for corporate control stresses the role of equity 
markets in the facilitation of acquisitions. “The lower the stock price, relative to what it 
could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the takeover becomes to 
those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently” (Manne, 1965, 
p. 113). In other words, this is a situation in which the bidder tries to address the 
problem of the agency cost and managers’ discretionary behaviour (Williamson, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986). The goal is to eliminate the non-value-maximising practices of the target 
management which result either from their inaptitude or excessive focus on the 
extraction of private benefits. Examples of such destructive behaviour include, amongst 
others, disproportionate growth and diversification, overconsumption of perquisites, 
provision of overly generous contracts to third parties or debt avoidance (Morck et al., 
1988). Recapitulating, entrenched managers will be removed by those who can better 
utilise the firm’s resources.  
However, it should be kept in mind that those value-destroying managers can also 
initiate some of the M&A activity. Although, Gupta et al. (1997) point out that 
synergies are the key motive for M&A transactions, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) 
additionally infer that personal interests do frequently induce managers to become 
involved in takeovers or mergers. The model developed by Jensen (1986) shows that 
managers who are not closely monitored and whose companies produce cash flows in 
excess of profitable investment opportunities are more likely to waste the surplus on 
projects with a negative net present value. What is more, managers may prefer to spend 
this surplus on projects which will increase their private benefits rather than return the 
money to the shareholders in the form of dividends or share buy-backs. “When an 
191 
investment provides a manager with particularly large personal benefits, he is willing to 
sacrifice the market value of the firm to pursue that investment” (Morck et al., 1990, p. 
32). This has been supported by Ng and Young Baek (2006) who also prove that 
acquisitions made by cash-rich bidders diminish operating efficiency. One managerial 
objective which does not necessarily target shareholder-value maximisation, but which 
enables the extraction of private benefits might be corporate growth. As shown by 
Conyon and Murphy (2002), it is the size rather than the performance of the company 
which has the highest influence on the financial rewards of those in charge. 
Additionally, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) observe that managers will pursue strategies 
which direct the company towards higher dependence on their expertise to increase their 
job security. Managers are, as a result, inclined to use their free-cash-flows for empire 
building. Their main objective is growing the company and this can be easily done 
through acquisitions.  
C. Hubris  
Another theory proposed by Roll (1986) focuses on managerial hubris. It assumes that 
although managers may have good intentions, they simply display overoptimism 
regarding their own abilities. “If there is an equal probability that mangers are over- and 
underestimating the synergies of potential mergers or acquisitions, and managers make 
a bid after having overestimated synergy values, they may mostly pay too much for the 
target” (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004, p. 33). Hence in general, we can state that 
managerial hubris results in overpaying (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). The price paid for the target is a prerequisite to merger’s success and 
therefore findings of Dong et al. (2006), who propose that overpaying increases the 
chances of failure are not a surprise. Literature relating to psychology shows that the 
power held by the managers is the driver of their hubris (Ashton-James et al., 2010). On 
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one hand, individuals who are in power tend to remain overly optimistic about their 
future prospects and this tendency attracts them to more risky projects (Anderson and 
Galinsky, 2006). On the other hand, power also gives them a sense of an ability to 
control situations which are often beyond their scope which again leads to increased 
levels of risk-taking (Taylor and Brown, 1988). 
Research based on European M&A data for the period 1993-2000 identifies managerial 
hubris as one of the most important factors leading to poor investment decisions 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Further papers document strong evidence of hubris in 
US acquisitions (Berkovitch and Narayan, 1993), while another publication shows that 
hubris is more likely to be observed in glamour bidders (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) also note that managers who do not exercise their in-the-
money options (implying their overconfidence) tend to engage in diversifying 
acquisitions which on average perform worse than same-industry transactions, which 
might be perceived as an indication of hubris.   
D. Waves 
New M&A literature focuses more on behaviour of groups of investors in order to 
explain the phenomenon of merger waves. It has been noted that periods of high merger 
activity coincide with times of high market valuations (e.g. see Jovanovic and 
Rousseau, 2002), while others point out that these actually are the driver of M&A 
activity. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that overvaluation of equity can incentivise 
firms to become involved in equity-financed acquisitions. “In a more general 
framework, firms with overvalued equity might be able to make acquisitions, survive, 
and grow, while firms with undervalued, or relatively less overvalued, equity become 
takeover targets” (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003, p. 309). It has been proven that bidders 
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are generally overvalued relative to their targets and this holds for both, cash and equity 
offers (Dong et al. 2006). Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2003) show that “acquirers with high 
firm-specific error use stock to buy targets with relatively lower firm-specific error at 
times when both firms benefit from positive time-series sector error” (p. 32). At the 
same time, cash acquisitions are more common for undervalued targets and are carried 
out by acquirers with lower level of overvaluation. Jensen (2005) perceives this as a 
managerial problem and refers to it as the ‘agency cost of overvalued equity’, although 
a contradicting neoclassical theory states that merger waves are triggered by industry 
shocks which may be a response to economic, technological or regulatory changes 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). What is more, the analysis of takeover activity in 1980s 
and 1990s carried out by Harford (2005) confirms that the waves which occurred in 
those years were all an effect of industry shocks rather than stock misvaluations.   
E. Cross-border M&A 
Apart from the conventional motives behind M&A, the literature identifies additional 
reasons underlying cross-border takeovers. The first incentive to acquire abroad is 
geographical diversification - this is commonly known as the co-insurance of cash flows 
which allows the acquirer to reduce the volatility of cash flows and to enhance the stability 
of the acquiring company. Sometimes the managers’ decision to expand abroad may be 
motivated by defensive motives, such as reducing dependence on export sales, competing 
with business rivals abroad or overcoming economic shocks in the home country, or the 
willingness to meet clients’ needs by providing services to their subsidiaries abroad 
(Sudarsanam, 1995). Given the significant importance of legal complexities in mergers and 
acquisitions when acquiring domestic targets, it is not surprising that acquirers turn to 
international acquisitions in order to overcome the potential problem of antitrust issues 
resulting from the restricted size of the domestic market (Kuipers et al., 2003). Lastly, 
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managers may be acting opportunistically taking advantage of exchange rate fluctuations to 
acquire a foreign target cheaply (Sudarsanam, 1995). All of the above help us to understand 
why cross-border acquisitions are consistently becoming an ever-growing form of FDI 
flows.  
1.2. COSTS OF FAILED ACQUISITIONS 
However, not all bids lead to a takeover. Betton et al. (2008) having investigated 35,727 
takeover attempts which took place between 1980 and 2006 find that on average only 
78% of those attempts are successful. One could argue that it is due to lack of 
managerial commitment, but regardless whether managers are motivated by synergistic 
benefits, managerial entrenchment or hubris, the respective theories imply that 
managers should be fully dedicated to their acquisition projects. One reason for this is 
because acquisitions can be expensive, not only when they take place and the forecasted 
synergies do not materialise, but also when the transaction falls through. An example 
illustrating the magnitude of costs involved can be the recent acquisition attempts by 
BHP Billiton. The corporation tried to take over three different companies between 
2008 and 2010. None of the deals were finalised, but the cost of pursuing the targets 
totalled almost $900 million (The Guardian, 2010). Of course, the acquirer was 
primarily interested in multibillion dollar corporations which would complement the 
current portfolio. While majority of the deals in the market are considerably smaller, 
this evidence provides some indication of the costs incurred by the biggest acquirers. 
Most of the direct costs are normally generated by consultants. These include 
investment bankers, lawyers and auditors. Walter et al. (2008) provide data on US 
acquisitions which took place in 2003. The value of M&A transactions in that particular 
year reached $435 billion, investment bankers advised on $386 billion-worth of those, 
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while their clients received bills amounting to $596 million. This demonstrates that 
costs of failed acquisitions can be high. Furthermore, as pointed out by Flanagan et al. 
(1998), “top management normally spends a significant amount of time identifying 
targets, planning the takeover, and executing the transaction. Failed tender offers can 
result in a waste of management time and efforts” (p. 21). An unsuccessful acquisition 
also means that the bidder resolves some of the information asymmetry and exposes his 
plans regarding the company’s future without gaining anything in return. Ineffective 
takeover attempts can be sometimes regarded as missed opportunities which cannot be 
replicated if the initial deal is not completed. Furthermore, Hirshleifer and Titman 
(1990) note that the bidder may revise his initial offer, but it is more beneficial to win 
the target in the first round of negotiations. 
“There are a number of reasons why rejection of an initial bid may 
ultimately result in a failed or at least a less profitable acquisition. For example, 
the rejection may result in the loss of a window of opportunity, such as a 
reduction of synergies. Alternatively, failure of the initial bid may give 
management or labor unions more time to mobilise legal or asset structure 
defensive activities. If the management response blocks the takeover, it leads to 
a loss to the bidder that is consistent with the assumptions of the basic model. A 
failed bid may also give management the opportunity to learn about and take 
steps to preempt the policies planned by the bidder, increasing the firm's 
pretakeover stock price and making the takeover unprofitable” (Hirshleifer and 
Titman, 1990, p. 307). 
Empirical evidence additionally supports the assumption that unsuccessful acquisition 
attempts do not only have negative consequences on future returns of the target, but are 
also value-destroying for the bidding company shareholders (Bradley et al., 1983). 
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Puolakka (2011) points out that this effect stems from the loss of increased competitive 
advantage potential.  
1.3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON DEAL SUCCESS 
We divide the existing literature into four groups. We start off with papers whose main 
focus is to investigate the determinants of deal success and then proceed to some more 
specialised research which looks mainly at the method of payment and the cost basis 
effect and their impact on the likelihood of deal success. Although these studies have 
quite a narrow scope, they employ many control variables which are of interest to us. 
Additionally, we review research which investigates the impact of hostility and 
termination fees, but also includes some models estimating takeover success. The last 
group centres around M&A arbitrage and the extent to which bid success can be 
estimated from the movement in target’s stock price post-announcement. However, 
these results allow one to predict the chances of success only after the information about 
the planned transaction has been made public, while our research aims to mitigate 
potential costs of failed acquisition requiring us to study variables available before the 
announcement. 
A. Core Literature 
Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) were the first to study the probability of deal success. In 
their research they look at cash offers made between 1976 and 1977 in the US. The final 
sample consists of 84 observations and includes 17 independent variables. The 
transaction is defined as successful if the acquirer manages to obtain the number of 
shares sought or more, and unsuccessful otherwise. The financial variables used in the 
econometric model include: current ratio, profit margin, payout ratio, dividend yield, 
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price-earnings ratio, return on equity, growth in earnings and dividends 2 years prior to 
the offer. The authors also take into account the potential vulnerability to takeover 
attempts and this is mirrored by percentage of shares already owned by the bidder, size 
of the bid premium as a percentage of the stock price two weeks before the filing with 
the SEC and the bid premium expressed as a percentage of the book value of the target. 
Additional three variables are used to measure the target’s standing within its own 
industry and these are comparative profit margin, relative ROE and current ratio. The 
results obtained using multivariate discriminant analysis show that target’s management 
hostility, firm size and payout ratio reduce the chances of deal completion, while 
successful takeover attempts usually involve targets with high current and P/E ratio, but 
the premium offered has no effect on the likelihood that the transaction will succeed.  
A paper by Walkling (1985) introduces additional variables and tries to address, what 
he regarded as shortcomings of the previous approach. The data used encompasses cash 
tender offers filed with the SEC between 1972 and 1977. The final dataset consists of 
158 observations, 50 of which are used for out-of-sample testing. The definition of 
success remains the same, i.e. the offer is regarded as successful if the acquirer obtains 
at least the number of shares sought if not more. The first improvement on the previous 
work by Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) is the introduction of a logistic regression which is 
perceived as more appropriate in this context (for further discussion of related issues, 
see Data and Methodology section of this paper). Authors select bid premium, 
managerial hostility, percentage of shares controlled by the bidder prior to the offer, 
dollar amount of solicitation fees and the opposing offers dummy as independent 
variables. Walkling (1985) stresses the importance of the correct specification of bid 
premium calculation. He argues that the procedure adopted by Hoffmeister and Dyl 
(1981) is flawed because their premium is defined as the price offered as a percentage 
of the stock price two weeks prior to the SEC filing at which time many of the offers are 
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already known to market participants. He, therefore, puts forward to calculate the 
premium based on the share price 14 days prior to the public announcement in order to 
exclude the effect of the newly introduced information on the stock price. The results 
support some of the findings of the previous paper. Higher number of shares owned by 
the bidder before the acquisition facilitates takeovers while transactions which attract 
managerial resistance are more likely to fail. Additionally, competing bids have a 
negative effect while the opposite is true for the payment of solicitation fees. The newly 
defined premium variable proves to be both significant and positive, in line with the 
existing theory.  
Flanagan et al. (1998) build on the previous work by Walkling (1985) and Hoffmeister 
and Dyl (1981). The authors look at the success rate of tender offers which took place in 
the US between 1985 and 1994. The sample consists of 991 transactions of which 793 
were successful. The paper investigates tender offers where the purchase would result in 
a 5% or more ownership of the target, so change of control is not a necessary criterion. 
The offer is regarded as successful if the shares tendered are accepted by the acquirer. 
The previously studied prediction variables include: P/E ratio, percentage of shares 
already owned by the bidder, premium, attitude and presence of competing bids. Family 
ownership, return on assets, same industry/cross-border/MBO/two-tier dummies, 
percentage of shares sought, transaction size and termination offers are also introduced 
to the models. The authors conclude that offers are more likely to be successful when 
there is a termination fee in place, the more shares the bidder owns in the target and 
when the target and the bidder are from the same primary industry, but different 
countries. Hostile attitude, the existence of competing bids and two-tier transactions 
indicate lower chances of transaction completion. 
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The above work was based on empirical analysis, but the first theoretical model of deal 
success was put forward by Hirschleifer and Titman (1990). In their paper they build a 
model based on the assumption of rational and profit-maximising bidders and find that 
premium increases the chances of bid success and the same effect is to be seen when the 
bidder has partial ownership of the target. Surprisingly, they establish that some 
defensive strategies may in fact increase the chances of takeover success and also the 
likelihood that the target shareholders will tender their shares. Information asymmetry is 
also found to be an important for the outcome of the offer. In an informationally 
symmetric framework the bidder can win the auction by bidding one cent above the 
post-takeover value in a tender offer. However, in an asymmetric scenario even 
overbidding does not guarantee bidder’s success.  
B. The Influence of Method of Payment & Cost Basis Effect 
The next two papers also look at deal success, but have fairly narrow focus. That is, 
Branch and Yang (2003) investigate the influence of method of payment on takeover 
success by looking at data from 1991-2001. The dataset consists of 1,097 proposed 
transactions using stock, cash tender or collar merger offer. The authors use a stepwise 
logistic regression model and study variables such as target’s size, debt/assets ratio, 
friendly attitude of the deal, transaction size, and a dummy for a stock swap or a collar. 
They show that size, transaction value and stock swap decrease the likelihood of deal 
completion while higher debt/assets ratio and friendly attitude increase the chances that 
the bid will be successful. The later research carried out together with Wang (Branch et 
al., 2008) looks at predicting takeover success with both a logistic regression and a 
feed-forward neural network. They study takeover attempts from 1991-2004. The 
sample includes 1,196 observations, 240 of which are used for out-of-sample testing. 
The authors analyse determinants such a target resistance, arbitrage spread, deal 
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structure and transaction size. They conclude that arbitrage spread, hostility, deal 
structure and transaction value are the dominating factors. The neural network model 
was found to have a better predictive power than a logistic regression when modelling 
failed attempts performs, as well as it has proven to be superior to a logistic regression 
for successful ones.  
On the other hand, a recent paper by Aobdia and Caskey (2012) looks into some 
behavioural reasons why target shareholders may be reluctant to dispose of their shares. 
They investigate the cost basis effect and test how it impacts the premium and takeover 
success rate. They predict that the likelihood of takeover completion is higher when the 
bid exceeds the cost basis of institutions, ceteris paribus. The authors use data from 
1980 until 2009, where the takeover attempt has to involve an acquisition of at least 
50% of the shares in the target company. The final sample consists of 7,067 bids. The 
logistic models incorporate control variables such as deal hostility, tender offer dummy, 
competing bids dummy, target’s asset value, debt/equity ratio, excess returns, same 
industry dummy, net income-to-assets ratio, sales-to-assets ratio and a offer/52-week 
high. The results show that the cost basis does have a positive effect on takeover 
success even when controlling for the 52-week high price. Deal hostility, contested 
offers, higher debt/equity and net income/assets ratios for the bidder reduce the chances 
of transaction completion, while tender offers, same-industry deals and size of bidder’s 
assets increase this probability.  
C. Related Research 
Despite the fact that the next two papers do not concentrate explicitly on the subject of 
this research, they include models which shed some additional light on deal success 
probability as studied in our framework. For example, Schwert (2000) thoroughly 
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examines hostile takeovers. Among many models he also investigates the effect of 
hostility on takeover success. The author looks at 2,346 takeover contests for exchange-
listed target firms recorded between 1975 and 1996. The acquisition is defined as 
successful if the transaction was completed even if the acquirer is different from the 
original bidder. He uses four different measures of hostility and controls for the 
accounting performance of target firms. These latter variables used in the probit models 
are: ROE, sales growth, liquidity, debt/equity ratio, size, market-to-book ratio and P/E. 
The results indicate that the chance of success is particularly low when the offers have 
not been negotiated and pre-bid events took place (the two events specified include 
attempted acquisition by the buyer or merger rumours for the target). Surprisingly, deals 
labelled as hostile by SDC seem to have a positive impact on deal success, but the 
models test all four measures of attitude at the same time. The regressions also show 
that low debt/equity and market-to-book ratios are related to successful acquisitions. In 
a similar manner, Officer (2003) investigates the effect of termination fees, but also 
looks at acquisition success. He uses 12 years-worth of data starting in 1988. The final 
sample has 2,511 observations. The author looks at variables such as target/bidder 
termination fee dummy, existence of a poison pill which would affect the bidder and a 
dummy which is equal to one if another bidder has made an offer for the target six 
months prior to the offer in question. Other binary variables indicate that the transaction 
has involved cash, the bidder and the acquirer were from the same industry, the 
transaction was hostile, or it was a tender offer, that both the bidder and the target were 
from financial services industry, transaction included a toehold and one which indicates 
that the bidder already held majority of shares in the target prior to the acquisition. 
Quantitative variables include total market value and the market-to-book value for both 
the target and the acquirer. The results show that the likelihood of offer acceptance 
increases with the existence of a termination fee payable to the target and a higher 
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premium. Furthermore, it rises when the acquirer has a toehold and a majority of shares, 
but also if the target is in financial services and when the bidder’s market value is 
greater. The likelihood falls if there are competing bids six month prior to the offer 
announcement or after it, if the acquisition is hostile and also when the target’s market 
value is greater.  
D. M&A Arbitrage  
The first paper on predicting takeover success from target’s stock price movements was 
written by Brown and Raymond (1986). The article is from a slightly different genre of 
literature in that it focuses on risk arbitrage. The authors collected data from 1980-1984 
and end up with a sample of 71 transactions, of which 50% are successful. They inspect 
target’s stock price movements and prove that successful and unsuccessful merger 
proposals exhibit different probabilities of completion well before the actual outcome is 
known and these can be inferred from the price reaction to takeover news.  
Although Baker and Savasoglu (2002) primarily investigate the M&A arbitrage returns, 
they also look at the chances of takeover success. Their dataset goes back to 1981 and 
finishes in 1996. They look into transactions where both the acquirer and the target are 
public companies and their final sample consists of 4,135 bids. The probit regression 
results show that the hostility has the greatest and negative effect on the outcome. Same 
industry deals dummy and log of equity value for the target are both significant and 
negative, but their impact is small. Bidder’s size increases the likelihood, but 
surprisingly premium is insignificant.  
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1.4. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Given the costs associated with unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions, we believe that 
it is crucial to develop a good understanding of why offers are rejected by target 
shareholders so that the acquirers can limit the risk of incurring high costs when the 
chances of acquisition are slim. This paper looks at actions which increase the 
probability that the target shareholders will accept the bid and the determinants which 
reduce the likelihood of deal completion. Contrary to the existing literature, we focus on 
the UK market and offer a systematic approach investigating both cash and stock offers. 
We try to deepen our understanding of the factors which may encourage the target 
company shareholders to sell. The following section aims to structure our understanding 
of the factors which have an effect on the transaction completion likelihood. However, 
the main contribution of this research is the recognition of the problem of potential 
endogeneity, as present in the previous literature. Having studied factors which have 
been proven to influence deal success and takeover premia, we noted that there is a 
significant theoretical overlap. What is more, there exists statistical evidence that some 
variables influence both the premium and the success rate which becomes problematic 
given that premium is one of the most important independent variables in the previously 
built models. Hence, we conclude that the existing research fails to identify the fact that 
many variables used to predict success rate also impact the size of the premium. We 
recognise the issue and address it by employing the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
methodology which enables us to separate the indirect effect, i.e. the effect of other 
variables included in the model on the premium, from their direct effect on bid success.  
Next section focuses on literature review and the development of hypotheses for this 
paper. It is then followed by Data and Methodology. In the proceeding section we 
discuss the empirical results which are followed by Robustness Checks. The last two 
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sections of this paper are Limitations and the Conclusion, which summarises the 
findings of this research.  
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2. HYPOTHESES 
Below we analyse factors which we expect to have a significant and positive effect on 
deal completion. In short we believe that a pre-emptive offering process maximises the 
chances that a transaction will be finalised. Therefore, we propose that in order to get 
the target shareholders’ consent the acquirer should:  
1. offer a large premium 
2. pay in cash 
3. engage in bilateral negotiations, if not possible make sure the transaction is 
friendly in its nature  
4. acquire a stake in the target prior to the official sale process 
5. introduce a termination fee 
A detailed motivation for the selection of these actions is presented in the following 
paragraphs.  
We are aware of the endogeneity problem and therefore our models take into account 
the fact that although all of the variables studied have an effect on the probability of 
success of an offer, some of them will also impact the premium. We, therefore, look at 
both, the direct (influencing the probability of deal completion) and the indirect (the 
impact which they may have on the premium which then influences the likelihood of 
success) effect of these variables. 
206 
2.1. PRE-EMPTIVE BIDDING 
This paper puts forward that contract and transaction specifics will have a great impact 
on the likelihood of bid acceptance. In this sub-section we look at variables such as 
premium, nature of the bid, competing bids, method of payment, number of shares to be 
acquired and the termination fee. 
A. Premium 
The premium is the potential cause of the endogeneity problem in the existing research 
but also the main factor that comes to mind when assessing the probability of a bid’s 
success. If the premium is too high the potential returns from the acquisition will be 
reduced, if the transaction is completed. On the other hand, if the premium is too low 
the bid might be rejected and this may lead to a loss of a potential investment 
opportunity. The prediction stemming from economic theory is very straightforward – 
we expect that a higher premium will increase the chances of bid success. Furthermore, 
as noted by Walkling and Edmister (1985), the highest premium a value-maximising 
bidder would pay for a firm should be marginally lower than the net benefits achieved 
post-acquisition. In general, it is expected that the bid premium the acquirer is ready to 
pay for the target should be a positive function of the benefits related to the acquisition 
and a negative function of the target’s bargaining power (Walkling and Edmister, 1985). 
Theoretical Literature 
The economic intuition and theoretical models explaining why higher premia should 
increase the chances of success seem to be highly appealing. The model by Hirshleifer 
and Titman (1990) has shown that the relationship between the premium and deal 
success is indeed positive. Further work on the topic has been carried out by Fishman 
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(1988) who built a model under the assumption of asymmetric information which can 
be alleviated in the bidding process. The model predicts that the return of the second 
bidder diminishes with increasing value of the initial bid. Hence, higher bids shall 
increase the likelihood of success. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
of the free-riding problem by Grossmann and Hart (1980) who study the issue in an 
M&A context. They show that dispersed ownership encourages shareholders not to 
tender their shares in hope that majority of investors will, which would enable them to 
benefit from the post-acquisition appreciation in the value of the target. The free-riding 
shareholders have no incentive to tender their shares unless the offer price is equal to 
the post-acquisition price reflecting all the improvements implemented by the new 
management. This also implies that higher premia would provide stronger incentives to 
sell and thus would increase the likelihood of deal success.  
Empirical Literature 
An empirical study by Walkling and Edmister (1985) covering US transactions which 
took place between 1972 and 1977 finds that successful bidders incorporate premiums 
13 percentage points higher than those who do not manage to finalise the transaction. 
Bid premium has a positive and significant effect on the success rate in numerous 
studies (Quirin, 1971; Walkling, 1985; Giammarino and Heinkel, 1986; Holl and 
Kyriazis, 1996; Betton and Eckbo, 2000 or Officer, 2003). However, earlier evidence by 
Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) based on a sample of 117 cash tender offers placed between 
1977 and 1979 indicates that the size of tender premium has no effect on completion 
rates. It was argued that this is due to flawed methodology (as discussed before). 
However, related papers, including recent ones, also document statistical insignificance 
of this variable (Hayes and Taussig, 1967; Pellegrino, 1972; Ebeid, 1974; Hoffmeister 
and Dyl, 1981; Flanagan et al., 1998; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Baker and Savasoglu, 
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2002; Branch and Yang, 2003). This has been further studied by Aobdia and Caskey 
(2012) in relation to anchoring near the initial share purchase price by investors. They 
find that the cost basis is significant even when controlling for the 52-week high price. 
However, the premium calculated on the basis of share price 4 weeks prior to 
announcement remains insignificant.  
Hypothesis 1: 
The probability of transaction completion will be higher the higher the premium  
Premium as a Dependent Variable 
Researchers’ interest has sparked the emergence of literature modelling the bid 
premium. Walkling’s (1985) article is among one of the first ones on the topic. Further 
papers which investigate the characteristics of the target and the transaction features are 
not primarily studying bid premia, but deal hostility and termination fees. The earlier 
one of the two publications, written by Schwert (2000), includes financial 
characteristics of the target. In the same paper the author models the likelihood of 
completing a transaction and the results indicate some overlap in the determinants of 
deal success and the size of the premium. Two variables which affect both are those 
related to deal hostility. What is more, research by Officer (2003) provides evidence 
that variables such as termination fee, tender offer dummy, financial services dummy 
(both target and bidder from financial services industry), bidder’s market value and the 
ownership of more than 50% of the target impact both the bid premium and success 
rate. Therefore, we conclude that many variables which on the basis of financial theory 
are expected to affect the likelihood of takeover completion are also likely to influence 
the bid premium. Hence, some of the independent variables selected for the purpose of 
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this research are likely to have a direct effect on the success rate, but also an indirect 
one by increasing or decreasing the value of the bid premium. The main problem with 
the existing work looking at bid success is that the researchers fail to recognise the 
existence of this endogeneity. This paper addresses this problem through the employed 
econometric techniques as described in more detail in the Data and Methodology 
section. It also looks at both effects at the same time, discussing on the following pages 
of this paper the indirect and direct effect of the variable in question.  
B. Method of Payment 
When deciding how to structure a transaction the bidder also has to choose the method 
of consideration. In Chapter 2, we have discussed in more detail the factors affecting the 
acquirer’s decision with regard to the method of payment. However, the two which are 
by far the most common ones are cash and stock exchange and they have significant 
implications for the target and bidder shareholders. In a cash offer, the target agrees to 
sell its shares for a pre-specified price. A share exchange takes place when the bidder 
decides to give away an agreed number of his own shares in exchange for the target’s 
stocks. Alternatively, the bidder can offer a mix of the two. 
Bidder’s Perspective 
For the buyer, a cash offer implies that the bidding company’s shareholders retain the 
same level of control over their company, thus there is no dilution of ownership or 
power. Nevertheless, if the acquirer makes a cash offer and it later appears that the 
target has been keeping away information essential for the valuation of company or the 
cash flow projections were more optimistic than the reality, the cost of the acquisition 
might be higher than initially expected, consequently making the transaction potentially 
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not worthwhile. Clearly, the positive outcome where the target performs better than 
expected should not be disregarded. In this case a cash offer means that the bidder can 
fully benefit from the existing upside because target shareholders are not entitled to any 
of the residual cash flows anymore. On the other hand, assuming that the acquirer 
offered equity, the transaction is completed and the target appears to be worth less than 
assumed, the shareholders of both companies will be adversely affected, as the lower-
than-expected value of the target decreases the value of the combined company. This is 
known as the risk sharing hypothesis (Martin, 1996). Also, if the target shareholders 
anticipate that the acquisition will be paid for in shares, they might be inclined to 
disclose more information to the acquirer in order to realise higher gains in the future 
when selling the shares. However, if the realised synergies are higher than projected in 
the valuation, the dilution of power means that the bidder cannot reap all the profits 
from this transaction and has to share them with the target shareholders who received 
bidder’s stock in exchange.  
Target’s Perspective 
Choosing cash as a method of consideration implies that the existing shareholders have 
to give up all control of the target, but they do not have to worry about the true value of 
the bidder’s shares. In a cash offer the bidder indirectly agrees to take on all the risks 
resulting from the asymmetry of information related to the true value of the pursued 
company. Target shareholders also do not have to bear any of the uncertainty relating to 
how the market will react in the period after the announcement and before the actual 
share exchange. However, in an equity exchange a higher-than-expected increase in value 
of the combined firm will be beneficial for both companies’ shareholders. Assuming that 
there are no informational asymmetries, the shareholders may still be reluctant to accept 
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shares as a payment method because the realisation of potential synergies will to a great 
extent depend on the new management.  
Signalling 
The decision about the method of payment has certain implications for the bidder and 
the target, but also for all market participants. Provided that managers are rational, we 
expect them to focus on maximisation of profits or minimisation of costs. Therefore, a 
manager is expected to pay for an acquisition in a way that is most financially beneficial 
to the company. If the managers of a bidding firm are convinced that the true value of 
their firm’s shares is higher than the current share price, they will prefer not to issue 
equity suggesting cash instead (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). On the other hand, if 
they believe that the market valuation of their company is excessive, they will choose a 
share exchange. Hence, the market may interpret the financing choice as a signal about 
the company’s under- or overvaluation, revising the share price of the bidding firm 
accordingly. In other words, a negative price correction is expected for all-equity bids 
and a positive one for all-cash bids, which is commonly referred to as the signalling 
hypothesis (Leland and Pyle, 1977). In addition, the chosen method of payment tells us 
about acquirers’ beliefs regarding the value of the target. A cash bid is interpreted as a 
positive signal about the target firm’s quality along with its predicted future 
performance as the bidding firm is exchanging cash for the target’s shares, hence 
indicating they are not willing to share future value increases.  
Direct Effect 
Papers by Eckbo et al. (1990), Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) or Brown and 
Ryngaert (1991) also point out the signalling benefits of cash offers in a single-bidder 
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framework. In work by Fishman (1988) cash is a signal used by high-valuation bidders 
and allows to deter competition through pre-emptive bidding. Additionally, previous 
research shows that as the number of bidders increases a higher proportion of the total 
offer is cash (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1990). It is not surprising as this payment 
method enables the bidder to complete the deal faster. Using stock may mean a few-
months-long waiting period to get an approval of a registration statement (Lane et al., 
1983). What follows, hostile transactions tend to utilise cash more often on average than 
when the acquisition is friendly (Chen and Cornu, 2002). Furthermore, transactions 
involving stock mean that the target shareholders have to bear additional risks resulting 
from the method of payment and thus they may be more reluctant to accept it. 
Therefore, an offer involving cash as a method of payment will be more successful than 
those involving a share exchange. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The transaction has a higher chance of completion when the method of payment is cash 
Indirect Effect 
Cash offers show the buyer’s determination to finalise a transaction, regardless whether 
this transaction is hostile or friendly in its nature, which could potentially mean that 
offers involving cash premia could be higher than those paid for in shares. These results 
are supported by researches who conclude that all-cash bids tend to be higher than all-
stock bids (Huang and Walkling, 1987; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989; Hayn, 1989). 
Although one other reason quoted in the literature for higher bid premia in cash offers 
are tax considerations, Franks et al. (1988) put forward that premia in the UK were 
higher for cash than stock offers even before the introduction of the capital gains tax. 
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This may be explained by the fact that a share exchange offers target shareholders some 
potential upside. On the other hand, share exchanges pose a lot more risk for the target 
shareholders who should, therefore, require a higher premium. Additionally, stock-
payment indicates overvaluation of the bidder, hence we can conclude that the acquirer 
should also be less concerned about offering a higher premium (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). Unlike in the case of a cash offer, assuming overvaluation, the true value of the 
premium in a share-exchange will be lower than the nominal amount. Given the above 
we conclude that the effect of the payment methods on the premium is ambiguous. 
Hypothesis 3a: 
Using cash as a method of payment will increase the premium 
Hypothesis 3b: 
Using cash as a method of payment will decrease the premium 
 
C. Competing Bids 
Multiple Bids 
One way of maximising the chances of closing a transaction is engaging in a pre-
emptive process with bilateral negotiations. A study of a sample of 10,000 initial public 
bids in the US during 1980-2005 shows that the initial bidder wins the target only 66% 
of the time (Eckbo, 2009). Tender offers resolve some of the information asymmetry in 
the market and convey a signal about the value of the target to other market participants. 
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Hence, an initial bid will attract more competitors if those assign a higher value to the 
target by being able to extract greater synergies (Fishman, 1988). Also, in case of a 
hostile bid the directors may try to find a white knight who will place a competing offer 
perceived more favourably by the target management. 
Direct Effect 
The existence of multiple bids is expected to limit the chances of deal success. 
Empirical evidence proves that the presence of active competitors has a negative impact 
on deal completion (Flanagan et al., 1998) and the same has been concluded by Aobdia 
and Caskey (2012). One potential explanation is the possibility that the new bidder 
might be perceived more favourably by the management than the original one. 
However, empirical evidence provided by Schwert (2000) shows that multiple-bidder 
auctions are actually more likely to be hostile. Overall, we expect that the likelihood of 
completion will be lower when the competition is greater. 
Hypothesis 4: 
The likelihood that the transaction will be finalised is lower when there are multiple 
bidders 
Indirect Effect 
The theoretical model of Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) demonstrates that targets 
benefit from increased competition and manage to generate better returns when there 
are multiple bids. This is in line with the findings of Bradley et al. (1988), who 
additionally show that more competition decreases acquirer’s returns, which would 
imply that under such circumstances the negotiated premium is higher. This is because 
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in order to win a multiple-bidder contest any new auction entrants have to place a higher 
offer than the original bidder in order to acquire the target. Already Walkling and 
Edmister (1985) documented that premiums are 33.5% higher when there is more than 
one bidder. Results by Betton and Eckbo (2000) provide evidence that the initial bid 
premium in such cases is lower, but note that the premium increases in subsequent bids. 
According to more recent research, the premium is greater even when there are potential 
bidders who have not yet placed an offer (Aktas et al., 2010). Overall, we therefore 
expect that increased competition will have a positive impact on the premium offered 
for the target. 
Hypothesis 5: 
The premium increases with multiple bidders 
If the option to engage in bilateral negotiations is not attainable, the acquirer should take 
measures which would ensure that the negotiations remain friendly and that the 
takeover offer gets the backing of the target’s management. 
Friendly versus Hostile Acquisitions 
Rational managers in efficient markets may choose to acquire a company for two 
reasons – obtaining synergistic benefits or disciplining inefficient management. 
Synergistic takeovers rely on the possibility of extracting additional profits by 
combining two firms. The appreciation in value can be a result of increased market 
power, optimisation of tax assets/liabilities, merging of the R&D or marketing resources 
or by eliminating overlapping functions within the new company (Morck et al., 1988). 
Therefore, acquisitions which aim to realise post-transaction synergies are likely to be 
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friendly in their nature. The second motive is the one which involves the disciplining of 
inefficient management of the target company. This is a situation in which the bidder 
tries to address the problem of the agency cost and managers’ discretionary behaviour 
(Williamson, 1984; Jensen, 1986). The goal is to remove the non-value-maximising 
practices of the target’s management which stem from their inaptitude or excessive 
focus on the extraction of private benefits. Examples of such destructive behaviour 
include, amongst others, disproportionate growth and diversification, overconsumption 
of perquisites, provision of overly generous contracts with third parties or debt 
avoidance (Morck et al., 1988). Hence, disciplinary takeovers which ultimately lead to 
at least a partial change in management are likely to be hostile. Unfortunately, Morck et 
al. (1988) point out that the nature of the motives is not always clear because some 
diversifying mergers may encounter managerial resistance, while transactions which 
aim to remove the management may be friendly if the compensation offered to the 
target’s managers is sufficiently high. However, they argue that friendly acquisitions 
can also be driven by the need for corporate diversification, synergies, life-cycle 
decisions of those in charge, while alternative aims of a hostile acquisitions might be 
shutting down the firm and/or selling its assets.   
Reasons for Managerial Resistance 
The first reason for managerial resistance is the shareholder interest theory which states 
that offers are rejected because managers, acting in the best interest of the shareholders, 
refuse to accept bids which are below the value of the company (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). This is in line with the findings from the theoretical model of Baron (1983) who 
argues that managers reject offers because they do not represent the true worth of the 
company and the rejection acts as a signal conveying information about the value of the 
target in question. To test the hypothesis that managers decline offers in order to 
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maximise shareholder-value Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) investigate the relationship 
between the bid premium and managerial resistance to find that hostility does in fact 
decrease with increasing bid premium offered for the target. A contradicting theory is 
the one of managerial entrenchment. It is believed that managers may reject fully 
rational and financially attractive bids simply because their acceptance would have 
adverse impact on theirs wealth (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Research suggests that the 
board turnover and the intensity of restructuring within in the organisation increase 
significantly after the acquisitions (Franks et al., 2001). Agrawal and Walkling (1994) 
who study the careers of managers of the selling companies, conclude that target CEOs 
are more likely to get fired and may find it difficult to secure a similar position within 
the first three years after the takeover. Given the above, it is not surprising that 
academics found a negative relationship between managerial resistance and changes in 
private benefits of the management (Walkling and Long, 1984; Cotter and Zenner, 
1994). However, there is also a special instance of the shareholder interest theory. 
Schwert (2000) presents the bargaining power hypothesis in which he states that 
managers may want to oppose a takeover in order to attract other bidders and to, 
therefore, increase the bid premium. In such scenarios managerial resistance shall be 
perceived as a strategic bargaining tool rather than as a sign of managerial entrenchment 
detrimental to shareholder wealth.  
Direct Effect 
Hostile takeovers are by definition transactions in which the bidder bypasses the 
management. Therefore, regardless whether we believe that the managers work towards 
the maximisation of shareholder value or to increase their private benefits, managerial 
resistance is likely to reduce the chances of bid acceptance. Indeed, empirical models 
show that the likelihood of success for hostile bids is lower than in the case of friendly 
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ones (Aobdia and Caskey, 2012). The same results were obtained by Hoffmeister and 
Dyl (1981). They show that hostile takeover attempts have a lower rate of completion 
than friendly ones and the proportion of completed deals can be even less than half the 
proportion of successful transactions when the offer is friendly (Flanagan et al., 1998). 
Thus, we expect that managerial resistance will directly reduce the chances of deal 
completion. 
Hypothesis 6: 
The probability of success decreases when the bid is hostile 
Indirect Effect 
There is also an indirect effect of hostility. The theory predicts that hostile acquirers are 
usually ready to pay a higher premium as they expect that the future profits will increase 
after the introduction of more efficient management. Chen and Cornu (2002) provide 
empirical evidence that the bid premium increases with the proportion of hostile offers 
in the sample. Hence, we expect that hostility will lead to higher premia. 
Hypothesis 7: 
The premium is higher for hostile transactions 
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E. Shares to Be Acquired 
Benefits of Toeholds 
One strategy which ought to help the bidding company to complete the transaction is a 
purchase of a toehold, i.e. the acquisition of a small proportion of outstanding shares in 
the company to be bought. The first advantage of possessing a toehold is a reduction in 
the number of shares which have to be purchased later on at a premium, therefore 
“owning a toehold can help the bidder win an auction, and win cheaply” (Bulow et al., 
1999, p. 428). It has been additionally stated that “if target management is expected to 
resist irrespective of the toehold size, then acquiring a toehold is always optimal” 
(Eckbo, 2009, p. 166). A further advantage is that they can deter other bidders by 
implying that any new auction entrants would have to pay an even higher premium in 
order to have a chance of winning the contest (Eckbo, 2009). However, such a 
shareholding is also advantageous to the bidder even if he does not offer the highest 
price and fails to win the auction. This is because the winner’s higher valuation will be 
reflected in the profit made when selling the existing shareholding. What is more, a 
partial ownership in the target can help overcome the free-riding problem as shown by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) or Hirshleifer and Titman (1990).  
Use of Toeholds 
Although the literature strongly highlights the benefits of toeholds, it has been observed 
that they became less popular in the last 20 years and toehold bidding is now very 
infrequent (Eckbo, 2009). One proposed reason for this fall in their popularity in the US 
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might be the increase in the costs related to such purchases stemming from increased 
regulation, market illiquidity or target management resistance (Eckbo, 2009). In the US 
the 1968 Williams Act put in place a requirement to disclose any shareholdings of 5% 
or more. Additionally, the 1976 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act 
introduced a share purchase threshold which requires the notification of the antitrust 
agencies (Betton et al., 2008). This means that the acquirer has to reveal his intentions 
early on and this increases the costs relating to the toehold purchase or alternatively 
reduces the potential benefit resulting from such a transaction. However, these changes 
do not seem to rationalise the fall of popularity of toeholds across time, because even in 
1980s, i.e. after the introduction of both regulations, these were commonly used. The 
second potential reason for the cost increase also does not find support in the data, as 
the overall level of liquidity has increased (Betton et al., 2005). However, newer 
research does provide us with some explanations for the existence of this phenomenon. 
First, Goldman and Qian (2005) put forward that an acquisition of a toehold in a 
company whose managers extract private benefits may actually destroy value. This is 
because the existence of a toehold should indicate that the bidder has some power over 
the managers. If regardless the agent still rejects the bid, it signals a high degree of 
managerial entrenchment which may have a negative impact on the share price. Second, 
Bris (2002) argues that the purchase of a toehold actually increases the costs of the 
acquisition as it can be perceived as a signal which triggers a share price run-up 
attributable to those investors looking to generate a return from M&A arbitrage.  
Direct Effect 
A shareholding in the target provides the bidder with significant advantages because as 
argued by Flanagan et al. (1998) “prior ownership of the target should increase a 
bidder’s influence on the target’s board of directors. This should increase the probability 
221 
that the bidder will receive the board’s cooperation and complete its offer” (p. 24). 
Additionally, toeholds deter other potential bidders from participating in the auction 
process. In line with the theory, Bates and Lemmon (2002) find evidence that toeholds 
and bid success are positively correlated and this is consistent with empirical evidence  
provided by Walkling and Edmister (1985), Holl and Kyriazis (1996) and Elsland and 
Weber (2006) and theoretical results of Singh (1998). Analysed data indicates that the 
probability of success increases with a decreasing number of shares which have to be 
acquired to obtain control (Flanagan et al., 1998; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990). The 
above discussion leads us to believe that the effect of toeholds and the number of 
target’s shares held by the bidder on the bid success should be positive. 
Hypothesis 8: 
The higher the bidder’s shareholding in the target the higher the probability of success 
Indirect Effect 
As described above the acquisition of the toehold is likely to reduce the chances of 
target’s hostility towards the acquisition and should result in fewer competing bids on 
average. In fact, empirical evidence proves that, in line with the deterrence effect, the 
introduction of a toehold does not only reduce the premium, but also the target 
shareholders’ returns (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Eckbo and Langhor, 1989; Betton and 
Eckbo, 2000; Betton et al., 2008). The theoretical models by Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) show that toeholds allow the bidder to 
purchase the target at a lower price. However, others argue that the existence of a 
toehold may lead to more aggressive bidding (Burkart, 1995; Singh, 1998, Bulow et al., 
1999) which should result in a higher premium and this supposition is supported by the 
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empirical work by Chowdry and Jegadeesh (1994). Given the existing evidence, we are 
more inclined to put forward that toeholds are expected to reduce the premium offered 
in an acquisition. 
Hypothesis 9: 
The higher the shareholding of the bidder in the target the company the lower the 
premium 
F. Termination Fees 
Another potential tool with which the acquiring mangers can increase their chances of 
success is through the introduction of a termination fee. This is a compensation which 
has to be paid to the target if the transaction is unsuccessful. US data from 1997-1999 
shows that almost two-thirds of all announced deals included a termination fee (Officer, 
2003). These are also very common in Canada but slightly less frequently used in the 
UK where the size of the fee is limited by the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and 
indirectly by the 1985 Companies Act and is effectively capped at around 1% (Gregory, 
2007). Termination fees are quite popular in Germany and Australia but not in Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Spain (Gregory, 2007). Andre et al. (2007) claim that “termination 
fees are used as an efficient contractual device, where their magnitude is set rationally 
to account for the expenses incurred to conclude the transaction, the expected benefits 
from the proposed business combination and potential opportunity costs” (p. 564), 
however their results seem less clear. Their models show that termination fees are 
positively related to merger costs, deal value and cash payments which is in line with 
the above statement. However, they also show that termination fee size is higher the 
higher the toehold, when the company is owned by a family and is also positively 
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correlated with CEO retention but lower the higher the number of outside directors – all 
these results indicate that higher termination fees may be linked to a potential agency 
problem.   
Theory 
The first of the two theories postulates that the use of termination fees can be effectively 
perceived as a form of managerial entrenchment. Its existence allows the managers to 
distort the bidding process which may prove detrimental to the target’s shareholders. 
This is because such contracts encourage the target management to favour the bidder 
who offers them private benefits of the highest value. However, the alternative 
hypothesis states that termination fees may be beneficial to the target shareholders as 
they incentivise the bidder to reveal his post-takeover plans. These may not be disclosed 
in the absence of a termination fee because there exists a risk that this information will 
be used by other bidders to offer a higher price by free-riding on the revealed 
information (Officer, 2003). Additionally, the bidder may be reluctant to get involved in 
the preparation of the post-merger integration if the likelihood of deal completion is not 
to some extent secured by the termination fee.  
Direct Effect 
Termination fee is expected to affect the likelihood of success in three ways. First, it 
ensures that target management is fully supportive of the deal, hence the managers will 
not try to block the transaction. Second, “the significantly higher success rates in 
termination fee deals are potentially the result of bidders making more substantial 
investments in the bid process, including the release of non-public information about 
post-bid strategies for the target’s assets, because such investments are protected with a 
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termination fee from free-riding by other bidders” (Officer, 2003, p. 458). Third, offers 
with termination fees are less likely to receive competing bids which usually lead to 
failed acquisitions. Empirical work indeed shows that termination fees enhance the 
likelihood of deal completion (Flanagan et al., 1998), according to Officer (2003) by 
20% and this is additionally supported by univariate analysis carried out by Coates and 
Subramanian (2000). Regardless whether we assume that managers act in the best 
interest of the shareholders or try to secure highest private benefits, the introduction of 
the termination fee should increase the likelihood of deal completion. 
Hypothesis 10: 
Termination fees increase the likelihood of deal success 
Indirect Effect 
There is a potential agency cost which comes from the reduction in the takeover 
premium resulting from the lack of competition due to the existence of a termination 
fee. We expect that the reduced competition is likely to have a negative impact on the 
premium. Although the econometric models indicate that only a small proportion of 
transactions including a target termination fee receive follow-on bids (Odean, 1998), it 
has been found that its existence is surprisingly linked with larger premia, also when 
controlling for other deal characteristics. The difference is as high as 4% (Officer, 
2003). This result is consistent with the empirical results by Bates and Lemmon (2003), 
but contradicts the evidence provided by Bargeron (2005). Despite most of the 
empirical work, we postulate that termination fees should have a negative effect on 
premia because of fewer competitors entering the contest. 
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Hypothesis 11: 
Premium is lower when there is a termination fee in place 
 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
2.2. CONTROL VARIABLES 
Additionally to the above key themes, we also introduce a number of control variables 
which may influence the chances of deal completion due to their impact on the 
bargaining power and attitude towards the takeover offer. 
A. International Acquisitions 
Researchers argue that cross-border acquisitions generate more value for the target 
shareholders than domestic transactions (Conn et al., 2005; Sudarsanam, 1995; Kuipers 
et al., 2003). However, there is no agreement in the literature regarding the ability of 
those to generate positive returns for the acquiring company. Eun et al. (1996) note that 
cross-border M&A can result in wealth gains, in particular when the bidders acquire 
targets with R&D competences. However, as discussed previously and pointed out by 
Boeh (2011), cross-border M&A are associated with additional risks and higher 
information asymmetries.  
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Problems Relating to Cross-border M&A 
After examining international acquisitions by U.S. MNCs, Doukas and Travlos (1988) 
reach a conclusion that if the corporation expands to the target’s country for the first 
time, it experiences significantly positive excess returns, especially high when the 
acquisition involves a high degree of geographical and industrial diversification. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of potential complications associated with cross-
border deals, which can be value-destroying to the bidding firm shareholders. The first 
problem is the informational asymmetry, which is likely to make the valuation more 
challenging. The fact that a deal involves two firms located in different countries 
increases the number of unknowns. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) show that there are 
fundamental differences between domestic and international acquisitions. Cross-border 
transactions involve greater information asymmetries (Reuer et al., 2004). “The Church-
Tower Principle implies that the difficulty for the lending bank in assessing the default 
probability of a borrowing firm increases with the distance to it” (Carling and 
Lundberg, 2002, p. 16). We can extend this framework to M&A transactions and state 
that you should only engage in business in your proximity simply because you know the 
market. This also explains the home bias, i.e. investors’ preference to invest in firms 
located in their proximity (see for example Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ke et al., 
2010). Basu and Chevrier (2011) provide evidence that larger distance in M&A leads to 
lower abnormal returns for the acquiring company and greater likelihood that the bidder 
will use stock as a medium of exchange.  
Cultural Clashes 
The human factor is very often forgotten, but highly important. When the target and the 
bidder are located in two different countries the companies will have to marry two 
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different cultures. Hence, there is a risk that the post-acquisition integration process can 
be complicated by cultural clashes, especially if the cultural gap between countries is 
considerable (Conn et al., 2005). Such problems may jeopardise the realisation of the 
forecasted synergies which may result in value-destroying acquisitions. This is not a 
problem of negligible magnitude. Coopers and Lybrand (1973) rank cultural clashes as 
the number one cited cause of M&A failure.  
Other obstacles that bidders may face when acquiring overseas may be related to 
statutory and regulatory barriers imposed by the authorities of the target firm’s country. 
Although it has been argued that cross-border acquisitions may encounter less resistance 
stemming from antitrust issues (Flanagan et al., 1998), governments around the world 
have over time started to exhibit growing economic nationalism, trying to protect 
companies which they deem to be of significant importance to the domestic market, 
while the increased monitoring and creation of supervisory bodies at an international 
level, such as the European Union, may actually increase the likelihood that a 
transaction will be blocked. Therefore, having studied the existing literature, we expect 
cross-border acquisitions to be more successful as those have a lower chance of being 
rejected by the regulators on the basis of anti-trust issues. Furthermore, we recognise the 
fact that transactions where the target and the acquirer are from different countries 
involve additional risks and higher information asymmetry but may offer additional 
synergies, including but not limited to the co-insurance of cash flows. Therefore, we put 
forward that acquirers will be willing to pay more for targets located abroad than 
domestic companies.  
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B. Industry Diversification 
Same versus Different Industry 
Same-industry deals also indicate that the acquisition is a disciplining tool (Bhagat et 
al., 2005). Additionally, because the bidder is from the same industry he brings in 
expertise and general know-how. In such cases the acquirers are expected to have better 
information about resources, suppliers, market demand, operational arrangements, etc. 
(Gordon, 1991). The opposite should hold for inter-industry deals (see e.g. Koh and 
Venkatraman, 1991; Montgomery and Hariharan, 1991). The bidder’s knowledge and 
the nature of the bid promise success deriving from correction of inefficiencies and 
monetisation of the target’s growth potential. Greater synergies may be created due to 
an easier integration process, economies of scale, lower cost of capital for the combined 
firm, etc. Acquirer’s experience in the industry also allows him to design a more 
attractive offer in respect to the transaction structure and method of compensation 
(Flanagan et al., 1998). Although same-industry transactions may be an indication of 
empire building, target shareholders perceive bids made by buyers from the same 
industry as more favourable (Morck et al., 1990). However, the fact that the bidding 
company management may already have the necessary know-how and will be less 
likely to keep the target’s management post-acquisitions may lead to greater bid 
resistance (Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). Furthermore, Flanagan et al. (1998) also point 
out that same-industry offers are less likely to be accepted due to potential anti-trust 
issues. On the other hand, if that acquirer is from a different industry, he will not have 
the essential know-how and this increases the chances that the target’s management will 
chose to cooperate hoping that they may run the company even after the transaction is 
completed. Contrary to our expectations the existing evidence shows that conglomerate 
transactions generate positive returns to bidders (Travlos, 1987; Asquith et al., 1987; 
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Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005), while a study by Moeller et al. (2004) propounds 
that industry relatedness is one of the characteristics of large-loss deals, but Conn et al. 
(2005) notice that results for industry relatedness are not statistically significant. On the 
other hand, Yook (2003) concludes that only non-conglomerate deals may result in 
synergies, which is consistent with several other studies.  
The increased pace of consolidation in many sectors has increased government’s 
concern over the emergence of monopolies which reduce customers’ bargaining powers 
and distort free-market mechanisms and hence same industry deals are more likely to be 
rejected. However, same-industry deals indicate that the bidder already knows the 
industry and should be better equipped to draft an attractive offer terms. In line with our 
expectations, the results of Flanagan et al. (1998) show that the probability that a tender 
offer is successful is higher when the bidder and the target are from the same industry. 
Despite the fact that same industry deals are more likely aimed at the removal of the 
target’s inefficiencies and hence may more often raise managerial resistance, we put 
forward that the acquirer’s knowledge and expertise in the sector should generally aid 
them to put forward an offer which is more likely to be accepted, ceteris paribus. At the 
same time the effect on the premium is ambiguous. On one hand, same-industry bidders 
should be able to estimate the potential operational synergies more accurately giving 
them more confidence in the true value of the target and hence encouraging them to bid 
more aggressively. On the other hand, diversifying bidders will face greater asymmetry 
of information, but this would simply result in greater dispersion of the estimated 
company value. However, if we assume that the motivation of the transaction is the 
diversification of cash flow sources, this may mean that bidders from a different 
industry would be willing to pay even more than the target’s peers. They would 
effectively be offering an additional premium for the co-insurance of cash flows effect. 
Although Walkling and Edmister (1985) found that the effect of conglomerate deals on 
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premia is insignificant, the theory urges us to argue that acquirers would be ready to pay 
more for targets operating in industries different than the one of the acquirer. 
C. Financial Performance 
The financial performance of the target is yet another factor which has a strong impact 
on the chances of a bid success. We have already discussed that some acquisitions arise 
in order to remove the inefficient management. Hence, we can assume that companies 
which are less profitable will be acquired by those which are more profitable. We also 
expect that the existence of inefficient management will be reflected in the target’s poor 
financial performance which increases the likelihood of an acquisition. What is more, 
companies which become targets of hostile takeovers perform poorly and exhibit lower 
growth when compared with their peers, although the opposite does not hold for 
potential friendly deals as targets of such transactions cannot be distinguished from their 
peers (Morck et al., 1988). 
The extant literature strongly supports the argument that the management of a 
financially sound company shall be well perceived by the shareholders. Flanagan et al. 
(1998) argue that shareholders of such firms are likely to conclude that the management 
is effective and shall remain in control or may think that the share price is likely to 
increase even further in the future, allowing them to earn more than in case of a 
takeover. Although the existing research shows that industries which are characterised 
by strong profitability and growth do experience a high volume of transactions (Betton 
et al., 2008), higher abnormal returns lead in general to lower likelihood of a takeover 
(Palepu, 1986). Results of a recent study supported the hypothesis that better 
performing companies, regardless whether measured by looking at profitability or assets 
turnover, are also more likely to reject bids (Aobdia and Caskey, 2012). At the same 
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time bidders are likely to offer a higher premium for targets which present significant 
opportunities to improve efficiency (see for example, Chen and Cornu, 2002). Given 
that profitable companies are already resourceful, in such cases most of the value can be 
derived through the realisation of potential synergies and not the elimination of 
inefficiencies. Although empirical studies claim that there is no indirect effect, i.e. 
performance does not influence takeover premia (Comment and Schwert, 1995; 
Schwert, 2000), in line with the theory, we expect that poorly performing targets should 
be more attractive to buyers who would be willing to bid higher in order to win the 
contest. Well-performing targets are expected to attract a lower premium than those 
targets which generate poor financial results, as the latter are likely to suffer from 
entrenchment, offering greater scope for appreciation in value once the inefficiencies 
are eliminated. 
D. Market Valuation 
One other measure of company performance is its market valuation. Return-seeking 
investors will be drawn towards companies which provide them with high dividends 
and/or strong appreciation in the share price over time. Therefore, if we believe that the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis holds and there are no market imperfections, the share 
price should be a reflection of how well the company is performing. Furthermore, the 
Q-theory of mergers predicts that high market-to-book firms should acquire low market-
to-book firms and replace target’s inefficient management or eliminate the inappropriate 
use of assets so that more value will be extracted from existing resources. This goes 
back to the work by Manne (1965). In Q-theory the biggest improvements will take 
place when the best performing companies are paired with their most undervalued 
peers, what can actually lead to waves in merger activity (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002). However, the research by Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008) shows that this 
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does not necessarily hold because although the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer is 
indeed higher than the one of the target, firms that pair up seem to have similar ratios. 
There are a few theories trying to explain why companies with low M/B ratios are more 
likely to become targets. The first states that low ratio indicates ownership of many 
assets, but few growth opportunities (Myers, 1977). The second points out that the 
company might be cheap to acquire given the stock undervaluation. Third, the 
efficiency with which they are run might be lower than the market average (Lang et al., 
1989). In line with the theories, earlier literature postulates that companies with higher 
M/B ratio are less likely to be acquired (Hasbrouck, 1985; Comment and Schwert, 
1995), but the data collected by Morck et al. (1988) provides evidence that this effect 
holds only in case of tender offers. Palepu (1986), on the other hand, shows that this is 
of no importance - when paying in cash or through a stock exchange.  
With regard to deal completion, we would expect that companies that perform well and 
have high M/B ratios are more likely to reject bids as the management should be more 
favourably perceived by the shareholders and has the power to oppose an offer, ceteris 
paribus. However, empirical research by Hoffmeister and Dyl (1981) indicates that 
targets with higher price-to-earnings ratio actually enjoy a higher rate of completion 
than those with lower ratios but following the same line of reasoning, as in the case of 
the hypothesis on financial performance, bidders should be much more interested in 
targets which do not exhibit high market-to-book ratios because they provide little 
scope to remove inefficiencies and generate more value. Accordingly, literature looking 
at premia and market valuations proves that acquirers pay higher premia for targets 
which have lower market-to-book ratios (see Walkling and Edmister, 1985). 
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E. Size 
Large Targets 
Previous research shows that purchasing more expensive targets relative to the size of 
the acquiring company may point at managerial motives, such as empire-building (see 
Roll, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Morck et al., 1990). However, larger size of the 
target may potentially mean greater synergies post-acquisition which would result from 
bigger economies of scale, market power, etc. and as pointed out by Morck et al. (1988) 
acquisitions driven by such motives are more likely to be friendly. It should be, 
however, kept in mind that larger targets are a lot harder to integrate and potential 
adverse effects of a failed acquisition are greater, the larger the size of the target. 
Results obtained by Hasbrouck (1985), Palepu (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1989) 
and Shivdasani (1993) prove that larger size discourages takeovers in all transactions, 
whereas Morck et al. (1988) provide evidence that this is true for hostile acquisitions. 
One reason for this result may be the fact that larger companies usually have a more 
dispersed shareholder base which makes them harder to acquire. Additionally, 
acquisitions of large targets also require a significant amount of capital and the number 
of potential buyers with sufficient financial resources decreases with the size of the 
target (Flanagan et al., 1998). On the other hand, smaller targets are a lot easier to 
integrate in the company structure and potential negative effects are much smaller. In 
fact, Draper and Paudyal (2006) demonstrate that deals with low relative size result in 
significantly higher excess returns in the short run, but Asquith et al. (1983) and Travlos 
(1987) find the opposite.  
Chen and Cornu (2002) argue that companies with higher sales levels are more often 
acquired in hostile takeovers and reveal that this may result from the fact that such 
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targets have better financial expertise (i.e. tools to reject a friendly bid) or that the 
management simply enjoys the fact that they work for a large company. The meta-
analytic review carried out by Tosi et al. (2000) has also shown that firm size is a very 
strong determinant of CEO remuneration and accounts for more than 40% of its 
variance. We can, therefore, infer that private benefits of the CEOs increase with firm 
size. Given that acquisitions involve changes in the management boards, CEOs of large 
companies are more likely to reject potential bids as they have more to lose (this is 
discussed in more detail in the Limitations section). A whole spectrum of empirical 
evidence concludes that the size of the target shows a negative relation with bid success 
(Hoffmeister and Dyl, 1981; Raad and Ryan, 1995; Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001; Branch 
and Yang, 2003; Officer, 2003). Although the findings of Schwert (2000) do not show 
that this relationship is significant, in line with the above theory, we predict that smaller 
targets will be easier to acquire than larger ones and easier to integrate, hence they 
should be able to secure a higher premium. What is more, the small relative size makes 
the target less risky. This means that the management of the acquiring company might 
be less concerned about overpaying. On the other hand, larger targets may create greater 
synergies, but the magnitude of negative consequences if the post-merger integration 
does not proceed as planned is also likely to be much more substantial. Research 
supports this hypothesis and shows that higher market capitalisation targets secure 
lower premiums (Hasbrouck; 1985; Comment and Schwert, 1995; Schwert 2000; 
Eckbo, 2009). This may be a result of a liquidity discount. Recapitulating, larger targets 
will attract smaller premia either due to the higher level of risk involved, a liquidity 
discount or both.  
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F. Leverage 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose to solve the agency problem by limiting the free 
cash flows used at manager’s discretion. They point out that this can be achieved 
through the introduction of leverage which would incentive the agents to work towards 
servicing the existing debt rather than misallocating the assets at their discretion. Lower 
debt levels mean that the target can obtain cheaper financing from the market and 
indicate lower riskiness for potential investors. What follows is that the target is valued 
using a lower discount rate which should result in a higher valuation, but earlier papers 
do not find that leverage affects the likelihood of a company becoming a takeover target 
(Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986). On the other hand, when the level of leverage 
increases the shareholders are more prone to bankruptcy risk and the costs of financial 
distress and liquidation are high. However, financial theory also puts forward that too 
low level of debt may be a sign of managerial entrenchment as it allows managers to 
generate higher free cash flows which can be used at their discretion. Hence, targets 
which rely heavily on equity financing offer significant improvement opportunities to 
bidders. As noted by Lewellen (1971), financial efficiencies may be attainable even if 
there is no scope for operational improvement and increasing the gearing of a company 
with a lower than optimal level of debt would ultimately lead to an appreciation in the 
target’s value. 
Assuming that sub-optimal levels of debt are effectively an agency cost and a sign of 
managerial entrenchment, we can conclude that shareholders of such companies would 
be more willing to sell their shares than those who have the optimal mix of debt and 
equity. Empirical research proves that leverage is negatively related to success of 
takeover attempts and this is irrespective whether we look at debt as a percentage of 
equity, total assets or changes in those variables (Raad and Ryan, 1995; Saffieddine and 
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Titman, 1999; Schwert, 2000). We, therefore, predict that targets with low debt levels 
will be easier to acquire. What is more, Chen and Cornu (2002) show that low debt ratio 
is also a desirable feature in hostile bidder’s eyes as it allows him to secure cheaper and 
more accessible debt-financing by lowering the leverage levels for the combined entity. 
Additionally, hostile bidders chose more often targets with high liquidity because this 
allows the acquirer to bid higher without the need to secure further financial resources 
(Chen and Cornu, 2002). Results provided by Walkling and Edmister (1985) do indeed 
show that firms with lower leverage enjoy larger premia. Therefore, we expect that 
targets which do not rely heavily on debt-financing are expected to be offered higher 
premia in takeover attempts. 
 
2.3. SHARE EXCHANGE 
In offers which involve cash, target shareholders should not be concerned about the 
acquirer’s features. However, when the method of consideration is stock, the situation 
becomes more complex and bidder’s characteristics suddenly start to play an important 
role. Although Shleifer and Vishny (2003) point out that target shareholders might be 
concentrating on the short horizon, looking to dispose of the shares as soon as possible 
before the overvaluation gets corrected, sometimes the shareholders may want to keep 
the shares over a longer period of time. In such circumstances bidder characteristics 
become significant because the target shareholders are effectively becoming owners of 
the bidding company. In this section we, therefore, discuss aspects such as financial 
performance, market valuation, leverage, bidder status, industry and nationality of the 
bidder as these are likely to influence the level of risk involved in a share exchange and 
hence may impact the likelihood that target shareholders will agree to accept them.  
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A. Financial Performance 
There is no empirical evidence on the effect of financial performance of the bidder on 
bid success. However, if we assume that the method of payment is stock, the financial 
performance of the bidder may become an important factor in the target shareholders’ 
decision whether or not to engage in such an exchange. Given that the bidder has 
offered his own shares, an important determinant of transaction success will be how 
well this company has performed in the past. Good financial results are an indication 
that the company is creating value for its shareholders. Although one could argue that 
past performance does not guarantee the same returns in the future, literature which 
focuses on behavioural finance shows that investors tend to extrapolate past outcomes 
too far into the future (Lakonishok et al., 1994; Barberis et al., 1998; Greenwood and 
Hanson, 2013). 
Bidders generating a higher rate of return in excess of the industry average will be 
perceived as more attractive by investors. Therefore, if the target shareholders are 
offered shares in the acquiring company they will be more willing to accept them if the 
bidder has been generating profits - optimally outperforming the market and its peers in 
the past. Hence, given the above share exchange acquisitions have a higher chance of 
completion if the bidder has been generating strong financial results in the past. Also, if 
the method of consideration is a share exchange and we expect an appreciation in the 
bidder’s stock price based on historical performance, we can also assume that this will 
have a negative effect on the premium offered as the bidder is already giving the target 
shareholders an opportunity to share some of its future profits. On the other hand, well 
performing bidders are also more likely to be overconfident and as a result we could 
expect them to bid more aggressively. Hence, we conclude that bidders who generate 
238 
good returns for their investors are more likely to offer a higher premium in 
acquisitions.  
 
B. Market Valuation  
Market valuation is yet another factor which may incentivise or deter target 
shareholders to accept a takeover offer. We look separately at the financial performance 
and market valuation because some companies may be undervalued by the market even 
though they perform better than their peers. What follows, we expect that target 
shareholders will be less likely to accept shares when the acquirer is overvalued. This 
results from a fear that a potential correction of this market inefficiency will take place 
before they dispose of the shares.  
The research on this topic is quite scarce; the evidence provided by Officer (2003) 
shows that bidders with higher valuation do tend to enjoy higher completion rates in 
acquisition attempts. This result may stem from the fact that the level of valuation is a 
reflection of how the bidder is perceived by the market. Hence, high value bidders are 
perceived as well-functioning organisations whose shares are attractive to investors, but 
this may also be an indication of overvaluation which theoretically should deter 
investors. Although undervalued companies should be more sought after as they offer 
greater returns when the price readjusts, target shareholders offering such shares cannot 
be sure when this misevaluation will be corrected, discouraging them to accept 
undervalued currency. Furthermore, we put forward that the market is not fully capable 
of distinguishing overvalued companies from those which are in high demand, but 
which are priced correctly which means that high value bidders offering shares should 
be more successful than their undervalued counterparties. We also expect that stock 
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payments will be employed by overvalued companies which can additionally afford to 
offer higher premia due to the availability of cheap equity-financing (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). Further research by Officer (2003) indeed indicates that higher market 
value leads to higher premia and the same is true for market-to-book ratios. The 
existence of merger waves seems to provide evidence for our claim. 
C. Leverage 
Suboptimal use of debt may indicate financing inefficiencies resulting from managerial 
entrenchment. Additionally, the optimal level of leverage will be different depending on 
the industry. However, in an M&A context low leverage may also be an indication of 
financial stability which should be well perceived by target shareholders participating in 
a share exchange. Tuo et al. (2011) found that leverage is of crucial importance when 
predicting the probability of winning an auction – after all, cash rich bidders have a lot 
more fire power and can afford to bid higher in order to win over the target 
shareholders. This effect is particularly effective in a single-bidder auction, but it is far 
weaker when more bidders are involved. In any case, bidders usually secure financing 
when they are certain that the transaction will take place, additionally low leverage may 
also indicate that bidder is cash rich and that there is low level of corporate control 
exercised by the debtholders.  
It has already been shown by Bruner (1988) that capital structure is one of the drivers of 
M&A and that bidding firms tend to have greater leverage levels than targets or their 
peer companies. However, the empirical research by Clayton and Ravid (2002) 
provided evidence that more indebted firms have higher chances of failure in auctions. 
This might be because low level of gearing increases the overall stability of the 
company and therefore should give the seller more security in a share exchange. 
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Morellec and Zhdanov’s (2008) theoretical model establishes that the winning bidder is 
the one with the lowest level of debt. They infer that it allows the bidder to win due to 
the ability to secure financing at a lower cost. What follows from here is that cheaper 
financing is then reflected in the lower discount rate which effectively leads to higher 
target valuation. Furthermore, less debt indicates that the managers have more 
discretion and are less closely monitored which also gives them an opportunity to bid 
higher using their accumulated free cash flows. Hence, bidders with low leverage are 
able to offer higher premia. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. DATA 
Given a very strong focus on acquisitions by US bidders in the previous studies, 
coupled with the importance of UK investments for the global M&A activity, we have 
decided to investigate how UK bidders can maximise their chances of deal completion, 
both at home and abroad. The sample was collected from Thomson ONE Banker 
provided by the Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (UK database). It 
consists of takeover/merger offers for public targets by UK companies (both public and 
private) that took place between January 1, 1983 and December 31, 2012. The dataset 
represents a set of transactions announced over the above period (completed, pending 
and withdrawn). However, it only includes deals where the proposed transaction 
involves a change in control. Additionally, financial institutions have been removed 
from the sample, as they are subject to additional risks and their asset structure differs 
significantly (see for example, Viale et al., 2009). Transactions with unknown status 
have been excluded, whereas offers pending for more than one year have been regarded 
as unsuccessful. The final sample includes 1,419 transactions, 1,073 (75.62%) of which 
are domestic and 346 (24.38%) are cross-border. Targets are located in 33 countries 
around the world. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Basic sample statistics are presented in Table 2. It can be seen that the majority of cross-
border acquisitions took place in the U.S. (57.51% of all cross-border deals). Of all the 
domestic offers 75.21% are accepted; in case of foreign targets this rate is significantly 
higher (87.00%). Most of the acquirers tend to be public (cross-border 84.97%, 
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domestic 74.00%). Acquisitions of targets in related industry make up over two-thirds 
of all takeovers (domestic/cross-border). Most of the offers are friendly and targets are 
compensated in cash (cross-border 90.17%, domestic 85.37%). 
The average percentage of shares acquired in domestic and foreign targets equals 94.28% 
and 91.78% respectively, whereas the average premium based on the acquirer’s stock 
price one week prior to announcement in most cases reaches 40%. 15.32% of cross-
border offers involve a toehold and very few domestic contracts involve a termination 
fee, but those are much more popular in cross-border transaction (39.02%). 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Figure 1 depicts the yearly distribution of the deals within the sample, which is 
consistent with the merger activity pattern (merger waves) described by Martynova and 
Renneboog (2005). That is, we observe a larger number of deals taking place during the 
market boom of 1988-1989, a decline in merger activity during 1991-1993 followed by 
a rise of the number of M&A in the late 1990s, which ended with a sharp downward 
correction at the period of the ‘dot-com’ market collapse. Another rise of the merger 
activity is to be seen during 2004-2007, which changed into a downturn in 2008-2012. 
3.2. VARIABLES 
The factors described above have been reflected in the selection of variables used in the 
econometric models in this research. The list of all the independent variables is 
presented in Table 3. Additionally, we control for year and industry effects (target’s and 
acquirer’s) by including a dummy.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
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3.3. METHODOLOGY 
We have already discussed the problem of endogeneity as it arises in the context of this 
research. Our main concern is the fact that some of the explanatory variables are likely 
to impact both the dependent variables and one of the independent variables – the 
premium, which is expected to be a crucial determinant of bid success. One proposed 
way of overcoming the problem of endogeneity was through the inclusion of 
instrumental variables (IV). Two models which help to address the problem of 
endogeneity in non-linear settings are two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) and two-
stage residual inclusion (2SRI). When using the former approach the first step is to 
estimate auxiliary regressions, results of which are then used to generate predicted 
variables for endogenous variables. The predicted values are then substituted into the 
model of interest. The second approach uses the same first stage of the process, but the 
second equation includes both, the endogenous variable and its first-stage residuals. 
Terza et al. (2008) note that although both approaches produce identical results in linear 
models, 2SRI is superior in that it is statistically consistent, whereas the 2SPS is not. 
For this reason we decide in favour of the 2SRI in our framework.  
First Stage 
In the first stage of the process we have to estimate our endogenous variable – the 
premium. In order to do that, we apply the OLS procedure to estimate the relationship 
between the premium and other independent variables. We use the following model:  
  
! = ! + !!! + !!!!!  
where 
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p - premium, 
- intercept, 
- vector of independent variables, , 
  - error term. 
We then use the model to estimate the predicted premia ! so that we can then produce 
the residuals, denoted as !:     
! = ! − ! 
Second Stage 
The model incorporates variables which describe transaction features and 
target’s/bidder’s characteristics. It investigates how these influence the likelihood of 
deal completion. Additionally, we include the residuals from the first stage of the 
process which will account for the endogeneity. It is important to note that our second 
stage model also includes the endogenous variable – the premium. The model is the 
following:  
 
Pr !"##$%% = 1 = ! ! + !!! + !!!!! + !!!!!  
where 
- intercept, 
‘Z’-vector of independent variables the same as X vector plus premium, ′!! = [!!,!!,… ,!!] 
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v – residuals obtained in the first step, 
  - error term. 
Sample models in which we additionally control for year and industry effects are 
presented below:  
First Stage –Modelling Premium with an OLS Model 
! = ! + !!!"#$%&#'!!"#$ + !!!"#ℎ! "##$ + !!!"#$%&'! "##$+ !!!ℎ!"#$!!"#$%&'( + !!!"#$%&'(%)&!!""#$%%& + !!!"#$$− !"#$%#! "##$ + !!!!"#$!!"#$%&!"! "##$+ !!!"#!!"!!"#$%!!!! "#!!"#$%& + !!!/!!!"#$%+ !!"!"#"$!!"#$%!!!!!"#!"!!""#$"!+ !!!!"#$%!!!!!"#"$%&"+ !!!"!!"#! "##$ + !!"!"#$%&!!"#$%&'(! "##$+ !!"!"#$%&'&!!"#$%&'(! "##$ + !! 
 
Second Stage – Modelling Success with a Probit Model Pr !"##$%% = 1= ! ! + !!!"#$%&$ + !!!"#ℎ!!"##$+ !!!"#$%&#'!!"#$ + !!!"#$%&'! "##$ + !!!ℎ!"#$!!"#$%&'(+ !!!"#$%&'(%)&!!""#$%%& + !!!"#$$ − !"#$%#! "##$+ !!!!"#$!!"#$%&'(! "##$ + !!!"#!!"!!"#$%!!!! "#!!"#$%!+ !!"!/!!!"#$% + !!!!"#"$!!"#$%!!!!!"#$%!!""#$"!+ !!"!"#$%!!!!!"#"$%&" + !!!"!"#$! "##$+ !!"!"#$%&!!"#$%&'(! "##$+ !!"!"#$%&'&!!"#$%&'(! "##$+ !!  
 
We estimate all the coefficients [α, β1, β2, … , β15] using a normal Cumulative 
Distribution Function. A list of all the models created for the purpose of this research is 
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included in the appendices, whereas the results are discussed and interpreted in the 
following section.  
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4. RESULTS  
4.1. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
In order to get some insight with regard to what increases the chances of completing a 
deal, we start our investigation with basic univariate analysis. We look at binary 
independent variables and test if they have the predicted and statistically significant 
effect. In line with our hypotheses (Hypothesis 6 and 4) we find that friendly offers and 
transactions with one bidder have a higher chance of completion (85.74% vs. 40.66% 
and 80.82% vs. 56.05%) but contrary to our initial prediction (Hypothesis 2), method of 
payment (cash or stock) has no effect. Transactions involving toeholds and termination 
fees are more successful (as predicted by Hypothesis 8 and 10; statistically significant 
difference of around 20% for both variables).  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
4.2. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: FIRST STAGE – MODELLING THE 
PREMIUM 
In the first stage we model the premium using an OLS approach. Given the relatively 
large number of independent variables, we have decided to use the Forward Stepwise 
Regression technique (Gujarati, 2006) which enables us to derive the final model used 
later on to obtain the residuals which are included in the logit analysis in the second 
stage. We add variables in the same sequence in which they appear in the hypotheses. 
We start off with a model with one independent variable - ‘Friendly Dummy’ and add 
subsequent variables which are then incorporated into the model if they prove 
significant and removed if they are not. All of the discussed models are statistically 
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significant and we additionally control for year- and industry-effects relating to the 
bidder and the target. We also use acquirer-level clustering to account for the fact that 
one acquirer could have made more than one offer in our sample. The R-squared ranges 
from 10.42% to 24.01%.  
A. Pre-emptive Bidding 
The first factor in our model is the hostile attitude dummy. We have predicted that this 
variable should positively affect the size of the premium (Hypothesis 7). However, the 
empirical results show the opposite (Models 1-21). The premium is reduced in hostile 
transactions by around 12 percentage points. This may be an indication that targets of 
friendly takeovers manage to negotiate premia higher than those paid by acquirers when 
trying to remove inefficient management. The same applies to situations with multiple 
bidders. As predicted, more competition increases the premium paid for the target by 
around 14 percentage points (Hypothesis 5; Models 2-23). Also cash acquisitions prove 
to involve higher premia than those involving stock (6-10 percentage points, Models 3-
22, Hypothesis 3a). One potential reason for this might the fact that transactions 
involving cash will be most often carried out by acquirers who want to finalise the 
acquisition in a short period of time which may also mean that the bidder will offer a 
higher premium to reach his goal. Lastly, shares acquired (Hypothesis 9) and 
termination fees (Hypothesis 11) were predicted to have a negative effect but the data 
shows that those are of no statistical importance (Models 4 and 5).  
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B. Control Variables 
We expected cross-border acquisitions to attract higher premia due to additional 
synergies which can be potentially extracted and although the results show that the 
coefficient is indeed positive, the variable is statistically insignificant (Model 6). 
Following a similar line of reasoning, we have put forward that investors will be willing 
to pay more for diversifying acquisitions, but this has found no support in the data 
(Models 7 and 8). In line with our expectations good financial performance of the target 
leads to lower premia (-1.55 percentage points for a 1 million increase in EBITDA and 
between -1.65 and -2.20 pp. for net income; Models 9-12) which indicates that acquirers 
are ready to pay more if the target offers scope for improvement. However, despite the 
predictions that targets with low market-to-book value/difference in the ratio when 
compared to sector peers/appreciation in market value should attract higher premia, 
these variables are of no statistical importance (Models 11-13). We find that the log of 
target’s sales is highly correlated with the log of targets EBITDA/net income. We, 
therefore, remove the measures of financial performance and include a proxy for size. 
After adding the log of target’s total size we find that, in line with predictions, larger 
targets do secure lower premia (Model 15, -1.51 percentage points for every million 
increase in target’s sales). We also test the impact of another size proxy which is the log 
of target’s total assets and obtain the same result (Model 16). Proposed reason for this 
negative effect is the difficulty of integrating larger companies. Finally, contrary to our 
prediction, we find a positive relationship between premia and gearing (Model 17), but 
this result is not statistically significant.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
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C. Share Exchange 
In the last part we look at bidder’s characteristics and investigate whether those are of 
any importance when the transaction is settled through the means of a share exchange. 
Contrary to our suppositions we find that financial performance of the bidder (Models 
18 and 19) and his market valuation on a stand-alone basis and versus peers/industry are 
insignificant (Models 20-22). Also, our prediction on a negative impact of leverage on 
premium finds no support in our data (Model 23). These results contradict the existing 
theory on value-destroying bidders who have been characterised as those with high 
market-to-book ratios and low level of leverage.  
The above analysis allows us to choose the model which best describes the relationship 
between the premium offered and the chosen independent variables. The regression 
which we believe best mirrors this relationship is Model 15 – the inclusion of additional 
factors as shown in Models 16-23 leads us to conclude that those variables are 
insignificant and do not improve the overall explanatory power of the model. Hence, 
Model 15 is used as a basis for obtaining the residuals which are included in the second 
stage of the modelling process.  
4.3. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: SECOND STAGE – MODELLING THE 
SUCCESS 
The enclosed table exhibits the outputs from the multiple regressions estimated using a 
series of logit models, which enable us to analyse the factors increasing the chances of 
bid acceptance. As outlined in the Methodology section, the variables which have been 
chosen for the models relate to macro and micro setting of any deal. We started off with 
models which look at transaction characteristics in order to then proceed with the 
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analysis of target’s characteristics and at the end investigate the bidder’s features when 
the proposed method of payment is stock.  
A. Pre-emptive Bidding 
We have provided 8 models to show the relationship between the success rate and a 
series of variables which we predicted would have an effect on the outcome of a bid. 
Having run the regressions, we discover that, as predicted, premium has a positive 
effect on the chances of deal completion (Hypothesis 1). On average the probability that 
the transaction will be finalised shows a significant increase of 0.9-14 percentage points 
for every percentage point increase in the premium being offered (Models 24-27). 
Furthermore, the selling shareholders seem sensitive with regard to the method of 
consideration (Model 29) but the effect is the opposite to what we have predicted 
(Hypothesis 2) – cash deters selling shareholders. This may be an indication that 
investors perceive a share exchange not as a more risky method of payment but one 
which offers a potential upside. In line with our hypotheses, transactions which are 
hostile (Hypothesis 6) and those which attract multiple bidders (Hypothesis 4) have 
significantly lower chances of completion (Models 24-31). This is because hostile bids 
by definition bypass the management which may create serious resistance lowering the 
chances that the offer will be accepted by the target’s shareholder, whereas multiple 
bidders fuel the competition, reducing the probability that the original bidder will fail. 
One variable which is highly significant is the target termination fee. Its inclusion 
increases the chances of deal completion by 22-31 percentage points (Models 24-31), 
which might provide further motivation to the bidding party to put additional effort into 
closing the transaction in order not the lose out on the promised fee. This supports 
Hypothesis 10.  
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B. Control Variables 
With regard to cross-border transactions, these do not seem to be more successful (as 
predicted, Models 24-31) and contrary to our prediction, same industry deals seem to 
be less likely to succeed, but this effect is statistically insignificant (Models 24-31). 
The possible reason why the coefficient relating to this particular variable is negative 
might be related to the target’s shareholders’ reluctance to sell to one of the 
competitors. What is more, in contrast to our supposition we find that targets with 
higher M/B ratio (Model 26), M/B ratio versus sector (Model 27) are more likely to 
finalise a transaction but in line with our predictions those with higher gearing 
(Model 27) do tend to reject offers more often. This might be because high gearing is 
an indication that the company is well-run and its managers have greater power to 
advise their shareholders to discard bids made by other companies. On the other 
hand, shareholders of companies with high M/B ratios may be aware of the potential 
overvaluation and hence are more inclined to dispose of their shares. Contrary to our 
prediction, targets’ financial performance is of no statistical importance. Lastly, 
although we predicted that size of the target will reduce the chances of a bid being 
accepted because managers of larger are more likely to exhibit empire-building 
practices and therefore be more defensive in case of a takeover, this has not been 
supported by our data. Models 26-28 which incorporate either log of total assets or 
sales are statistically insignificant.  
C. Share Exchange  
We have claimed that markets may not be perfect and therefore selling shareholders 
may be influenced by bidder’s characteristics when considering whether to accept an 
offer or not. However, contrary to our hypotheses, we discover that the features of the 
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bidder have no impact on the chances of bid acceptance which may be an indication 
that the investors believe that markets are efficient and securities are priced correctly, 
making them indifferent when choosing between a cash offer and a share exchange 
(Model 29-31).  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
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5. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1. DOMESTIC VS. CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS 
We check the robustness of our results by dividing our sample into two sub-sets – one 
involving only domestic (Table 7) offers and one for cross-border bids (Table 8) – to 
see whether the previously noted patterns are consistent in those two settings. In line 
with the overall results, we find that, supporting Hypothesis 1, the premium has a 
positive effect in a domestic setting (Models 32-35) but proves to be insignificant in 
cross-border transactions (40-48). In line with our previous findings and hypotheses 
(Hypothesis 6 and 4) are the results referring to deal hostility and the existence of 
multiple bidders (Models 32-36, 40-48), both of which have a negative effect on the 
chances of deal completion. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, we obtain evidence that using 
cash in domestic transactions lowers the likelihood of deal completion (Model 34; 
marginal effect of -34.76 p.p.) which maybe an indication that domestic target 
shareholders are willing to accept the additional risk in order to benefit from the 
potential upside resulting from a share exchange. This effect does not hold for cross-
border transactions (Models 47), presumably due to more severe information 
asymmetries making selling investors reluctant to accept shares. On the other hand, 
termination fees only have a positive effect (as predicted by Hypothesis 10) in cross-
border deals (Models 40, 41, 46-48) which may be an indication that foreign selling 
managers are more likely to be influenced by potential private benefits, while domestic 
agents focus more on shareholder-value maximisation, i.e. the size of the premium 
offered.  
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The first control variable in the regression refers to industry relatedness and the result in 
Model 35 support the findings of the univariate analysis (Table 4) but contradicts 
prediction which states that acquirers should be more successful when bidding for 
targets in the same industry. However, this holds only for domestic transactions which 
may suggest that shareholders do not want to sell their shares to competitors but only 
unless those are based within the borders of the same country. Domestic results on M/B 
ratio and gearing (Models 34-36) uphold the findings from the models run on the whole 
sample. We, in addition, find support for our supposition that larger firms will be harder 
to acquire (Model 36) but only domestically. Surprisingly, we also find that better 
performing domestic targets will be more likely to be acquired (Model 36). Variables 
relating to target characteristics prove to be insignificant in a cross-border setting. This 
may lead to a supposition that the probability of transaction success maybe be more 
reliant on managers who look to extract additional benefits than on the shareholders 
looking to maximise their value. All of the share exchange characteristics remain 
insignificant.  
5.2. SAMPLE SELECTION MODEL – PREMIUM 
Our dataset consist of public targets and both public and private acquirers. In our 
approach we ex-ante assume that the dataset is representative of the whole universe of 
transactions. However, in reality not all the transactions are always recorded by 
database providers. For example, one could expect that unsuccessful transactions are 
more frequently omitted by those managing the database. In order to see if there are any 
specific patterns in missing data on premia, we employ the Heckman selection model. 
The results of the test for correlation of error terms lead us to believe that there is no 
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bias in our models referring to premium. A sample outcome from our analysis is 
available in Table 9.  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
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6. LIMITATIONS 
6.1. DATA 
The first limitation of this research is quite technical in its nature. The available data is 
quite extensive, however many buyers do not disclose some of the transaction specifics 
and therefore data on premia, termination fee levels or targets’ and acquirers’ financials 
is rather limited despite the fact that all targets in our dataset are public companies. 
Given that the premium is one of the most important factors in acquisitions, the 
shortage of observations for this variable constitutes a serious drawback. Also, it is 
highly likely that our data set misses particularly many observations in the 1980s when 
information on transactions was not as well recorded and disseminated as it is now.  
6.2. MANAGERIAL SHAREHOLDINGS 
The second limitation of this research is the fact that we do not look at the level of 
managerial shareholdings. Yet the existing literature provides rather mixed evidence. It 
has been argued that when managerial shareholdings are low and the ownership is 
generally dispersed the board may utilise the company’s assets to improve managerial 
benefits rather than to maximise the value of the company (Berle and Means, 1932). 
These may include shirking or increasing perquisites, sales growth, empire building, 
improving employee well-being (Morck et al., 1988), selecting a white knight to whom 
they will sell the company in exchange for job security, offering in addition bid 
protection (Odean, 1998) or simply blocking a takeover. Furthermore, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) have shown that the cost of pursuing non-profit-maximising objectives 
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is reduced when the managerial ownership is significant. However, the hypothesis that 
managerial stockholdings lead to better alignment of incentives of the management is 
contradicted by Demsetz (1983) or Fama and Jensen (1983) who point out that even 
when managers own a small stake in the company they may be working toward profit-
maximisation as they are being disciplined by the market. On the other hand, they also 
recognise that management with sufficient voting power and little supervision can be 
more effective securing its jobs and attractive compensation. Shivdasani (1993) 
provides evidence that managerial ownership discourages hostile takeovers, while 
Moeller (2005) shows that low CEO and inside directors’ shareholdings when 
accompanied with a presence of large outside investors enable the targets to achieve 
better premiums while CEO compensation is negatively related to bid premia (Hartzell 
et al., 2004). What is more, managerial ownership can influence not only takeover 
premia, but also bid nature (Song and Walkling, 1993; Moeller, 2005). 
6.3. TARGET’S CEO 
An acquisition of a company very often leads to a managerial change, i.e. managers of 
the acquired company are replaced with new officers (Odean, 1998). Research by 
Agrawal and Walkling (1994) provides evidence that managers are more likely to lose 
their jobs in case of a successful takeover, rather than after an unsuccessful acquisition. 
The managerial turnover is also higher in case of tender offers where the acquirer 
decides to negotiate directly with the shareholders, and does not consult the current 
management board. Data shows that within three years after the takeover, replaced 
CEOs fail to find another similar senior executive position in a public company 
(Agrawal and Walkling, 1994). “If managers lose their jobs, they not only lose their 
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firm-specific human capital, but also are likely to suffer a downward revaluation of their 
general human capital” (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990, p. 146).  
However, one should also keep in mind that managers may be ready to cooperate with 
the acquirer in order to convince current shareholders to sell their shares and that they 
do not always oppose takeovers (Aobdia and Caskey, 2012). Their choice will to a large 
extent depend on the potential private benefits from such a transaction. Those CEOs 
with illiquid equity or option holdings are easier to convince and require smaller 
premiums (Cai and Vijh, 2007). While others with more to lose may be incentivised not 
to block the acquisition by granting them unscheduled options which become 
exercisable after the merger is consummated or by offering them ‘golden parachutes’ 
which aim to discourage CEOs to jeopardise profitable acquisitions. Research shows 
that the more adversely the CEOs are to be affected by the acquisition, the more likely it 
is that they will be granted such options (Cai et al., 2011). What is more, their cash 
payments are negatively associated with the likelihood that this CEO will be introduced 
to the board of the acquiring company (Hartzell et al., 2002), but the equity grants are 
more likely to be awarded when the target has more bargaining power (Heitzman, 
2011).  
Unfortunately, there is also a downside to lack of bid-resistance resulting from such 
private benefits. The extant research puts forward that the larger the gain to the 
management from the acquisition, the less likely they are to fight the bid (Walkling and 
Long, 1984). Eckbo (2009) wonders whether managers are ready to sacrifice higher bid 
premia in return to receive private benefits and this is supported by Cotter and Zenner 
(1994), Wulf (2004) or Hartzell et al. (2004) who find that there is a link between 
executive compensation and their support for certain transactions. Consequently, we see 
that transactions involving ‘golden parachutes’ and unscheduled options are value-
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destroying for the target shareholders’ with an average loss per transaction amounting to 
around $127 and $307 million respectively. The shortfall from unscheduled options 
translates to a $54 drop in target value for every dollar received in unscheduled options 
(Cai et al., 2011; Fich et al., 2013). This lead researchers to believe that there is a 
wealth transfer from the target to the bidder’s shareholders (Fich et al., 2013), but they 
find no support in their data and instead show that the returns to bidders are not 
significantly different whether or not the target CEO has received a bonus or not (Fich 
et al., 2011). What Fich et al. (2011) find is that although the premium paid is lower, 
the post-transaction synergies also tend to be lower. 
However, the chances of transaction completion can also be influenced by the structure 
of the compensation received by the acquiring managers, as those usually have a lot of 
influence over the management board (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
It has been documented that the proportion of share compensation has increased 
significantly during the 1990s (Murphy, 2003) which had substantially incentivised 
risk-taking among CEOs (Cai and Vijh, 2007; Croci and Petmezas, 2013) and increased 
their focus of share price performance. Fama et al. (1969) put forward that there is an 
information loop used by managers who try to analyse their past actions and try to 
understand how those affected the share price of the company they are running. With 
regard to M&A transactions this means that the share price reacts positively to 
acquisitions which are perceived by the market as value-increasing and negatively 
otherwise (Bollaert and De Bruyne Demidova, 2014). Although the experience of the 
managers may to some extent impact their responsiveness to signals generated by the 
market (Aktas et al., 2009/2011/2013), we argue that a negative market reaction should 
induce them to reconsider a potential bid, especially given that there is evidence that 
neglecting such signals increases the likelihood of being replaced (Lehn and Zhao, 
2006), while those who respond to negative signals by abandoning projects get 
261 
rewarded by the market (Jacobsen, 2012). Given the above, we argue that the likelihood 
of deal completion can to a large degree depend on the compensation not only of the 
target managers but also of those who made the initial bid.  
6.4. COST BASIS 
There is growing literature regarding behavioural finance which can be used in an M&A 
context when assessing the probability of bid success. Although along the lines of 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis investors should be willing to sell their shares as long as 
they are offered a price above their market value, this is not always the case. Already 
Khaneman and Tversky (1979) have shown that individuals when faced with risk and 
uncertainty do not always act rationally, as predicted by economic theory. Aobdia and 
Caskey (2012) introduce the concept of investor cost basis and disposition effect which 
can help to understand why investors may be reluctant to dispose of their shares even 
when the price offered is above the market value. It has been put forward that this can 
be caused by two separate effects. First is the Prospect Theory, based on this Shefrin 
and Statman (1984) note that, on average, investors tend to sell winners too early and 
hold losers for too long. This goes hand in hand with mental accounting – i.e. “decision-
makers tend to segregate the different types of gambles faced into separate accounts, 
and then apply prospect theoretic decision rules to each account by ignoring possible 
interaction” (Shefrin and Statman, 1984, p. 780). This means that investors will be more 
risk-loving when holding shares with unrealised losses and more risk-averse with 
unrealised gains. Furthermore, even the most experienced traders who are fully aware of 
the concept suffer from it (Locke and Mann, 2005) and the literature provides evidence 
for the existence of the disposition effect in institutional investors’ behaviour (Frazzini, 
2006). The second possible explanation for this reluctance to loss realisation is 
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anchoring. In this framework anchoring refers to investors’ tendency to rely heavily on 
the initial information when making an investment decision and where new information 
is interpreted around the ‘anchor’ (Khaneman and Tversky, 1974) leading to an anchor 
bias. Aobdia and Caskey (2012) test the impact of cost basis on the likelihood of 
success in takeovers and find that the relationship is stronger in case of tender offers, 
hostile bids, targets with high institutional ownership and short-term investors. 
Generally speaking, when institutional investors are offered a premium higher than their 
purchase price the transaction has a higher chance of completion.  
6.5. MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE 
As pointed out by Malmendier and Tate (2008), overconfident managers tend to 
overestimate their abilities also when it comes to generating returns and this goes back 
to the work of Roll (1986) and his managerial hubris. The underlying causes for 
excessive optimism can be explained by psychology literature. Research in this field has 
shown that individuals are likely to consider themselves above average (see for example 
Kruger, 1999 or Svenson, 1981). Furthermore, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) show that 
this is especially true for highly skilled individuals, whereas Larwood and Whittaker 
(1997) provide evidence that this tendency is particularly strong in case of corporate 
executives. What is important in context of this paper is the fact that individuals tend to 
be overconfident regarding their own future (Kunda, 1987; Weinstein and Klein, 2002) 
and outcomes which they think depend on them (Langer, 1975). Overoptimism is the 
greater, the more committed the individuals are to a project (Weinstein, 1980). 
Therefore, we can assume that the level of overoptimism in CEOs will be exceptionally 
high. The overconfidence of bidding managers means that they over-invest (Doukas and 
Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008) this may exhibit itself through over-
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bidding, bidding for many companies or trying to pursue unachievable targets. We can 
extend the existing framework and make some predictions about the actions of the 
target management. If the managers are in general overconfident, we may end up in a 
situation in which the target management advises the shareholders to reject a perfectly 
attractive offer simply because they believe the current value of the company is higher 
or that they will be able to grow the company further and generate even better returns to 
shareholders in the future.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The results of our analysis provide us with some insight into the factors driving bid 
success. Unlike the previous studies we address the problem of endogeneity stemming 
from the fact that many factors influencing the chances that the transaction will be 
accepted by the target shareholders also impact the level of premium offered for a 
particular company. The three variables which exhibit a particularly strong impact on 
the chances of transaction success are multiple bids, hostility and termination fee 
dummy. Supportive of the existing evidence are our results with regard to competing 
bids which significantly lower the chances of deal success. On the other hand, the result 
for hostility has a very strong negative effect and is in line with all the previous research 
mentioned in the review of the literature section, excluding Schwert (2000) who found 
the relationship to be positive. However, one variable which has a very strong and 
positive impact is the termination fee. As in the case of Flanagan et al. (1998) and 
Officer (2003), we find that introduction of such a fee in the contract significantly 
increases the chances of deal success. Contrary to the findings by Hoffmeister and Dyl 
(1981), but in line with Walkling (1985) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), we find 
that the probability of deal success increases with the increasing premium.  
The above analysis has provided valuable information for acquirers who want to get 
involved in mergers and acquisitions. The most important conclusion is that although 
the size of the premium is significant, its importance is fairly negligible when compared 
with the impact of hostile transactions, competing bids and the inclusions of a 
termination fee. From the above we can infer that carefully planned bilateral 
negotiations leading to a high premium would maximise the chances of deal 
completion. If such process is not a viable option a bidder should try to limit the 
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chances of emergence of competing bids by offering a termination fee, which makes us 
believe that it is highly desirable to avoid hostile takeovers and that bidders should try 
to obtain the target’s managers’ support. Due to the above, future research could more 
carefully investigate ways in which one could most effectively reduce the managerial 
resistance, the chances of emergence of competing bids and the optimal size of a 
termination fee to be used in transactions. This would provide the acquiring companies 
with even more insight on how to structure an acquisition and pick targets in order to 
make sure that the transaction will be executed. 
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9. APPENDICES 
Table 1 - List of Variables and Expected Effects 
Description  Expected Effect  
Deal Success 
Expected Effect  
Premium 
Steps for Successful M&A 
Premium +  
Method of payment (cash) + ? 
Multiple bids - + 
Hostile - + 
Toehold + - 
Number of shares needed to obtain majority - + 
Termination fee + - 
 
 
!
!
280 
 
 
Table 2 - Sample Statistics  
      Cross-Border (n = 346) Domestic (n = 1,073) 
  n % n % 
Panel A. Target Countries (top 5) !! !! !!
France! 9! 2.60%! !.!! !.!!
Ireland! 13! 3.76%! !.!! !.!!
Canada! 26! 7.51%! !.!! !.!!
Australia! 27! 7.80%! !.!! !.!!
USA! 199! 57.51%! !.!! !.!!
!! ! ! ! !!
Panel B. Deal Status  !! !! !! !!
Completed! 301! 87.00%! 807! 75.21%!
Unsuccessful! 45! 13.00%! 266! 24.79%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel C. Acquirer Status! !! !! !!
! ! ! ! !
Acquirer!Public! 294! 84.97%! 794! 74.00%!
Acquirer!Private! 52! 15.03%! 279! 26.00%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel D. Relatedness of the Bidder and the Target  
Same!Macro!Industry! 258! 74.57%! 738! 68.78%!
Different!Macro!Industry! 88! 25.43%! 335! 31.22%!
!
Same!SIC!Code! 128! 36.99%!
!!
36.91%!396!
Different!SIC!Code! 218! 63.01%! 677! 63.09%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel E. Offer Type 
Friendly! 315! 91.04%! 863! 80.43%!
Multiple!bids! 44! 12.72%! 113! 10.53%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel F. Contract Specifics 
Toehold! 53! 15.32%! 188! 17.52%!
Target!termination!fee! 135! 39.02%! 52! 4.85%!
Acquirer!termination!fee! 46! 13.29%! 10! 0.93%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel G. Method of Payment!     
Cash!! 312! 90.17%! 916! 85.37%!
Stock! 34! 9.83%! 157! 14.63%!
! ! ! ! !
Panel H. Transaction Details! mean! std.error! mean! std.error!
Average!deal!value! x! x! x! x!
Average!%!of!shares!acquired! 91.78%! 1.13%! 94.28%! 0.46%!
Average!premium!(USD!mil)! 43.43! 3.45! 39.31! 4.45!
! ! ! ! !
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Figure 1 - Annual Distribution of Deals in the Sample 
(no. of deals) 
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Table 3 - Description of Variables 
Name Type Definition 
Transaction Features 
Cross-border Dummy One if the target is located abroad and zero otherwise 
Premium Quantitative Premium 1 week prior to announcement date 
Method of payment (Cash/Stock) Dummy One if the method of payment is cash/stock 
Multiple bids Dummy One if more than one acquirer made an offer  
Friendly Dummy One if the deal is classified as a ‘friendly’ acquisition 
Toehold Dummy One if the acquirer already owns some part of the target 
Shares to Obtain Majority Quantitative Shares needed to be acquired by the buyer to obtain majority 
Target Termination Fee  Dummy One if the target can expect to be paid a termination fee 
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Table 3 - Description of Variables (continued) 
Name Type Definition 
Control Variables 
Same Macro Industry/ Same SIC 
Same SIC  
Dummy One if the target and acquirer are from the same macro industry 
and zero otherwise/ One if the target and acquirer have the same 
SIC code and zero otherwise 
Target Private/Public Dummy One if the target is private company and zero otherwise /One  if 
the target is a public company and zero otherwise 
Target Macro Sector Return Quantitative Return for target’s sector as classified by Fama-French 17 
industries, LTM 
Target Macro Sector Mean M/B Quantitative Average M/B for target’s sector as classified by Fama-French 17 
industries, as of the year of transaction 
Target Return vs. Market Quantitative Over- or underperformance of the target against the sector 
expressed as a percentage 
Target M/B vs. Market Quantitative Over- or underperformance of the target against the sector 
expressed as a percentage 
Target Sales Quantitative Net sales million USD, LTM 
Target Total Assets Quantitative Target’s total assets from the most current financial statement 
Target Net Income  Quantitative Net income million USD, LTM 
Target Gearing  Quantitative Target’s total debt divided by Shareholder’s Equity from the 
most current financial statement 
Target Cash  Quantitative Cash held by the target 
Target Liquidity Quantitative Cash to Total Assets Ration, from the most current financial 
statement 
Acquirer Private/Public Dummy One if the target is private company and zero otherwise /One  if 
the target is a public company and zero otherwise 
Acquirer Macro Sector Return Quantitative Return for acquirer’s sector as classified by Fama-French 17 
industries, LTM 
Acquirer Macro Sector Mean M/B  Quantitative Average M/B for acquirer’s sector as classified by Fama-French 
17 industries, as of the year of transaction 
Year Dummy Dummy A series of dummies for all the years in the sample to control for 
year-specific effects 
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Table 4 - Univariate Analysis – Deal Success 
Variable All 
Friendly  
vs. 
Hostile  
Mean 85.74% 
Mean 40.66% 
p-value 0.0000 
Difference 45.08% 
Multiple offers 
vs.  
One bidder 
Mean 56.05% 
Mean 80.82% 
p-value 0.0000 
Difference -24.77% 
Cash 
vs.  
Stock 
Mean 78.01% 
Mean 78.08% 
p-value 0.9792 
Difference -0.07% 
Toehold 
vs.  
No- shareholding 
Mean 97.93% 
Mean 74.02% 
p-value 0.0000 
Difference 23.90% 
Termination fee 
vs. 
No termination fee  
Mean 96.26% 
Mean 75.32% 
p-value 0.0000 
Difference 20.93% 
Cross-border  
vs.  
Domestic  
Mean 75.21% 
Mean 86.99% 
p-value 0.0000 
Difference -11.78% 
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Table 5 – Modelling the Premium 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
-0.1161*** -0.1221*** -0.1281*** -0.0863 -0.1319*** -0.1240*** -0.1279*** -0.1256*** -0.1624*** -0.1196*** -0.0777** -0.0777** -0.1244*** -0.1266*** -0.1225***
(0.0262) (0.0255) (0.0258) (0.0599) (0.0267) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.0293) (0.0276) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0406) (0.0267) (0.0255)
0.1388*** 0.1360*** 0.1474*** 0.1360*** 0.1337*** 0.1361*** 0.1352*** 0.1429*** 0.1514*** 0.1444*** 0.1404*** 0.0903* 0.1463*** 0.1414***
(0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0500) (0.0328) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0366) (0.0345) (0.0396) (0.0393) (0.0475) (0.0329) (0.0321)
0.0843*** 0.0952*** 0.0879*** 0.0809*** 0.0844*** 0.0849*** 0.1015*** 0.0848*** 0.0706** 0.0646* 0.0182 0.0881*** 0.0942***
(0.0270) (0.0313) (0.0274) (0.0223) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0312) (0.0286) (0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0445) (0.0286) (0.0277)
0.0000
(0.0026)
-0.0270
(0.0284)
0.0312
(0.0223)
-0.0018
(0.0219)
-0.0094
(0.0207)
-0.0155**
(0.0061)
-0.0165*** -0.0220*** -0.0220*** -0.0062 -0.0111
(0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0087) (0.0110)
-0.0004
(0.0003)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0047
(0.0036)
-0.0072 -0.0151***
(0.0106) (0.5726)
No. of observations 1,172         1,172         1,172         861            1,172         1,172         1,172         1,172         900            1,093         801            797            521            1,062         1,106          
p-value for F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 10.42% 12.24% 13.02% 12.81% 13.10% 13.17% 13.02% 13.04% 16.58% 14.49% 17.44% 17.15% 16.33% 15.30% 14.62%
Acquirer vs Sector Return (+)
Gearing (-)
Cross-border Dummy (+)
Log Acquirer EBITDA (+)
Log Acquirer Net Income (+)
Acquirer Market-to-Book (+)
Acquirer vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Target vs Sector Return (-)
Log Target Sales (-)
Log Target Total Assets (-)
Gearing (-)
Same Macro (-)
Same SIC (-)
Log Target EBITDA (-)
Log Target Net Income (-)
Target Market-to-Book (-)
Target vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Hostile Dummy (+)
Multiple Bids Dummy (+)
Cash Dummy (-)
Shares Acquired (-)
Target Termination Fee (-)
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Table 5 – Modelling the Premium (continued) 
  
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23
-0.1116*** -0.1247*** -0.0140 -0.0349 -0.1197** -0.1197** -0.0851 -0.0176
(0.0273) (0.0318) (0.0424) (0.0366) (0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0548) (0.0413)
0.1489*** 0.1334*** 0.1397*** 0.1345*** 0.1034* 0.1034* 0.1764*** 0.1328***
(0.0339) (0.0329) (0.0494) (0.0426) (0.0540) (0.0540) (0.0605) (5.0183)
0.0947*** 0.1172 0.0567 0.0809** 0.0603 0.0603 0.0931** 0.0632
(0.0272) (0.0295) (0.0396) (0.0347) (0.0529) (0.0529) (0.0447) (0.0407)
-0.0081 -0.0246** -0.0252*** -0.0202* -0.0203* -0.0233* -0.0202**
(0.0065) (0.0109) (0.0094) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0095)
-0.0183***
(0.0059)
0.0014
(0.0023)
0.0128
(0.0088)
1.25E-02
(0.0086)
-3.00E-04
(0.0002)
-3.00E-04
(0.0002)
-2.47E-02
(0.0202)
5.42E-02
(0.0960)
No. of observations 1,118             833            490            616            313            313            339           463               
p-value for F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 14.27% 15.68% 18.73% 15.89% 23.84% 23.85% 24.01% 18.57%
Acquirer vs Sector Return (+)
Gearing (-)
Cross-border Dummy (+)
Log Acquirer EBITDA (+)
Log Acquirer Net Income (+)
Acquirer Market-to-Book (+)
Acquirer vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Target vs Sector Return (-)
Log Target Sales (-)
Log Target Total Assets (-)
Gearing (-)
Same Macro (-)
Same SIC (-)
Log Target EBITDA (-)
Log Target Net Income (-)
Target Market-to-Book (-)
Target vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Hostile Dummy (+)
Multiple Bids Dummy (+)
Cash Dummy (-)
Shares Acquired (-)
Target Termination Fee (-)
The table presents an OLS regression, where the 
dependent variable is the premium offered in a 
transaction. The independent variables are described in 
more detail in Table 3. 
!
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Table 6 – Multivariate Analysis 
All Deals (Marginal Effects) 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is the probability of completing a transaction. The independent 
variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
 
Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31
0.0233 0.0226 -0.0187 0.0471 0.0731 0.0193 0.0169 0.0028
0.0307 0.0306 (0.0528) (0.0571) (0.0590) (0.0827) (0.0829) (0.0558)
0.0009** 0.0009** 0.0013** 0.1415** -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0580
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008)
0.0013 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0057 0.0147 0.0140 0.0119
0.0019 (0.0019) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0092)
0.0028 0.0031 0.0171 0.0534 0.0067 -0.4846*** -0.0632 -0.0596
0.0352 0.0335 0.0528 0.0486 0.0799 0.1832 0.1847 0.1164
-0.2209*** -0.2218*** -0.2163*** -0.2182*** -0.1058 -0.4861 -0.4730*** -0.3759***
0.0395 0.0396 0.0577 0.0534 0.0829 0.1832 0.1800 0.1312
-0.2980*** -0.2958*** -0.0033*** -0.3378*** -0.4150*** -0.0976 0.1007 0.0248
0.0347 0.3561 0.0567 (0.0486) (0.0660) (0.0021) (0.2139) (0.1451)
0.2214*** 0.2220*** 0.3146*** 0.2949** 0.2406*** 0.2607*** 0.2597** 0.2748***
0.0601 0.0598 0.1159 0.1186 0.0771 0.1034 0.1035 0.0828
-0.0111 -0.0145 -0.0565 -0.1646 -0.1543
0.0262 0.0366 0.0544 0.1479 0.1420
-0.0126 -0.0273 -0.0722
0.0243 0.0304 0.0454
0.0006
0.0152
0.0148 0.0130
0.0099 0.0114
0.0013***
0.0004
0.0010***
0.0003
-0.0013
0.0017
-0.0039
(0.0179)
-0.0196 -0.0234
(0.0134) (0.0157)
-0.0016 -0.0088*** -0.0098
(0.0046) (0.0028) (0.0064)
0.0371
(0.0417)
0.00030 -0.00660
(0.0003) 0.02170
0.00820
(0.0293)
0.00010
(0.0004)
-0.05100
(0.0567)
-0.2793 -0.0038
(0.4307) (0.0046)
No. of observations 1,105        § 539           621           365           168           168           272           
p-value for F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared 30.45% 30.46% 38.49% 37.26% 32.02% 48.35% 48.28% 37.96%
Log Target Total Assets (-)
Log Target Sales (-)
Target Gearing (-)
Same SIC (+)
Log Target EBITDA (-)
Log Target Net Income (-)
Target Market-to-Book (-)
Target vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Target vs Sector Return (-)
Gearing (-)
Log Acquirer EBITDA (+)
Log Acquirer Net Income (+)
Acquirer Market-to-Book (+)
Acquirer vs Industry (+)
Market-to-Book
Acquirer vs Sector Return (-)
Target Termination Fee (+)
Same Macro (+)
Cash Dummy (+)
Cross-border Dummy (-)
Multiple Bids Dummy (-)
Premium (+)
Residual
Hostile Dummy (-)
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Table 7 – Multivariate Analysis 
Domestic Deals (Marginal Effects) 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is the probability of completing a transaction. The independent 
variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
 
Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39
0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0013** 0.0015** -3.60E-05 -0.0025 -0.0023 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0013)
0.0053 0.0054 0.0424*** 0.0095 -0.0872* 0.0009 0.0018 0.0021
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0156) (0.0366) (0.0506) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0154)
-0.0285 -0.0279 -0.3476** -0.0350 0.7109 0.3102 0.1999 0.2561
(0.0580) (0.0582) (0.1440) (0.3462) (0.4724) (0.3383) (0.2814) (0.2122)
-0.3134*** -0.3155*** -0.8987*** -0.4475 0.9846 -0.3256 -0.3334 -0.3421
(0.0765) (0.0768) (0.2338) (0.5186) (0.7153) (0.2598) (0.2599) (0.2286)
-0.2840*** -0.2761*** 0.1623 -0.2794 -1.4702** 0.2997 0.2821 0.1450
(0.0705) (0.0716) (0.1857) (0.4475) (0.6286) (0.2846) (0.2881) (0.2168)
0.0912 0.0902 0.0785 0.1174 0.0995 0.1802 0.1770 0.3775
(0.0634) (0.0630) (0.0788) (7.4145) (0.0820) (0.1701) (0.1698) (0.2494)
0.0016 -0.0735* -0.1083 -0.2576 -0.2398
(0.0293) (0.0420) (0.0810) (0.1747) (0.1670)
-0.0199 -0.0632 -0.0587
(0.0291) (0.0392) (0.0857)
0.0150
(0.0187)
0.0190 0.0439**
(0.0148) (0.0180)
0.0017***
(0.0003)
0.0033***
(0.0009)
0.0047
(0.0059)
0.0348
(0.0316)
-0.0221 -0.1627**
(0.0576) (0.0820)
0.0183 -0.0142*** -0.0247**
(0.0258) (0.0038) (0.0100)
0.0471
(0.0592)
0.0472
(0.0511)
0.0046
(0.0285)
0.0100
(0.0315)
-0.0444
(0.0804)
-0.0579 -0.3422 0.7153
(0.6708) (0.7321) (0.4906)
No. of observations 839           839           369           451           206           106           106           139           
p-value for F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0014 0.0023
Pseudo R-squared 32.79% 32.83% 44.17% 41.24% 36.21% 51.94% 52.15% 42.66%
Target Market-to-Book (-)
Premium (+)
Residual
Multiple Bids Dummy (-)
Hostile Dummy (-)
Target Termination Fee (+)
Same Macro (+)
Same SIC (+)
Log Target EBITDA (-)
Log Target Net Income (-)
Cash Dummy (+)
Target vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Target vs Sector Return (-)
Log Target Total Assets (-)
Log Target Sales (-)
Gearing (-)
Target Gearing (-)
Log Acquirer EBITDA (+)
Log Acquirer Net Income (+)
Acquirer Market-to-Book (+)
Acquirer vs Industry (+)
Market-to-Book
Acquirer vs Sector Return (-)
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Table 8 – Multivariate Analysis 
Cross-border Deals (Marginal Effects) 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is the probability of completing a transaction. The independent 
variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
 
 
 
Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 Model 47 Model 48
-0.0006 -0.0006 0.0021 0.0022 0.0010 0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 0.0010
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
0.0002 0.000029 -0.0098** -0.0071 -0.0102** -0.00021 -0.0021 -0.0026 -0.0016
0.0022 (0.0022) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0023)
0.0317 -0.0259 0.2042 0.0759 0.1890 -0.0153 0.0043 0.0979* -0.0071
(0.0561) (0.0563) (0.1374) (0.1298) (0.1289) (0.0267) (0.1161) (0.0568) (0.0823)
-0.1451*** -0.1448*** -0.1335 -0.1232 0.0048 -0.0183** -0.0599 -0.1105* -0.1205**
(0.0469) (0.0462) (0.0967) (0.0992) (0.1053) (0.0087) (0.0503) (0.0590) (0.0520)
-0.2796*** -0.2749*** -0.4546*** -0.5258*** -0.5008*** -0.0357*** -0.2227*** -0.2293*** -0.2408***
(0.0753) (0.0717) (0.1156) (0.0950) (0.0819) (0.0130) (0.0595) (0.0691) (0.0735)
0.3000*** 0.2977*** - - - 0.0303 0.1849** 0.1887** 0.1987***
(0.0723) (0.0697) - - - (0.0109) (0.0745) (0.0749) (0.0720)
0.0264 0.0384 0.0170 -0.0035 -0.0342 -0.0030 0.0042
(0.0410) (0.1027) (0.1031) (0.0094) (0.0490) (0.0798) (0.0487)
0.0349 0.1590
(0.0335) (0.0975)
0.0083
(0.0416)
-0.0020 -0.0435
(0.0243) (0.0276)
0.0105
(0.0085)
-0.0209
(0.0518)
0.0341
(0.0792)
-0.0125
(0.0493)
-0.0068 -0.0240
(0.0267) (0.0322)
-0.0301 0.0154 0.0050
(0.0267) (0.0334) (0.0080)
-0.0064
(0.0059)
-0.0157
(0.0228)
-(0.0030)
(0.0798)
-0.5312
(0.3508)
No. of observations 235           235           78             80             85             145           182           116           137           
p-value for F-statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0016 0.0023 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Pseudo R-squared 55.11% 55.35% 27.15% 26.09% 34.70% 37.82% 31.40% 39.94% 38.80%
Target Market-to-Book (-)
Log Acquirer EBITDA (+)
Log Acquirer Net Income (+)
Acquirer Market-to-Book (+)
Acquirer vs Industry (+)
Market-to-Book
Target vs Industry (-)
Market-to-Book
Multiple Bids Dummy (-)
Gearing (-)
Target Termination Fee (+)
Premium (+)
Residual
Hostile Dummy (-)
Target vs Sector Return (-)
Log Target Total Assets (-)
Log Target Sales (-)
Target Gearing (-)
Same Macro (+)
Same SIC (+)
Log Target EBITDA (-)
Log Target Net Income (-)
Cash Dummy (+)
Acquirer vs Sector Return (-)
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Table 9 – Multivariate Analysis 
Sample Selection Check (Marginal Effects) 
 
The table presents marginal effects obtained from a probit model, where the 
dependent variable is the probability of completing a transaction. The independent 
variables are described in more detail in Table 3. 
 
  
Model 49
-0.0054
(0.0663)
0.1427*
(0.0761)
0.1224**
(0.0607)
-0.0236**
(0.0110)
0.0032***
(0.0011)
0.0131***
(0.0014)
-0.0090***
(0.0009)
-1.29e-08
(5.15e-08)
3.78e-08**
(1.82e-08)
-0.0024
(0.0009)
0.0057***
(0.0007)
(0.0017)
(0.0017)
No. of observations 3,123                       
p-value for Ch2 0.0000
Log Likelihood -4,552.892
LR test of indep. Equations 0.1566                     
Premium
Selected
Public Acquirer Dummy
Multiple Bids Dummy 
Cash Dummy 
Log Target Sales
Target Total Assets
Acquirer Total Assets
Completed
Cross-border
Hostile Dummy
Multiple Bids Dummy 
Cash Dummy 
Hostile Dummy
